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Abstract 
Despite its enormous popularity, Russell’s theory of definite descriptions has received 
various criticisms. Two of the most important objections against this theory are those 
arising from the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan’s 
Distinction. According to the former although a speaker may say something true by 
assertively uttering a sentence containing an incomplete description , on the Russellian 
analysis such a sentence expresses a false proposition; so, Russell’s theory cannot 
adequately deal with such sentences. According to the latter objection a descriptive 
sentence is actually ambiguous—it expresses a general proposition when the description 
contained in it is used attributively, and a singular proposition when the description in 
question is used referentially; Russell’s theory is inadequate as it fails to capture this 
ambiguity and offers an analysis according to which a descriptive sentence expresses only 
a general proposition. These objections are examined in the present dissertation. It is 
shown here that these objections arise from: (i) ignoring the distinction between the 
meaning of a sentence and the assertions made by using it, (ii) the failure to distinguish 
between the semantic meaning of a sentence and the pragmatic meaning with which it is 
used on a particular occasion. To make the distinction mentioned in (i), a significant part 
of Scott Soames’ theory concerning meaning and assertions has been adopted in this 
dissertation; and, to make the distinction mentioned in (ii), a test, namely the cancellability 
test, and two Distinguishing Criteria, namely DC-1 and DC-2, have been developed here. 
It has been argued here that if we properly make the relevant distinctions, then we will find 
that: (a) the phenomenon cited by the Argument from Incompleteness can be well explained 
keeping the Russellian analysis of descriptive sentences intact, (b) the phenomenon arising 
from the Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction raises an issue of pragmatics and is 
irrelevant to Russell’s semantic analysis of descriptive sentences. So, none of the above 
criticisms poses a genuine threat to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions; his theory 
actually provides, to a large extent, a correct semantic analysis of descriptive sentences. 
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Concise List of Sentences Used in Examples 
(1) The present queen of England is a scholar 
(2) The present king of France is bald. 
(2a) The present king of France is not bald. 
(2b) The king of France in 1905 is bald. 
(3) The round square is a round square. 
(4) The existent round square is an existent round square. 
(5) Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep. 
(6) The round square does not exist 
(7) George IV wishes to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley. 
(8) Scott is the author of Waverley. 
(9) George IV wishes to know whether Scott is Scott. 
(10) The word “Cicero” begins with the third letter of English alphabet. 
(11) Cicero is identical with Tully.   
(12) The word “Tully” begins with the third letter of English alphabet. 
(13) The teacher of Alexander is Aristotle. 
(13a) The teacher of Alexander is such that it is true of him that he is Aristotle. 
(14) The author of Principia Mathematica is such that it is true of him that he is 
Bertrand Russell. 
(14a) The author of Principia Mathematica is Bertrand Russell. 
(15) It is true of the author of Waverley that George IV wishes to know whether 
Scott is him. 
(16) It is true of Scott that George IV wishes to know whether Scott is him. 
(17)   (  )   
(18)    (  )   
(19) The father of Charles II was executed. 
(19a) Exactly one person begat Charles II, and whoever begat Charles II was 
executed. 
(19b) (  ) (                    (  )(                       ))  
             )  
(20) The father of Charles II was not executed. 
viii 
 
(20a) Exactly one person begat Charles II, and whoever begat Charles II was not 
executed. 
(20b) (  ) (                   (  )(                      ))  
                   
(20c) It is not the case that exactly one person begat Charles II, and whoever begat 
Charles II was executed. 
(20d)  (  ) (                   (  )(                      ))  
               
(21) The present president of the United States is an African-American male 
person. 
(22) I believe that the tallest spy is a spy. 
(22a) It is true of the tallest spy that I believe him to be a spy. 
(23) Aristotle was fond of dogs. 
(23a) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs. 
(24) The murderer of President John F. Kennedy was killed by Jack Ruby 
(25) The table is covered with books. 
(25a) The table near the window of this room is covered with books. 
(25b) [the x: x is a table & x is over there] x is covered with books. 
(25c) [the x: x is a table & x is owned by me] x is covered with books. 
(25d) [the x: x is a table & x was bought last month by me] x is covered with 
books. 
(25e) [the x: x is a table] x is covered with book. 
(26) The king of France is wise. 
(27) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
(27a) [the x: x murdered Smith] x is insane. 
(27b) [the x: x murdered Smith & x = Jones] x is insane 
(27c) Jones is insane. 
(27d) [the x: x murdered Smith] x = Jones. 
(28) The student whom I do not know has sent me a mail. 
(29) The thief has stolen my dictionary. 
(30) The cat is hungry. 
ix 
 
(31) All students are attending Professor Kripke’s lecture today. 
(32) Everyone likes her. 
(33) The Russian has voted for the Russian. 
(33a) The Russian judge of today’s match has voted for the Russian boxer of  
today’s match. 
(33b) [the x: x is a Russian] x voted for the Russian. 
(33c) [the x: x is a Russian & x is a judge of today’s match here] {[the y: ((y is a 
Russian & y is a boxer of today’s match here) & (y ≠ x))] (x voted for y)} 
(34) The librarian is very busy today. 
(35) The man in a red vest is a fool. 
(36) The murderer is insane. 
(36a) [the x: x is a murderer] x is insane. 
(36b) [the x: x is a murderer of v] x is insane. 
(36c) [the x: x is a murderer & x = m] m is insane. 
(36d) m is insane. 
(36e) [the x: x is a murderer of v & x = m] x is insane 
(37) The cook is more experienced than the cook who prepared the main course. 
(38) “Hesperus” referred to a heavenly bodyi and “Phosphorus” referred to iti. 
(39) Her husband is kind to her. 
(40) A man came to the office today. He tried to sell me an encyclopedia. 
(40a) A man came to the office today. The man tried to sell me an encyclopedia. 
(40b) A man came to the office today. The man who came to the office today tried 
to sell me an encyclopedia. 
(41) A man came to the office today. A man tried to sell me an encyclopedia. 
(42) A said that a man came to the office today. A also said that he (the man) tried 
to sell her an encyclopedia. 
(42a) B asserted that A said that a man came to the office today. B also asserted 
that A said that he (the man) tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
(43) There is some man such that B asserted (of that man) that A said that he tried 
to sell her an encyclopedia. 
(43a) B asserted that A said that you tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
x 
 
(44) Ralph believes that Otrcutt is a spy. 
(44a) Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes him to be a spy. 
(45) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy. 
(45a) The shortest spy is such that Ralph believes him to be a spy. 
(46) Ralph believes that Smith’s murderer is insane. 
(47) She ate rice and fish in her lunch yesterday. 
(47a) She ate both, rice and fish, in her lunch yesterday. 
(47b) She ate rice in her lunch yesterday. 
(47c) She ate fish in her lunch yesterday. 
(48) I met Tendulkar. [A sentence] 
(48a) I met Tendulkar. [The semantic content of (48)] 
(48b) I met the genius cricketer Tendulkar.  
(49) The man is talking with another man. 
(49a) [the x: x is a man] x is talking with another man. 
(49b) [the x: x is a man & x is sitting on the seat numbered 30 in the room SS 1252 
of the University of Calgary at 11 a.m. of 14
th
 September] x is talking with 
another man. 
(50) The dinner party was nice. 
(50a) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held last night in River Cafe) & Jones 
and Black, among others, attended in x] x was nice. 
(50b) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held on the night of 14
th
 of September 
2012 in River Cafe) & Jones and Black, among others, attended in x] x was 
nice. 
(50c) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held last Friday night in River Cafe) & 
Jones and Black, among others, attended in x] x was nice. 
(51) Every student must attend tomorrow’s seminar. 
(51a) [Every x: x is a student] x must attend tomorrow’s seminar. 
(51b) [Every x: x is a student & x takes the course PHIL 501 taught by Mr. Y] x 
must attend the seminar to be held tomorrow in the room SS 1252 of the 
University of Calgary. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions: the Theory and Its Use 
Normally, descriptive sentences of the form ―The F is G‖ are taken as meaningful and are 
supposed to have truth-values. For example, the sentence: 
(1) The present queen of England is a scholar 
is a meaningful sentence; a competent user of English is expected to understand it. This 
sentence is supposed to have a truth-value: if the unique object designated by the subject 
term has the property that is attributed to it by the predicate term, then the sentence is 
true; and if the unique object designated by the subject term lacks the property that is 
attributed to it, then the sentence is false. It is also supposed that in a case of a true or a 
false sentence of this sort there must be a particular object designated by its subject term 
to which a property is attributed (or denied of) by the predicate term of the sentence in 
question—if there were no such object, then there would be nothing to have or lack a 
property. There seems nothing problematic with this idea when we deal with a descriptive 
sentence whose description is satisfied by a unique object. But we face a problem with 
this idea when we deal with descriptive sentences that contain empty descriptions
1
, e.g. 
―the present king of France‖, ―the golden mountain‖, ―the round square‖, etc. For 
example, consider the following sentence: 
(2) The present king of France is bald. 
Since there is no king of France now, it seems that the definite description ―the present 
king of France‖ does not designate anything (which could have or lack the property of being 
bald). If this is so, then how can the sentence (2) be either true or false? To address this 
problem, Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, introduces the idea of subsistence. 
Subsistence, according to Meinong, is a special mode of being which belongs to objects that 
do not exist but about which something can be thought (―an object that exists ―in my thought 
of it‖ [―in meiner Vorstellung‖]‖2) and to whom references can be made. Meinong says: 
                                               
1 A description is an empty description if nothing satisfies that description. 
2 Alexius Meinong, Über Annahmen, (Leipzig: Barth, 1910), ed. & trans. James Heanue as On Assumption 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983; henceforth referred to as Meinong 
(1910/1983)), p. 49. 
2 
―That A exists,‖ or again, ―that it does not exist‖ is something that ―subsists‖ 
if the judgment made immediately apprehending it might have been 
correctly made; but it does not exist once over, as it were. And needless 
to say, much the same thing would have to be asserted of any objective 
that had subsistents as its own material: ―that 3 is greater than 2‖, or again, 
―that crooked is not straight‖—this likewise can subsist, but not exist.3 
So, it seems that for Meinong although an empty description, such as ―the present king of 
France‖, does not refer to an existent object, it refers to a subsistent object. 
 Meinong‘s account seems to be based on two claims—(i) every object of thought 
has some sort of being, and (ii) every sentence of the form ―The F is [an] F‖ expresses a 
true proposition. For example, consider the following sentence: 
(3) The round square is a round square. 
Now, according to Meinongian account, although there is no round square, the object 
designated by the definite description ―the round square‖ has some sort of being (the 
object designated by ―the round square‖ does subsist); and the sentence is true as it has 
the form ―The F is [an] F‖. Bertrand Russell disagrees with both of these claims, 
although like Meinong he believes that sentences containing empty descriptions are 
meaningful and have truth-values of their own. Against Meinong‘s first claim, Russell 
says that Meinong‘s concept of non-existent but subsistent objects is a highly implausible 
concept which is not supported by the sciences. He emphasizes that there is only one 
world—the real world—that is studied by various sciences. And logic is not something 
totally different from other sciences in that it studies the same world studied by other 
sciences.
4
 So, there is no reason to think that in logic the so-called subsistence of non-
existent objects are admitted. Against Meinong‘s second claim, Russell objects that 
Meinong‘s position involves a violation of the law of contradiction. He argues that if 
Meinong is correct in claiming that every sentence of the form ―The F is [an] F‖ is true, 
then the following sentence is true: 
(4) The existent round square is an existent round square. 
                                               
3 Ibid., p. 51. 
4
 Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1919), 
p. 169. 
3 
And, if the sentence (4) is true, then something round and square exists. But anything 
round and square is impossible, and hence, does not exist.
5
 In this way Meinong‘s 
position leads us to a violation of the law of contradiction. Russell anticipates that in 
response to this criticism Meinong may claim that the law of contradiction is applicable 
to actual and possible objects but not to impossible objects.
6
 But this reply, according to 
Russell, won‘t work because ―it is of propositions, not of subjects, that the law of 
contradiction is asserted‖7; and there is no good reason for assuming that the law of 
contradiction does not hold in cases of sentences that involve impossible objects if there 
were any such object.
8
 Meinong, in reply to Russell‘s criticism, claims that the existent 
round square is existent but does not exist. But, according to Russell, this reply does not 
make sense. He says: 
I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being 
existent; and beyond this I have no more to say on this head.
9
 
At any rate, according to Russell, Meinong‘s position deserves to be rejected on the 
ground that it involves a violation of the law of contradiction. 
 Gottlob Frege offers an alternative to Meinong‘s position. He distinguishes 
between the sense and the reference of a name. By the sense of a name Frege means the 
mode of presentation of its reference
10
; and by the reference of a name he means the 
object the name designates or applies to.
11
 For example, the sense of the name ―Hesperus‖ 
may be the brightest celestial object regularly seen in the eastern horizon after the sunset; 
                                               
5 Ibid., p. 534. 
6 Bertrand Russell, review of Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, by Von A. 
Meinong, Mind 16, no. 63 (1907), p. 439. 
7 Ibid., p. 439. 
8 Actually Russell does not admit the possibility of impossible objects. In his review of Meinong‘s Über die 
Stellung he clearly states that he does not see any reason to admit that there are impossible objects. (See: 
Russell (1907), p. 439.). 
9 Russell (1907), p. 439. 
10 Frege says that sense is the manner in which a reference is presented. (Gottlob Frege, ―Über Sinn and 
Bedeutung‖  Zeitschrft fur Philosophie. und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1892), pp. 25-50.; trans. and 
reprinted with the title ―On Sense and Reference‖ in The Philosophical Review 57, no. 3 (1948), pp. 209-
230. (Henceforth referred to as: Frege (1892/1948)), Frege (1892/1948), p. 210. 
11 Frege (1892/1948), p. 214. 
4 
and the reference of that name is the planet Venus. In Frege‘s account descriptions like 
―the present king of France‖, ―the heavenly body which has the greatest distance from the 
earth‖, etc., are treated as names. Now, according to Frege it is not the case that every 
name (or every description) which has a sense must have a reference; there are names 
which have senses but do not have references at all. Frege gives the example that the 
description ―the heavenly body which has the greatest distance from the earth‖ has a sense 
but does not have a reference. According to Frege it is the sense of a term that makes the 
term meaningful. So, a description which has a sense is meaningful even if it does not 
have a reference; and a sentence containing such a description (meaningful but without 
reference) may be meaningful. Frege holds the view that sentences containing empty 
names (empty descriptions) lack references although they may be meaningful. He says: 
Is it possible that a sentence as a whole has only a sense, but no referent? 
At any rate, one might expect that such sentences occur, just as there are 
parts of sentences having sense but no referent. And sentences which 
contain names without referents will be of this kind.
12
 
Frege‘s example of a sentence that, as a whole, has a meaning but does not have a 
reference is the following: 
(5) Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep. 
According to Frege (5) has a sense, but ―Odysseus‖ does not have a reference, and 
consequently, the whole sentence does not have a reference either.
13
 Sentences of this 
sort, i.e. sentences containing names that are devoid of references, are, according to 
Frege, neither true nor false; the question of truth-value does not arise for this sort of 
sentences.
14Since in Frege‘s account descriptions are names, what is said above about 
                                               
12 Ibid., p. 215. 
13 Frege holds the view that the reference of a complex expression is a function of its constituents. So, 
references of constituents of a complex expression yield the reference of the complex. Thus, a sentence 
which has a constituent that is devoid of any reference does not, as a whole, have a reference. This view is 
called the compositionality principle for reference. (See: Kenneth Taylor, Truth and Meaning: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, (Oxford, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), pp. 11-
12; and Michael Morris, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 25-26, 36-40. 
14
 Frege (1892/1948), pp. 215-16; and Gottlob Frege ―Comments on Sense and Meaning‖ (1892-95), trans. 
P. Long and R. White, Posthumous Writings, eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach (Oxford: 
5 
names is true of descriptions too. That is, for Frege, a sentence containing an empty 
description, e.g. the sentence (2), may be meaningful, but does not have a truth-value. 
So, we see, Frege accounts for the meaningfulness of sentences containing empty 
descriptions at the cost of their truth-values. Russell disagrees with Frege‘s view because, 
he believes, sentences containing empty descriptions, e.g. ―The present king of France is 
bald‖, ―The round square is round and square‖, etc., not only do have meanings but also 
are either true or false. So, Russell rejects Frege‘s theory on the ground that Frege‘s 
theory cannot account for the truth-values of sentences containing empty descriptions. 
After rejecting Meinong and Frege‘s proposals Russell is faced with the problems 
of how a meaningful sentence containing an empty description, e.g. the sentence (2), 
expresses a proposition that is either true or false; and how a true negative existential 
sentence like: 
(6) The round square does not exist 
can be asserted without committing a self-contradiction. The first problem concerns a 
puzzle which is described as the puzzle about the law of excluded middle in the context of 
empty descriptions, and the second problem concerns another puzzle which is described 
as the puzzle about self-contradiction in the context of true negative existential sentences. 
Russell describes the puzzle about the law of excluded middle in the context of empty 
descriptions in the following way: 
By the law of the excluded middle, either ―A is B‖ or ―A is not B‖ must be 
true. Hence either ―the present King of France is bald‖ or ―the present King 
of France is not bald‖ must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that are 
bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not find the present 
King of France in either list. Hegelians, who love a synthesis, will probably 
conclude that he wears a wig.
15
 
                                                                                                                                            
Blackwell, 1979; henceforth referred to as Frege (1892-95/1979)), p. 122.; Frege thinks that this sort of 
sentences, i.e. sentences that are devoid of reference, and consequently are neither true nor false, should be 
eliminated from sciences, logic and mathematics as those disciplines are interested in what is true. (See: 
Frege (1892/1948), pp. 222-23., and Frege (1892-95/1979), p. 122.) 
15 Bertrand Russell, ―On Denoting‖, Mind 14, no. 56 (1905), p. 485. 
6 
The way Russell puts the law of excluded middle can be expressed in the following way: 
LEM: For any sentence , either  or the denial of , i.e. , is true. 
Normally, there is no problem with this law. But we face a trouble with this law when we 
deal with sentences containing empty descriptions. For example, consider again the 
sentence (2): 
(2) The present king of France is bald. 
The denial of (2) is: 
(2a) The present king of France is not bald. 
Now, according to LEM either the sentence (2) or the sentence (2a) is true. But the 
problem is that there is no king of France now to whom the property of being bald or the 
property of being not bald can be attributed. So, it seems that neither the sentence (2) nor 
the sentence (2a) is true. Here, then, we observe a counterexample to LEM. So, it seems 
that the law of excluded middle is false. But Russell believes that the law of excluded 
middle is a true law of logic. So, for Russell, empty descriptions pose a puzzle about the 
truth of the law of excluded middle. 
 Russell, then, describes the puzzle about self-contradiction in the context of true 
negative existential sentences in the following way: 
Consider the proposition ―A differs from B.‖ If this is true, there is a 
difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form ―the 
difference between A and B subsists.‖ But if it is false that A differs from B, 
then there is no difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed 
in the form ―the difference between A and B does not subsist.‖ But how can 
a non-entity be the subject of a proposition? `...  it would appear, it must 
always be self-contradictory to deny the being of anything ...
16
 
The problem Russell indicates here is this: in a case of a true subject-predicate form of 
sentence the object designated by the subject term has the property which is attributed to 
it by the predicate term of the sentence. So, it seems that in a case of a true sentence of 
this sort there must exist an object (designated by the subject term of the sentence in 
                                               
16 Ibid., p. 485. 
7 
question) to have the property attributed to it by the predicate term of the sentence. But if 
the property in question is the property of non-existence, then the relevant sentence 
appears to be self-contradictory as in that case the existence of the object designated by 
the subject term is first admitted and then denied in the same sentence. That is why 
Russell says that it appears to be always self-contradictory to deny the being of 
anything.
17
 Yet, we actually can do this, i.e. we can make true negative existential 
sentences like ―The round square does not exist‖, ―The present king of France does not 
exist‖, etc., without committing any self-contradiction. There is, thus, a puzzle about how 
we can make true negative existential sentences without committing self-contradiction. 
 Besides the above described two puzzles, Russell chooses to deal with another 
puzzle. He describes this puzzle in the following way: 
If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and 
either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering 
the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know 
whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author 
of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott for the author of `Waverley', 
and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. 
Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first 
gentleman of Europe.
18 
The argument that represents the puzzle in the above paragraph can be expressed in the 
following way: 
(7) George IV wishes to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley. 
(8) Scott is the author of Waverley. 
(9) Therefore, George IV wishes to know whether Scott is Scott. 
Now, this puzzle concerning George IV‘s curiosity can be interpreted in two ways. In its 
first interpretation, this is a puzzle about the law of substitution of terms. According to 
this interpretation, the following law, i.e. the law of substitution of terms, is true: 
                                               
17
 Ibid., p. 485. 
18 Ibid., p. 485. 
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For any term   and  , if ┌= ┐is true, and a sentence S contains an 
occurrence of , and the sentence S* is obtained by replacing that 
occurrence of  with , then S and S* have the same truth-value. 
Now, we see, in the above argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity the first premise, 
i.e. (7), is assumed to be true; and the second premise, i.e. (8), is true because Scott really 
is the author of Waverley. The conclusion, i.e. (9), is derivable from (7) and (8) by the law 
of substitution of terms which (in this interpretation of the puzzle) is taken as a true law 
of logic. Now, since the premises of the above argument are true, its conclusion must be 
true if the law of substitution of terms is a true law of logic. But the conclusion of the above 
argument, according to Russell, actually is not true because, as he mentions, it is not the 
case that George IV is wondering whether Scott is Scott; rather, what George IV wishes 
to know is whether Scott is the person who wrote Waverley.
19
 Thus, it seems that the law 
of substitution of terms is false. But, as we have seen, the law of substitution of terms is 
taken as a true law of logic (in this interpretation). Hence, there is a puzzle about this law. 
 But the above interpretation of the puzzle is not satisfactory because the law of 
substitution of terms—which is taken as a true law of logic in the above interpretation of 
the puzzle—is itself a problematic law. To see why it has been claimed that the law of 
substitution of terms is a problematic law, consider the following argument: 
(10) The word ―Cicero‖ begins with the third letter of English alphabet   [S] 
(11) Cicero is identical with Tully   [Cicero = Tully] 
(12) Therefore, the word ―Tully‖ begins with the third letter of English 
alphabet   [S*] 
Here, the first premise, i.e. (10), is true because the word ―Cicero‖ really begins with the 
third letter of English alphabet. The second premise, i.e. (11), is true because ―Cicero‖ 
and ―Tully‖ are two names of the one and the same person. The conclusion, i.e. (12), is 
derivable from the premises (10) and (11) by the law of substitution of terms. But the 
conclusion is false since the word ―Tully‖ does not begin with the third letter of English 
alphabet. That is, here we observe: ―Cicero = Tully‖ is true, and S contains an occurrence 
                                               
19 Ibid., p. 489. 
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of ―Cicero‖, and S* is obtained by replacing that occurrence of ―Cicero‖ with ―Tully‖, 
but S and S* do not have the same truth-value; S is true, but S* is false. Thus, here we 
have a counterexample to the law of substitution of terms. So, the law of substitution of 
terms is false. Now, since the law of substitution of terms is false, there is nothing to be 
puzzled if the argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity violates the law of substitution 
of terms. So, it seems that the puzzle Russell is concerned with is not a puzzle about the 
law of substitution of terms. Hence, the above interpretation is not the correct 
interpretation of the puzzle Russell is concerned with. 
There is, however, a different interpretation of the puzzle concerning George IV‘s 
curiosity. Under this interpretation this puzzle is not a puzzle about the controversial law 
of substitution of terms but a puzzle about the uncontroversial law of identity. The law of 
identity is distinct from the law of substitution of terms—the law of substitution of terms 
is a law about language but the law of identity is a law about objects. According to the 
law of identity: 
For anything x and y, if x = y, then whatever is true of x is true of y, and 
vice-versa. 
Besides, this second interpretation of the puzzle takes two laws, namely the law of 
exportation and the law of importation, as true laws. Since these laws play a central role 
in the second interpretation of the puzzle, an illumination on them is required. Take, for 
example, the following sentence: 
(13) The teacher of Alexander is Aristotle. 
Now, it seems that if (13) is true, the following is also true: concerning the teacher of 
Alexander, it is true of him that he is Aristotle. If that is the case, then from the sentence 
(13) the following sentence, i.e. (13a), can validly be inferred: 
(13a) The teacher of Alexander is such that it is true of him that he is 
Aristotle. 
In (13a) the phrase ―the teacher of Alexander‖ has been exported from the clause 
succeeding the phrase ―it is true of him that‖. The law that allows to infer (13a) from (13) 
is called the law of exportation. Again, consider the following sentence: 
10 
(14) The author of Principia Mathematica is such that it is true of him 
that he is Bertrand Russell. 
Now, if (14) is true, then it seems that the following is also true: concerning the author of 
Principia Mathematica, it is true of him that he is Bertrand Russell. If that is the case, 
then from (14) the following sentence, i.e. (14a), can validly be inferred: 
(14a) The author of Principia Mathematica is Bertrand Russell. 
Here, (14a) is inferred from (14) by importing ―the author of Principia Mathematica‖ 
into the clause succeeding the phrase ―it is true of him that‖. The law that allows to infer 
(14a) from (14) is called the law of importation. 
Now, the second interpretation of the puzzle runs in this way: by the exportation 
of ―the author of Waverley‖ from the context of propositional attitude:  
From 
(7) George IV wishes to know whether Scott is the author of 
Waverley 
we find 
(15) It is true of the author of Waverley that George IV wishes to 
know whether Scott is him. 
The sentence (8) expresses an identity relation between Scott and the author of Waverley, 
i.e. Scott = the author of Waverley. Now, according to the law of identity, whatever is 
true of Scott is true of the author of Waverley. The sentence (15) expresses that it is true 
of the author of Waverley that George IV wishes to know whether Scott is him. So, if 
(15) is true, and if Scott = the author of Waverley, i.e. if (8) is true, then by the law of 
identity, we find: 
(16) It is true of Scott that George IV wishes to know whether Scott is him. 
Now, by the importation of ―Scott‖ in the context of propositional attitude: from (16) we 
find: 
George IV wishes to know whether Scott is Scott 
(i.e. the sentence (9)) 
So, we see: 
(A) If (7) is true, then (15) is true.                                             [Exportation] 
(B) If (15) is true, and (8) is true, then (16) is true.             [Law of Identity] 
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(C) If (16) is true, then (9) is true.                                              [Importation] 
(D) Therefore, if (7) is true, and (8) is true, then (9) is true    [From (A)-(C)] 
That is, if (7) and (8) are true, and if the law of identity is a true law of logic, then (9) 
must be true. But as we have seen earlier, (9) is false even though (7) and (8) are true. So, 
it seems that the law of identity is not a true law of logic. But actually the law of identity 
is a true law of logic. There is, thus, a puzzle that concerns the law of identity. This 
puzzle may be called as the puzzle about the law of identity in the context of propositional 
attitudes. It should be noted here that this second interpretation of the puzzle seems to be 
a more plausible interpretation of it as this interpretation concerns the uncontroversial law 
of identity instead of the controversial law of substitution of terms. So, we take it, i.e. the 
second interpretation of the puzzle, as the correct interpretation of the puzzle in question.  
From the above discussion we see that the challenge that Russell takes is to 
provide a theory that is non-Meinongian and non-Fregean, but which (i) can account for 
the meaningfulness of sentences containing empty descriptions without postulating the 
idea of non-existent but subsistent objects (unlike Meinong), (ii) can account for the 
truth-value of propositions expressed by such sentences (unlike Frege), and (iii) has the 
capacity of successfully dealing with the above mentioned puzzles. Russell believes that 
his theory of definite descriptions is a theory that can satisfy all of these requirements. 
Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions appears in many of his papers and books. 
In his Principia Mathematica we observe what Stephen Neale calls the formal 
characterization of the theory of descriptions,
20
 and in others of Russell‘s books and 
papers we observe the informal characterization of the theory. In this chapter I will first 
describe the formal characterization of the theory of definite descriptions for, as Neale 
mentions, ―only through its formal statement can the full domain of application of the 
Theory of Descriptions be made explicit‖.21 And, then, I will describe the informal 
                                               
20 Stephen Neale, ―Descriptions‖, The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005a), pp. 192-93. and Stephen Neale, Descriptions (Massachusetts: The 
MIT press, 1990), pp. 28-33.  
21 Neale (1990), p. 28. 
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characterization of the theory which will be helpful in understanding the application of 
the theory in natural language and how Russell solves the puzzles he wishes to solve by 
this theory. 
(a) The formal characterization of the theory of definite descriptions: In *14 
of Principia Mathematica (Part I, Section B) a formal characterization of the theory of 
definite descriptions is presented. Here Russell introduces a new symbol for definite 
descriptions. This new symbol, the iota-operator     , is a variable binding device for 
forming a term from a formula. Like universal and existential quantifiers, the iota-
operator operates on open sentences. But there is an important difference between the 
iota-operator and universal and existential quantifiers: the iota-operator is a term forming 
operator whereas universal and existential quantifiers are sentence forming operators. For 
example, by prefixing universal and existential quantifiers to open sentences Fx, Rxx and Rxy 
we form expressions,                                              , etc., all 
of which are sentences. But by prefixing the iota-operator to those open sentences we form 
expressions,                       , etc., all of which are terms rather than sentences. 
A term or a sentence may contain more than one occurrence of the iota-operator. 
Let us see how we can form terms and sentences that contain more than one occurrence 
of the iota-operator: suppose G is a predicate symbol. Now, by prefixing G to the term 
        we can form the sentence         . Here,          is an open sentence since 
it has a free occurrence of the variable y. So, the iota-operator is applicable to it. Now, by 
prefixing another iota-operator, e.g.     , to the open sentence          we can form the 
expression              which is a term. So, here we have a term that contains more 
than one occurrence of the iota-operator. Again, by prefixing another predicate symbol, 
e.g. F, to the term              we can form a sentence               which contains 
more than one occurrence of the iota-operator.  
In his Principia Mathematica Russell does not provide a definition for definite 
descriptions because, according to him, a definite description is an incomplete symbol 
which does not have any meaning in isolation; it can only be defined in a certain 
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context.
22
 That is why instead of providing a stipulative or explicative definition for a 
definite description Russell provides what he calls a contextual definition for a sentence 
in which the definite description in question occurs. The method of giving a contextual 
definition used in Principia Mathematica is something like this: to define an expression 
 contextually, we provide a procedure for converting a sentence that contains one or 
more occurrences of  into an equivalent sentence which is free from any occurrence of 
. So, in order to provide a contextual definition for a definite description what we need 
is just to convert the sentence that contains the definite description in question into an 
equivalent sentence which does not contain that definite description. That is why instead 
of defining the definite description        Russell proposes to provide a contextual 
definition for a sentence, e.g.        , which contains an occurrence of that definite 
description. The sentence         which contains an occurrence of        can be 
analyzed as: 
                           
Here,                            is equivalent to        , and has no 
occurrence of the definite description       . But still the following: 
                           
cannot be counted as a general schema following which one can always give a contextual 
definition of a sentence containing a definite description. For, there may be an occurrence 
of a definite description in a sentence which has another sentence as a part of it. In that 
case there may be a sort of confusion about whether the definite description is applied to 
the larger sentence or to the smaller sentence.
23
 The sentence (the larger one or the 
smaller one) to which the definite description is applied is called the scope of the definite 
description.
24
 When the larger sentence is the scope of the relevant definite description, 
the occurrence of the definite description in question is called the primary occurrence of 
it; and when the smaller sentence is the scope of the relevant definite description, the 
                                               
22 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1910), p. 66. 
23
 Ibid., p. 153. 
24 Ibid., p. 153. 
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occurrence of the definite description in question is called the secondary occurrence of it. 
This idea of scope distinction can be understood by the following example: consider the 
sentence: 
(17)          
Now, when        has its primary occurrence in (17), the larger sentence (which includes 
the negation) is the scope of       . In that case the sentence (17) is analyzed as: 
                            
And, when        has its secondary occurrence in (17), the smaller sentence (which 
excludes the negation) is the scope of       . In that case the sentence (17) is analyzed as: 
                            
Now, according to Russell, to avoid the ambiguity concerning the scope of the relevant 
definite description, the scope of the definite description should be mentioned in the 
sentence that contains the definite description in question. So, he proposes to use left and 
right brackets, ‗[‘ and ‗]‘, to indicate the scope at the beginning of the scope followed by 
required parentheses to extend to the end of the scope.
25
 Thus, according to Russell, 
instead of writing         , we should write                    when        has 
its primary occurrence in (17); and we should write                     when        
has its secondary occurrence in (17). Now, on the basis of his idea of the scope 
distinction and his proposal to mention the scope in the sentence that contains a definite 
description, Russell proposes the following contextual definition for a sentence that 
contains an occurrence of the definite description         
*14.01                                                Df.26 
 It should be mentioned here that when a definite description occurs in a sentence 
that contains two or more smaller sentences as its parts, the relevant definite description 
may involve two or more secondary occurrences of it. For example, consider the 
following sentence: 
(18)           
                                               
25
 Ibid., p. 173. (Whitehead and Russell actually use dots instead of parenthesis.) 
26 Ibid., p. 173. 
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Now, when the definite description        has its primary occurrence in (18), the larger 
sentence           is the scope of the definite description; and following the 
Russellian technique the sentence, then, can be written as                    . And, 
in accordance of *14.01, we have the following analysis of                    : 
                                                      
And, when the smaller sentence          is the scope of the definite description, the 
definite description        has a secondary occurrence in (18); and following the 
Russellian technique the sentence, then, can be written as                      . 
Now, according to *14.01, we have the following analysis of                      : 
                                                         
Again, when the smallest sentence         is the scope of the definite description, the 
description        has another secondary occurrence in (18); and the sentence           , 
then, can be written as                        . And, according to *14.01, we have 
the following analysis of                        : 
                                                     
In this way, it is possible to form sentences that have indefinite number of secondary 
occurrences of their relevant definite descriptions. 
 It is worth noting here that                             which is the 
reading of (18) when        has its largest scope in (18) (i.e. when        has its 
primary occurrence in (18)), and                              which is the 
reading of (18) when        has its narrowest scope in (18) (i.e. when         has (one 
of) its secondary occurrence in (18)) are equivalent; they have the same truth-
conditions—both of them are false if                      , or   , or the both 
are false; and both of them are true if                       and    are true. 
So, we see, two different outputs of different occurrences of a definite description may 
have the same truth condition. This phenomenon indicates that scope distinction is not 
basically a semantic issue. Rather, the scope distinction is basically a syntactical issue—
the scope of a definite description requires to be mentioned in the relevant sentence in 
order to avoid the possible ambiguity concerning the occurrence (primary or secondary) 
of the definite description involved. 
16 
In the language of Principia Mathematica there is no predicate symbol that stands 
for ―exists‖ because, according to Russell, ―exists‖ is not something that can be attributed 
to the (grammatical) subject of a sentence. It is rather something that is always 
presupposed of (grammatical) subjects that have any property.
27
 That means that if 
       has any property whatever, it must exist.28 This view leads Russell not to provide 
a predicate symbol for ―exists‖. But, Russell observes that we can make sense of 
sentences of the form ―  does not exist‖. To make sense of such sentences Russell 
introduces the symbol    (E shriek) that occupies the position in a sentence often 
occupied by its predicate term.    may be combined with a definite description to create a 
formula with existential import: 
* 14.02                                           Df.29 
Here, we see,          has a reading which is on the one hand description-free, and on 
the other hand, free of any occurrence of   . These features allow a plausible treatment of 
true negative existential sentences. For example, consider the negative existential 
sentence ―The F does not exist‖. Suppose that this sentence is true. Now, by using    the 
sentence ―The F does not exist‖ can be expressed in the following way: 
          
In this way the introduction of    in the theory of definite descriptions helps us to make 
sense of true negative existential sentences. 
(b) The informal characterization of the theory of definite descriptions: 
Besides Principia Mathematica, Russell presents his theory of definite descriptions in his 
Problems of Philosophy, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and ―On Denoting‖. 
In these books and paper we observe an account of descriptions that imitates what I have 
called the formal characterization of the theory of definite descriptions, but is more 
related to the use of definite descriptions in ordinary English. In ordinary English 
descriptions are phrases of the forms ―a so-and-so‖ and ―the so-and-so‖. ―A man‖ is an 
                                               
27 Ibid., pp. 174-75. 
28
 Ibid., p. 174. 
29 Ibid., p. 174. 
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example of the former form of descriptions; and ―the man‖ is an example of the latter 
form of descriptions. Descriptions of the former form are called indefinite descriptions; 
and descriptions of the latter form are called definite descriptions. According to Russell 
indefinite descriptions are ambiguous in the sense that they may be satisfied by more than 
one object; but definite descriptions are unambiguous in the sense that a definite 
description can be satisfied by at most one object. That is, a definite description always 
involves uniqueness, but an indefinite description does not necessarily involve 
uniqueness. This property of uniqueness plays a central role in Russell‘s treatment of 
definite descriptions. 
 In his ―On Denoting‖ Russell offers an ingenious technique of translating 
sentences containing definite descriptions. Here, Russell treats a sentence containing a 
definite description as a conjunction of three sentences none of which involves the 
definite description in question. For example, Russell analyzes the sentence: 
(19) The father of Charles II was executed 
as the conjunction of the following three sentences: 
(i) At least one person begat Charles II. 
(ii) At most one person begat Charles II. 
(iii) Whoever begat Charles II was executed. 
Here, (i) and (ii) together confirm the uniqueness condition of the definite description 
―the father of Charles II‖; and (iii) associates the relevant predicate to the definite 
description in question. It is worth noting here that none of (i)-(iii) includes the definite 
description ―the father of Charles II‖. Now, on the basis of the above analysis, the 
sentence (19) can be translated into ordinary language in the following way:  
(19a) Exactly one person begat Charles II, and whoever begat Charles II 
was executed. 
(19a) can be translated into the language of first order symbolic logic in the following way: 
(19b)                                                      
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Here, we see, (19b) is an existential generalization of a conjunction that contains three 
conjuncts. So, (19b) is true if all of its conjuncts are true. Thus, it can be said that (19b) 
gives an account of conditions under which the sentence (19) is true. 
 The issue of the scope distinction discussed in the formal characterization of the 
theory of definite descriptions is relevant here. For example, consider the following sentence: 
(20) The father of Charles II was not executed. 
Now, when the definite description ―the father of Charles II‖ has its primary occurrence 
in (20), then (20) gets the following analysis: 
(20a) Exactly one person begat Charles II, and whoever begat Charles II 
was not executed. 
In symbols:  
(20b)                                                        
                   
Again, when the definite description ―the father of Charles II‖ has its secondary 
occurrence in (20), then (20) gets the following analysis: 
(20c) It is not the case that exactly one person begat Charles II, and 
whoever begat Charles II was executed. 
In symbol: 
(20d)                                                         
               
Here, we see, when ―Whoever begat Charles II was not executed‖ is true, both (20b) and 
(20d) are true provided that Charles II was begotten by one and only one person. Again, 
when ―Whoever begat Charles II was not executed‖ is false, both (20b) and (20d) are 
false provided that Charles II was begotten by one and only one person. These 
phenomena conform to the idea (discussed in the formal characterization of the theory of 
definite descriptions) that the scope distinction may not matter to the truth-value of a 
descriptive sentence. 
In the above analysis, we see that instead of analyzing definite descriptions 
Russell analyzes sentences containing them. In his Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy Russell notes: 
19 
The definition to be sought (of the phrase ―the so-and-so‖) is a definition 
of proposition in which this phrase occurs, not a definition of the phrase 
itself in isolation.
30
 
Again, in his ―On Denoting‖ he says: 
This is the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: the 
denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every 
proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. The 
difficulties concerning denoting are, I believe, all the result of a wrong 
analysis of propositions whose verbal expressions contain a denoting 
phrase.
31
 
And that is why Russell provides analyses of sentences containing definite descriptions 
instead of providing analyses of definite descriptions per se. This procedure is what 
Russell calls the procedure of providing contextual definitions.
32
 When a sentence 
containing a definite description is analyzed in the way Russell suggests, as we have 
already seen, the descriptive phrase ultimately disappears. For example, in the analysis of 
(19) we have seen that the descriptive phrase ―the father of Charles II‖ has disappeared 
when the sentence (19) has been analyzed in the Russellian way. That is, when a sentence 
of the form ―The F is G‖ is analyzed in the Russellian way, the descriptive phrase of the 
form ―the F‖ disappears. The following is the Russellian analysis of a sentence of the 
form ―The F is G‖: 
Exactly one thing is an F, and whoever or whatever is an F is G. 
And, as Neale mentions, where we have just a thought to the effect that the unique 
satisfier of some definite description, whoever or whatever it may be, has G, we are 
talking about a purely general sentence in which the satisfier of the definite description (if 
there is any) is not a constituent part.
33
 And, as we have seen in the above discussion, this 
is the way Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions treats sentences containing definite 
                                               
30 Russell (1919), p. 172. 
31 Russell (1905), p. 480. 
32 The procedure of providing contextual definitions has been discussed in details in the section of the 
formal characterization of the theory of definite descriptions. 
33 Neale (1990), p. 17. 
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descriptions. Hence, it can be said that a descriptive sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ 
actually expresses a general proposition.  
 Since a descriptive sentence expresses a general proposition, such a sentence 
actually does not refer to any particular object. More precisely, in a descriptive sentence 
the relevant definite description, even if it is satisfied by a unique object, does not 
actually refer to the particular object described. And, one can understand such a 
descriptive sentence without knowing who or what is denoted by the relevant definite 
description. For example, one can understand the sentence ―The candidate who has gotten 
the most votes has become the president of the United States‖ without knowing who 
actually has gotten the most votes. That means that a definite description is not actually a 
referring term which refers to a particular object. Again, since a definite description is not 
a referring term that refers to a particular object, even when it is satisfied by a unique 
object, it is not necessary that in order for a descriptive sentence to have a truth-value 
there must be an object that satisfies the definite description it contains. Here, it is worth 
noting that even when a definite description denotes a unique object, it may be the case 
that the object denoted does not enter into the specification of truth-conditions of the 
relevant descriptive sentence. For example, consider the following sentence: 
(21) The present president of the United States is an African-American male 
person. 
The sentence (21), given the way things really are, is true. And, it is tempting to say that 
it is true in virtue of the facts concerning Barak Obama. But such a temptation may 
mislead us. For example, suppose, counterfactually, it is not Barak Obama but, say, Mike 
Tyson who is the present president of the United States. Since Mike Tyson is an African-
American male person, the sentence (21) would still be true. But it is plain that there is 
now no sense in which the truth-conditions of the sentence (21) depend on how things are 
with Barak Obama as he is not (in the counterfactual circumstance) the present president 
of the United States.
34
 And, Mike Tyson does not enter into the specification of truth-
                                               
34 Of course, this is not to say that the truth of the sentence (21), in the actual world, does not depend on how 
things are with Barak Obama. It does, since he is the president of the United States in the actual world. 
What I mean to say here is that he is not a part of the truth-conditions of the sentence (21). 
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conditions of (21) either as he is not the present president of the United States in actual 
circumstances; and hence, in actual circumstances the truth of (21) do not depend on how 
things are with Mike Tyson. In short, the unique object (if there is any) denoted by a 
definite description does not enter into the specification of truth-conditions of the 
descriptive sentence of which the definite description in question is a constituent part. 
 So, from the above discussion we find: 
(D1) A descriptive sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ expresses a general 
proposition. 
(D2) A descriptive sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ may be well 
understood by a person who does not know who or what is denoted by 
the definite description of the form ―the F‖ (even if nothing satisfies 
the definite description of the form ―the F‖, and even if a person 
knows that nothing satisfies the definite description of the form ―the 
F‖, the person may well understand the sentence of the form ―The F is 
G‖). 
(D3) A descriptive sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ may have a truth-
value even when the definite description of the form ―the F‖ which is 
involved in the sentence in question does not denote anything. 
(D4) Even when the definite description of the form ―the F‖ denotes an 
object o, it may be the case that o does not enter into the specification 
of truth-conditions of the relevant sentence of the form ―The F is G‖. 
(D1)-(D4) represent the main features of Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. 
 Russell strongly believes that his theory of definite descriptions has the capability 
of solving each of the puzzles discussed earlier. To solve the puzzle about the law of 
excluded middle in the context of empty descriptions Russell appeals to his device of the 
three-clause analysis of descriptive sentences and his idea of the scope distinction. His 
solution to this puzzle runs in this way: according to the three-clause analysis of 
descriptive sentences, the sentence: 
(2) The present king of France is bald 
is equivalent to the following sentence: 
22 
Exactly one person is a king of France now, and whoever is a king of 
France now is bald. 
In symbols:                            
Now, we see,                            is an existential generalization of a 
conjunction that contains three conjuncts. Now, the first conjunct of          
                 is false since there is no king of France now. Thus,          
                  is false. Since                            is 
equivalent to (2), the sentence (2) is false. 
 Now, according to Russell‘s idea of the scope distinction, the sentence: 
(2a) The present king of France is not bald 
has two different analyses. When the definite description ―the present king of France‖ has 
its primary occurrence in (2a), the sentence (2a) gets the following analysis: 
Exactly one person is a king of France now, and whoever is a king of 
France now is not bald. 
In symbols:                             
Since the first of the conjuncts of                             is false due to 
the fact that there is no king of France now, the whole conjunction, i.e.          
                  , is false. Again, since                        
     is equivalent to (2a), the sentence (2a) is false. In short, (2a) is false when the 
definite description ―the present king of France‖ has its primary occurrence in it. But 
when the definite description ―the present king of France‖ has its secondary occurrence in 
(2a), the sentence (2a) gets the following analysis: 
It is not the case that exactly one person is a king of France now, and 
whoever is a king of France now is bald. 
In symbols:                             
Now, as we have seen earlier,                            is false. So, its 
negation, i.e.                            , is true. Since           
                  is equivalent to (2a), the sentence (2a) is true. In short, (2a) is 
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true when the definite description ―the present king of France‖ has its secondary 
occurrence in it. Russell mentions these phenomena in the following way: 
That is, ―the king of France is not bald‖ is false if the occurrence of 
―the king of France‖ is primary, and true if it is secondary. Thus all 
propositions in which ―the king of France‖ has a primary occurrence 
are false; the denial of such propositions are true, but in them ―the king 
of France‖ has a secondary occurrence.35 
Thus, we see, the sentence (2) is false, and its denial, i.e. (2a), is true when the definite 
description ―the present king of France‖ has its secondary occurrence in (2a). This 
conforms to the law of excluded middle. Hence, the puzzle about the law of excluded 
middle in the context of empty descriptions is solved. 
 Of course, it is a fact that the sentence (2a) is true when the relevant definite 
description has its primary occurrence in it. In that case both (2) and (2a) are false. But 
that is not a violation of the law of excluded middle. Indeed, (2a) is not the denial of (2) 
when the relevant definite description has its primary occurrence in the sentence (2a). So, 
the law of excluded middle is not relevant here. Actually, (2a) is counted as the denial of 
(2) only when the definite description contained in (2a) has its secondary occurrence in 
the sentence in question. The following analogue may be of some help in understanding 
this point: the denial of the sentence ―A is B‖ is not ―A is not B‖, but ―It is not the case 
that A is B‖. The logical relation between sentences ―A is B‖ and ―A is not B‖ is what 
logicians call the contrary relation, not the contradictory relation. A sentence is the 
denial of the other, if they have the contradictory, not the contrary, relation to each other. 
Similarly, (2) and (2a) have contrary, not contradictory, relation to each other when the 
relevant definite description in (2a) has its primary occurrence in (2a). Hence, (2a) is not 
the denial of (2) when the definite description in (2a) has its primary occurrence in it. 
Thus, the law of excluded middle is irrelevant in that case. It should be noted here that 
two contrary sentences may both be false, but cannot both be true. So, when (2) and (2a) 
have contrary relation to each other, i.e. when the relevant definite description has its 
                                               
35 Russell (1905), p. 490. 
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primary occurrence in (2a), there is nothing wrong if both of them are false. No logical 
law is violated and the puzzle about the law of excluded middle does not re-emerge in 
such a case. 
Now, let us see how by his theory of definite descriptions Russell solves the 
puzzle about the self-contradiction in the context of true negative existential sentences. 
Before we enter into the details of his solution it is important to note that a negative 
existential sentence may contain a proper name in its subject‘s position36, e.g. ―Socrates 
does not exist‖, or it may contain a definite description in its subject‘s position, e.g. ―The 
round square does not exist‖. We are here concerned with negative existential sentences 
that contain definite descriptions in their subjects‘ position, i.e. sentences of the form 
―The F does not exist‖. When a negative existential sentence of the form ―The F does not 
exist‖ is true, there is nothing that satisfies the definite description contained in the 
sentence in question. But that does not pose a problem for Russell‘s theory as according 
to (D2) and (D3) of his theory a sentence containing a definite description of the form 
―the F‖ can perfectly be well-understood even when nothing satisfies the definite 
description of the form ―the F‖; and such a sentence may have a truth-value of its own. 
So, there can be true, as well as false, negative existential sentences (our concern here is 
true negative existential sentences). Furthermore, according to Russell‘s theory a 
sentence containing a definite description of the form ―the F‖ expresses a general 
proposition, and hence, such a sentence actually does not refer to a particular object. (D1) 
of Russell‘s theory indicates this feature of such sentences. And, according to (D4) of his 
theory the unique object (if there is any) that satisfies a definite description of the form 
―the F‖ does not enter into the specification of truth-conditions of the sentence that 
contains the definite description in question. Now, if (D1) and (D4) are true, and Russell 
thinks them to be true, then there is no need to presuppose the existence of an object 
                                               
36 In his Principia Mathematica Russell says: ―Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be 
supposed not to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is 
not a proper name, i.e. not a name directly representing some object‖ (Russell (1910), p. 66.). That indicates 
that in Russell‘s view a sentence like ―Sherlock Holmes does not exist‖ which apparently contains a name in 
the (grammatical) subject‘s position does not actually contains a name. In short, according to Russell the 
expression ―Sherlock Holmes‖ in the sentence ―Sherlock Holmes does not exist‖ is not a name. 
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when one makes a negative existential sentence containing a definite description (in the 
sentence‘s subject‘s position) which fails to designate any existent object. In other words, 
one can make negative existential sentences taking definite descriptions like ―the present 
king of France‖, ―the golden mountain‖, ―the round square‖ and so on, in the relevant 
sentences‘ subjects‘ position without presupposing the existence of the present king of 
France, the golden mountain, the round square etc. So, the sentence ―The present king of 
France is bald‖ does not involve a presupposition of the existence of the king of France 
now. Rather, such a sentence expresses a general proposition that does not refer to any 
particular object. So, there is no self-contradiction involved in a negative existential 
sentence of the form ―The F does not exist‖ when there is no existent object that satisfies 
the definite description of the form ―the F‖. And, as we have seen earlier, such a sentence 
may express a true or a false proposition. When a sentence of the form ―The F does not 
exist‖ expresses a true proposition, we have a true negative existential sentence. So, there 
may be true negative existential sentences that do not involve any self-contradiction. 
Hence, the puzzle about the self-contradiction in the context of true negative existential 
sentences is solved. 
Besides, following *14.02 of Principia Mathematica the puzzle about the self-
contradiction in the context of true negative existential sentences can be resolved. 
According to *14.02 of Principia Mathematica, when we analyze a sentence of the form 
―The F exists‖, the expression ―exists‖ actually disappears; and no constituent 
corresponding to ―exists‖ takes place in the analysis of the sentence in question. The 
same is true of a negative existential sentence too. To have a clearer idea about this point, 
let us repeat the negative existential sentence (6): 
(6) The round square does not exist. 
Now, following *14.02 of Principia Mathematica the sentence (6) is analyzed as: 
                       
Here, we see, in                        there is no predicate symbol for 
―exists‖—the expression ―exists‖ disappears, and no constituent of          
              corresponds to ―exists‖. This happens so because in the Russellian 
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analysis existence is not treated as a predicate.
37
 That is why, instead of a three-clause 
analysis, here we observe a two-clause analysis of the sentence (6): 
It is not the case that— 
(i) At least one thing is a round square. 
(ii) At most one thing is a round square. 
In ordinary English this two-clause analysis of (6) can be expressed as: it is not the case 
that exactly one thing is a round square. But, there is no round square. So, ―Exactly one 
thing is a round square‖, i.e.                      , is false. Hence,          
              is true. That is, the sentence (6) is a true negative existential 
sentence. Here, the phenomenon that                        does not contain 
the expression ―exists‖ or any constituent that corresponds to ―exists‖ indicates that the 
sentence (6) involves no presupposition of the existence of a unique object, namely a 
unique round square. This, in turn, indicates that a true negative existential sentence like 
the sentence (6) does not involve any self-contradiction. Hence, the puzzle about the self-
contradiction in the context of true negative existential sentences is resolved. 
 Of course, one may argue that in the above discussion what has been analyzed is a 
case in which a definite description of the form ―the F‖ has its secondary occurrence in 
the sentence of the form ―The F does not exist‖; but a case in which a definite description 
of the form ―the F‖ has its primary occurrence in a sentence of the form ―The F does not 
exist‖ may lead us to the self-contradiction. She may accuse that such a case, i.e. a case in 
which a definite description of the form ―the F‖ contained in a sentence of the form ―The 
F does not exist‖ has its primary occurrence in the sentence in question, has not been 
addressed yet, and hence, the puzzle about the self-contradiction in the context of true 
                                               
37 In Principia Mathematica Russell notes: ―When, in ordinary language or in philosophy, something is said to 
―exist‖, it is always something described, i.e. it is not something immediately presented ... It would seem that 
the word ―existence‖ cannot be significantly applied to subject immediately given; i.e. not only does our 
definition give no meaning to      , but there is no reason, in philosophy, to suppose that a meaning of 
existence could be found which would be applicable to immediately given subjects.‖ (Russell (1910), pp. 174-
75.). This leads us to think that in Russell‘s theory ―exists‖ is not considered as a predicate; for a predicate is 
something that can be applied to its immediately given subject, but, as we see, according to Russell ―exists‖ 
cannot be significantly applied to immediately given subjects. 
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negative existential sentence has not yet been solved. In response to this accusation it can 
be said that in Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions existential sentences of the form 
―The F exists‖ (or ―The F does not exist‖) are characteristically different from other 
descriptive sentences of the form ―The F is G‖ (or ―The F is not G‖). A descriptive 
sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ (or ―The F is not G‖) has a predicate in its predicate‘s 
position. But, an existential sentence of the form ―The F exists‖ (or ―The F does not 
exist‖) does not have a predicate in its predicate‘s position; it has the expression ―exists‖ 
in its predicate‘s position which is not a predicate in Russell‘s analysis. This difference, 
in turn, causes another difference between them: a definite description of the form ―the 
F‖ has only one sort of occurrence in a negative existential sentence of the form ―The F 
does not exist‖. This occurrence is similar to what Russell calls a secondary occurrence 
of a definite description. But, in any other negative sentence of the form ―The F is not G‖ 
the definite description of the form ―the F‖ has a primary as well as one or more 
secondary occurrences of it in the sentence in question. Hence, the question of 
considering the primary occurrence of a definite description in a negative existential 
sentence of the form ―The F does not exist‖ does not arise. 
 There are, however, many philosophers and logicians who treat ―exists‖ as a 
predicate. If ―exists‖ is treated as a predicate, then the sentence (6) can be analyzed as 
                                  when the relevant definite description has 
its primary occurrence in (6); and when the relevant definite description has its secondary 
occurrence in (6), the sentence (6) can be analyzed as      [(               )  
        ] 38 Now, since there is no round square,                         is 
false. Hence,                                   is false. That is, the sentence 
(6) is false when the definite description involved in (6) has its primary occurrence in (6). 
Of course, it may seem odd to claim that the sentence (6) is false. This seeming oddity 
actually is caused by the misguidance of the grammatical structure of the sentence (6). 
But once we begin to consider the logical structure of (6) instead of its superficial 
                                               
38 If we treat ―exists‖ as a predicate, then a description of the form ―the F‖ will have both a primary and a 
secondary occurrence in the sentence of the form ―The F does not exist‖. 
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grammatical structure, we realize that the sentence in question is not about an actual 
object; it, rather, is a sentence involving quantifiers. More precisely, the sentence (6) is a 
general sentence involving quantifiers which does not presuppose the actual existence of 
a round square. Thus, the seeming oddity vanishes; and the puzzle does not re-emerge. 
 Again, as we have seen earlier, the sentence (6) can be analyzed as           
                        when the relevant definite description has its secondary 
occurrence in (6), and when ―exists‖ is treated as a predicate. Now, since there is no 
round square,                         is false, and consequently,          
                        is also false. So,                         
          is true. Thus, here, again, we have a true negative existential sentence that does 
not involve any self-contradiction. That shows that even if existence is treated as a 
predicate, still the puzzle about the self-contradiction in the context of true negative 
existential sentences can be solved by Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. 
 To solve the puzzle concerning George IV‘s curiosity when it is taken as a puzzle 
about the law of substitution of terms one may appeal to Russell‘s idea of definite 
descriptions as non-referring terms and his three-clause analysis of descriptive sentences. 
In Russell‘s theory a definite description like ―the author of Waverley‖ is not a proper 
name; it, rather, is a general term that does not refer to any particular object. Were it a 
proper name, it could be replaced by a co-referring term without changing the proposition 
expressed by the sentence that contains the definite description in question. For example, 
―Scott‖ is a proper name which refers to a particular person Scott; and ―Walter‖ is 
another proper name which refers to the same particular person Scott. Now, since ―Scott‖ 
and ―Walter‖ are proper names that co-refer to the same particular person, one may 
substitute ―Walter‖ with ―Scott‖ in a sentence without changing the proposition 
expressed by that sentence.
39
 But, things are different when we deal with a definite 
description like ―the author of Waverley‖. Since the definite description ―the author of 
Waverley‖ does not refer to any particular object, there cannot be any term that co-refers 
with it. Thus, the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ cannot be substituted with 
another so-called co-referring term like ―Scott‖. That means that we cannot legitimately 
                                               
39 Russell (1919), p. 174. 
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form a sentence like ―Scott is Scott‖ by substituting the definite description ―the author of 
Waverley‖ with the term ―Scott‖ in the sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖. 
 To show that the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ cannot be 
substituted with the term ―Scott‖ in the sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ one 
may appeal to Russell‘s three-clause analysis of sentences containing definite 
descriptions. According to this analysis the sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ 
can be expressed in its logical form in the following way: 
Exactly one person wrote Waverley, and whoever wrote Waverley is 
Scott. 
In symbols:                                          
               
Thus, the whole argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity can be expressed 
symbolically in the following way: 
                                    (                
                        )            
                                                  
        
                                             
Now, we see, the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ with which one could 
wish to substitute the term ―Scott‖ actually disappears. Hence, there remains no 
legitimate way of replacing the term ―the author of Waverley‖ with the term ―Scott‖ to 
deduce the concluding sentence ―George IV wishes to know whether Scott = Scott‖. The 
following words from Russell‘s ―On Denoting‖ seem to support this analysis: 
The puzzle about George IV‘s curiosity is now seen to have a very 
simple solution. The proposition ―Scott was the author of Waverley‖ 
which was written out in its unabbreviated form (in the preceding 
paragraph), does not contain any constituent ―the author of Waverley‖ for 
which we could substitute ―Scott‖.40 
                                               
40 Russell (1905), pp. 488-89. 
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Hence, the above argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity is invalid, and the puzzle 
seems to be solved when it is taken as a puzzle about the law of substitution of terms. 
But, as we have argued earlier, the puzzle Russell describes may not be a puzzle about 
the controversial law of substitution of terms but a puzzle about the uncontroversial law 
of identity. So, it is important to focus on how Russell‘s theory contributes in solving the 
puzzle when it is taken as a puzzle about the law of identity in the context of 
propositional attitudes. 
 To solve the puzzle when it is taken as a puzzle about the law of identity in the 
context of propositional attitudes one needs to focus on the premise (A) of the 
reformulated argument: 
(A) If (7) is true, then (15) is true; where, 
(7) George IV wishes to know whether Scott is the author of 
Waverley; 
(15) It is true of the author of Waverley that George IV wishes to 
know whether Scott is him. 
In (A), the consequent is inferred from its antecedent by the law of exportation. But the 
law of exportation actually does not work when it is used in the context of propositional 
attitudes. Or, we may say, the law of exportation is false in the context of propositional 
attitudes. The following example proves that the law of exportation is false in the context 
of propositional attitudes. Consider the sentence: 
(22) I believe that the tallest spy is a spy. 
The sentence (22) is true. Now, by applying the law of exportation (i.e. by exporting ―the 
tallest spy‖ from the context of propositional attitudes) we infer: 
(22a) It is true of the tallest spy that I believe him to be a spy.
41
 
But (22a) may be false even when (22) is true—I may believe that the tallest spy is a spy, 
but I may not know who the tallest spy is, and hence, I may not believe of him (the 
person who actually is the tallest spy) that he is the tallest spy or he is a spy at all. This 
shows that the law of exportation is false in the context of propositional attitudes. 
                                               
41 Note that in (22) the description ―the tallest spy‖ has its secondary occurrence as in this case only the 
narrowest part (the smallest sentence) of (22), i.e. ―The tallest spy is a spy‖, belongs to the scope of the 
description; but in (22a) the description ―the tallest spy‖ has its primary occurrence as in this case the 
largest part (the whole sentence) belongs to the scope of the description. 
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 Now, return to the premise (A) of the reformulated argument. As we have seen, in 
(A) the consequent is inferred from the antecedent by the law of exportation in the 
context of propositional attitudes. But, it has been lately proved that the law of 
exportation is false in the context of propositional attitudes. So, (A) may be false. That is, 
it may be the case that (7) is true (and it is actually true) but (15) is false. That means that 
the truth of (7) does not guarantee the truth of (15). But if the truth of (15) is not 
guaranteed, then the law of identity is not applicable in the argument because, according 
to (B), the law of identity can be applied in the argument only if both (15) and (8) are 
true. And for the same reason the truth of (16) is not guaranteed. Again, since the truth of 
(16) is not guaranteed, the truth of (9) in (C) is not guaranteed either. So, we see, the 
truths of (7) and (8) do not guarantee the truth of (9). Hence, (D) is false—it may be the 
case that (7) and (8) are true, but (9) is false. That is what happens in the original 
argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity—the premises of the original argument, i.e. 
(7) and (8), are true, but the conclusion, i.e. (9), is false. Hence, the original argument 
concerning George IV‘s curiosity is invalid. But, the invalidity of the original argument 
does not pose a problem for the law of identity as we have seen in the reformulated 
argument that it is not the law of identity but the law of exportation that causes the 
problem; the law of identity cannot be applied—and so, it is not applied—in the 
argument. So, the invalidity of the original argument does not block the truth of the law 
of identity. Thus the puzzle about the law of identity in the context of propositional 
attitudes is solved. Of course, the law of exportation is questioned here, but, as we have 
seen earlier, the law of exportation is not a true law in the context of propositional 
attitudes. 
 So far the first premise, i.e. (7), of the argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity 
has been considered in a way that the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ has its 
secondary occurrence in (7). But, there is another analysis of (7) in which the definite 
description ―the author of Waverley‖ has its primary occurrence in (7). In that case the 
sentence (7) gets the following analysis: 
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Exactly one person wrote Waverley, and George IV wishes to know 
whether Scott is him. 
i.e.                                                         
And, then, the argument about George IV‘s curiosity can be expressed in the following 
way: 
                                                        
             
                                               
Russell thinks that when the argument about George IV‘s curiosity is expressed in the 
above mentioned way, i.e. when the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ is 
considered to have its primary occurrence in the sentence ―George IV wishes to know 
whether Scott is the author of Waverley‖, the verbal substitution of ―Scott‖ for ―the 
author of Waverley‖ is allowable. So, he treats the above argument as a valid argument. 
He says: 
This does not interfere with the truth of inference resulting from making 
what is verbally the substitution of ―Scott‖ for ―the author of Waverley‖ 
so long as ―the author of Waverley‖ has what I call a primary occurrence 
in the proposition considered.
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So, we see, when the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ contained in the first 
premise, i.e. ―George IV wishes to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley‖, of the 
argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity has its primary occurrence in the sentence in 
question, the argument concerning George IV‘s curiosity is a valid argument. Here, the 
argument involves the law of identity as in the second premise, i.e.             , the 
identity between the author of Waverley and Scott has been claimed. But, since the 
argument is valid, the law of identity does not face any trouble here. So, the puzzle about 
the law of identity in the context of propositional attitudes does not re-emerge.
43
 
                                               
42 Russell (1905), p. 489. 
43 Of course, the following observation can be made here. As Russell talks about the verbal substitution of 
―Scott‖ for ―the author of Waverley‖ (when ―the author of Waverley‖ is taken to have its primary 
occurrence in the relevant sentence), it may be thought that some version of the law of substitution of terms 
is at work here (of course, in that case there may be an issue about Russell‘s version the law of substitution 
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 From the discussion so far made in this chapter, it appears that Russell‘s theory of 
definite descriptions makes available a class of propositions to serve as meanings of 
sentences containing definite descriptions whether or not those definite descriptions are 
satisfied by particular objects. It does so in a non-Meinongian and non-Fregean way. In 
addition to serve this purpose Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions seems to solve the 
puzzles he wishes to solve. These apparent capabilities of his theory of definite 
descriptions give Russell an impression that his theory of definite descriptions is a correct 
theory of language. That is why although he has changed many of his views in various 
topics, his theory of definite descriptions has remained something of lasting value to him. 
Finally, before ending this chapter two other points may be made about Russell‘s 
Theory of definite descriptions. First, in his theory a definite description is treated as an 
incomplete symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation.
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 In his 
Principia Mathematica
45
, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
46
, My Philosophical 
Development
47
 Russell argues for his idea that definite descriptions are incomplete 
symbols. His argument may be understood in the following simple way: suppose, the 
                                                                                                                                            
of terms, but the puzzle about the law of identity in the context of propositional attitudes does not re-emerge). 
However, in my discussion of the puzzle it has been shown that the common version of the law of substitution 
of terms (i.e. For any term   and  , if ┌= ┐is true, and a sentence S contains an occurrence of , and the 
sentence S* is obtained by replacing that occurrence of  with , then S and S* have the same truth-value) is 
false. So, Russell may have a different and more restricted version of the law of substitution of terms in his 
mind. For the sake of argument, let us call it the law of substitution*. Now, the situation is this: when the 
description ―the author of Waverley‖ has its primary occurrence in the first premise and the conclusion is 
drawn by the law of substitution*, the argument is valid and the conclusion is true. In that case no puzzle 
about the law of substitution* arises. There would be a puzzle about the law of substitution*, if the conclusion was 
false and the premises were true (and the conclusion was drawn by the law of substitution*). So, the question 
of puzzle is irrelevant here. Actually, when we admit that the conclusion of the original argument, i.e. ―George 
IV wishes to know whether Scott is Scott‖, is true, no question of a puzzle (whether it is a puzzle about the 
law of identity, or about the law of substitution of terms, or about the law of substitution*) arises; the question 
of a puzzle arises when we observe that the conclusion of the argument is false despite the fact that the 
premises are true and the conclusion is derivable by a true (apparently) law. So, it seems that when Russell 
talks about the argument (concerning George IV‘s curiosity) in which the first premise involves the primary 
occurrence of the description in question, he actually is not thinking about any puzzle. 
44 Russell (1910), p. 67. 
45 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
46 Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (London, New York: Routledge, 1918 (reprinted in 
2010)), pp. 80-83. 
47
 Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Unwin Books 
edition, 1959 (reprinted in 1975)), pp. 63-65. 
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sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ expresses a true proposition (and it, in fact, 
expresses a true proposition). Now, the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ 
cannot mean what is meant by ―Scott‖ (―Scott‖ means the person Scott); for, if it meant 
so, then the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ 
would be the same as the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Scott is Scott‖. But the 
proposition expressed by the sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ cannot be the 
same as the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Scott is Scott‖ because the former is 
an informative sentence that expresses a proposition that could be false (though as a 
matter of fact the proposition expressed by it is true) whereas the latter is an 
uninformative sentence that expresses a trivially true proposition which could not be 
false. Again, the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ cannot mean anything 
other than what is meant by ―Scott‖; for, if it meant anything other than what is meant by 
―Scott‖ (namely the person Scott), then the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Scott 
is the author of Waverley‖ would be false. But actually the proposition expressed by the 
sentence ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖ is true. That is, the definite description ―the 
author of Waverley‖ cannot mean what is meant by ―Scott‖, and at the same time, it 
cannot mean anything other than what is meant by ―Scott‖. So, it cannot mean anything. 
Russell describes this in the following way: 
... in the case of descriptions, there is precise proof: If ‗the author of 
Waverley‘ meant anything other than ‗Scott‘, ‗Scott is the author of 
Waverley‘ would be false, which it is not. If the ‗author of Waverley‘ 
meant ‗Scott‘, ‗Scott is the author of Waverley‘ would be a tautology, 
which it is not. Therefore, ‗the author of Waverley‘ means neither ‗Scott‘ 
nor anything else—i.e. ‗the author of Waverley‘ means nothing, Q.E.D.48 
But, as we have seen, Russell agrees that although the definite description ―the author of 
Waverley‖ does not have a meaning in isolation, it has a meaning in use. Now, Russell 
has his own definition of incomplete symbols. His definition of incomplete symbols, 
roughly, is the following: if a symbol is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation 
but is only defined in certain contexts, then that symbol is an incomplete symbol.
49
 That 
                                               
48
 Russell (1959), pp. 64-65. 
49 Russell (1910), p. 66. 
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is, although an incomplete symbol does not have a meaning in isolation, it has a meaning 
when it is used in a sentence (in a context). Thus, according to the definition of 
incomplete symbols, the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ is an incomplete 
symbol. And, the same is true of all definite descriptions, i.e. all definite descriptions are 
incomplete symbols which have no meaning in isolation. 
 However, it seems to me that although Russell has quite successfully shown that 
the definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ cannot mean the same as what is meant 
by the proper name ―Scott‖, his claim that a definite description is an incomplete symbo l 
which has no meaning in isolation is controversial. For, although he has proved that the 
definite description ―the author of Waverley‖ cannot mean the same as what is meant by 
―Scott‖, he has provided no satisfactory proof for his claim that ―the author of Waverley‖ 
does not mean anything at all in isolation. Rather, it seems that ―the author of Waverley‖ 
has a meaning when it is not used in a sentence. If it had no meaning in isolation, then 
one would not know that ―the author of Waverley‖ and ―the author of Rob Roy‖ suggested 
different imports about the same individual before they were used in sentences. But, it is 
a simple fact that one may know that ―the author of Waverley‖ and ―the author of Rob 
Roy‖ suggest different imports about the same individual; and one may know this before 
they are used in a sentential context. Moreover, one may know the suggested imports of 
these definite descriptions without knowing anything about whom or what (if there is any) 
satisfies these definite descriptions. That is, one may be aware of the suggested imports 
of these definite descriptions even when one is not in a position to construct sentences 
like 
┌
n is the author of Waverley
┐
, or 
┌
n is the author of Rob Roy
┐
. So, the imports that 
these definite descriptions suggest are contained by them independently of any sentential 
context. All these simple facts indicate that ―the author of Waverley‖, ―the author of Rob 
Roy‖ and all other definite descriptions of the form ―the F‖ have meanings of their own 
before being used in sentences. In other words, definite descriptions do have meanings in 
isolation.  Observing such simple facts, Alan White comments: 
Indeed, anyone with a slight knowledge of English literature and of the 
English language knows that ―the author of Waverley‖ does mean 
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something, both in the sense that it refers to somebody, a well-known 
literary figure, and in the sense that it has a use or sense.
50
 
Actually, one can properly use a definite description in a sentential context only 
when one knows the meaning of that definite description. Or, it can be said, on the basis 
of the meaning of a definite description one identifies who or what (if there is any) 
satisfies that definite description.
51
 So, it seems reasonable to allow definite descriptions 
of the form ―the F‖ as expressions that have meanings in isolation. If it is so, then definite 
descriptions are not incomplete symbols as according to the definition of incomplete 
symbol provided by Russell an incomplete symbol is a symbol that does not have any 
meaning in isolation though it has a meaning in use. Hence, Russell‘s claim that definite 
descriptions are incomplete symbols is incorrect. 
 It should be noted here that many defenders of Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions agree that definite descriptions are not incomplete symbols although Russell 
thinks them to be so. For example, Scott Soames, a defender of Russell‘s theory, treats a 
definite description of the form ―the F‖ as an expression having an independent meaning 
of its own which expresses the property of being instantiated by whatever uniquely 
instantiates the property expressed by “F”.52 That is, definite descriptions of the form 
―the F‖, in Soames analysis, are included in the category of generalized quantifiers such 
as ―every F‖, ―some Fs‖, ―most Fs‖. So, according to Soames, a descriptive sentence of 
the form ―The F is G‖ gets the following analysis: 
              
The content of              is given in the following proposition: 
Being G is instantiated by whatever uniquely instantiates the property 
of being F. 
                                               
50 Alan R. White, ―The ‗Meaning‘ of Russell‘s Theory of Descriptions‖, Analysis 20, no. 1 (1959), p. 9. 
51 That is, one has a prior knowledge about the meaning of a description, e.g. ―the author of Waverley‖, 
before one identifies the reference (if there is any), e.g. Scott, and construct a sentence involving that 
description, e.g. ―Scott is the author of Waverley‖. 
52 Scott Soames, ―Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions do not Defeat Russell‘s Theory of Descriptions‖, 
Teorema XXIV, no. 3 (2005), p. 8. [Following Soames, we can say that ―the author of Waverley‖ has the 
following meaning: the property of being instantiated by whatever uniquely instantiates the property 
expressed by ―author of Waverley‖.] 
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And, Stephen Neale, another defender of Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions, maintains 
a similar view regarding the quantificational treatment of definite descriptions. He says 
that ―the‖ can be treated as combining with a formula to form a restricted quantifier of the 
form           . He also mentions that              is definitionally equivalent to 
                           which, again, is definitionally equivalent to 
       .53 So, Neale thinks that the quantificational treatment of definite descriptions is 
not something that is an alternative to Russell‘s analysis. It, rather, is just to find a more 
congenial method of stating it.
54
 Soames also thinks that the quantificational treatment of 
definite descriptions does not result in any significant loss to Russell‘s theory. Rather, it 
allows us to preserve all of the interesting and important features of Russell‘s theory 
along with a welcome gain in generality.
55
  
 Second, in his The problems of Philosophy Russell claims that proper names such 
as ―Plato‖, ―Aristotle‖, ―Bismarck‖, ―Obama‖, and so on really are definite descriptions 
in disguise. By replacing definite descriptions for such names we can unmask their real 
structure. Of course, different people, or the same person in different times, may 
associate different definite descriptions to a name; but as long as the object to which the 
name applies remains constant, the particular definite description associated usually 
makes no difference to the truth or falsity of the proposition expressed by the relevant 
sentence.
56
 Thus, one may associate the definite description ―the first Chancellor of 
German Empire‖ to ―Bismarck‖, ―the last great philosopher of antiquity‖ to ―Aristotle‖; 
and then, one may replace these names with their definite descriptions in sentences where 
these names occur. When names are replaced by their relevant definite descriptions, 
concerned sentences will have the form ―The F is G‖. And, then, the analysis of definite 
descriptions, including (D1)-(D4), should be applicable to them. But Saul Aaron Kripke 
claims that proper names actually do not satisfy (D4). This is how one can show that 
                                               
53 Neale (1990), p. 45. 
54 Ibid., p. 45. 
55 Soames (2005), p. 8. 
56 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Home University Library,1912 (reprinted by 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959/1970 (in this dissertation page numbers of Russell‘s 
The Problems of Philosophy are given from OUP (1970) edition), p. 32. 
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proper names do not satisfy (D4): consider the following sentence which involves a 
proper name ―Aristotle‖: 
(23) Aristotle was fond of dogs. 
Now, let ―the last great philosopher of antiquity‖ as the definite description associated to 
the name ―Aristotle‖. Thus, the sentence (23) turns into: 
(23a) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs. 
Now, suppose, in a counterfactual situation Aristotle was not the last great philosopher of 
antiquity. In that case, the truth of the sentence (23a) would depend on facts about 
whoever was the last great philosopher of antiquity in that counterfactual situation. But 
the truth of the sentence (23) which contains the proper name ―Aristotle‖ would depend, 
as it does in the actual situation, on whether the very person Aristotle was fond of dogs in 
the counterfactual situation in question. That is, the individual satisfier of the name 
―Aristotle‖ enters into the specification of truth-conditions of the sentence (23) in both, 
i.e. in the actual and in the counterfactual, situations. Hence, a correct analysis of proper 
names shows that proper names do not satisfy the condition stated in (D4) since 
according to (D4) the unique satisfier of a definite description does not enter into the 
specification of truth-conditions of the sentence containing that definite description 
(either in the actual or in the counterfactual situation). That is, if (D4) represents an 
essential property of definite descriptions (and according to Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions it does), then proper names are not definite descriptions. Hence, Russell is 
wrong when he treats proper names as disguised definite descriptions. But, this should 
not be considered as a flaw of Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions per se for, as 
Neale mentions, endorsing the theory of definite descriptions does not commit one to a 
treatment of proper names as disguised descriptions.
57
 In short, the phenomenon that 
proper names are not disguised definite descriptions—though it puts a question mark to 
Russell‘s theory of names—does not undermine Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions 
as his theory of definite descriptions concerns the analysis of the meaning of descriptive 
sentences, not the analysis of proper names.   
                                               
57 Neale (1990), p. 24. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Two Major Objections: the Argument from Incompleteness  
and the Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction 
Despite its enormous popularity, Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions has received 
various objections from different angles. It is extremely difficult to address all or most of 
these objections in a single research project like the present one. So, instead of trying to 
address all or most of these objections I will focus on two of them (which I take to be the 
most important objections against Russell‘s theory). These are those arising from: 
(a) The Argument from Incompleteness 
(b) The Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction 
In the present chapter I wish to describe these objections and determine their importance. 
I will examine and evaluate them in later chapters. 
 (a) The Argument from Incompleteness: According to Russell‘s theory of 
definite descriptions, a descriptive sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ expresses a 
proposition like the following: exactly one thing is an F, and whatever is an F is G. This 
indicates that on the Russellian picture a simple sentence containing a definite description 
entails the unique existence of an object denoted by the definite description in question. 
This feature of definite descriptions is often called the uniqueness condition of definite 
descriptions. Now, according to Russell‘s theory, if a definite description fails to satisfy 
the uniqueness condition, i.e. if there are several objects that fit the definite description in 
question, or if there is no object that fits that definite description, then the proposition 
expressed by the sentence containing that definite description must be false. For example, 
according to Russell‘s theory, the sentence:  
(24) The murderer of President John F. Kennedy was killed by Jack 
Ruby 
expresses the following proposition: exactly one person murdered President John F. 
Kennedy, and who murdered President John F. Kennedy was killed by Jack Ruby. Here, 
we see, the existence of one and only one murderer of President John F. Kennedy is 
implied. If there were several murderers of President John F. Kennedy, or if President 
40 
John F. Kennedy was not murdered at all, then the proposition expressed by the sentence 
(24) would be false because in that case the uniqueness condition would not be satisfied 
by the definite description ―the murderer of President John F. Kennedy‖. And, if exactly 
one person murdered President John F. Kennedy, and if that person was killed by Jack 
Ruby, then the proposition expressed by the sentence (24) is true. This analysis of 
descriptive sentences conforms to our everyday use of this sort of sentences. So, one may 
be tempted to claim that Russell‘s treatment of descriptive sentences is uncontroversially 
correct and the uniqueness condition he proposes is unproblematic. 
 But not all philosophers are convinced that Russell‘s treatment of descriptive 
sentences is correct. There are many philosophers who challenge Russell‘s view. P. F. 
Strawson is among those who think that Russell‘s uniqueness condition of definite 
descriptions is problematic. In his ―On Referring‖ Strawson claims that it is obviously 
false that a descriptive sentence always entails the existence of one and only one object 
that satisfies the definite description contained in that sentence. He says: 
Consider the sentence, ―The table is covered with books‖. It is quite 
certain that in any normal use of this sentence, the expression ―the table‖ 
would be used to make a unique reference, i.e. to refer to some one table. 
It is a quite strict use of the definite article, in the sense in which Russell  
talks on p. 30 of Principia Mathematica, of using the article ―strictly, so 
as to imply uniqueness‖. On the same page Russell says that a phrase of 
the form ―the so-and-so‖, used strictly, ―will only have an application in 
the event of there being one so-and-so and no more‖. Now it is obviously 
quite false that the phrase ―the table‖ in the sentence ―the table is covered 
with books‖, used normally, will ―only have an application in the event 
of there being one table and no more‖.58 
That is, according to Strawson if Russell was correct in claiming that a definite 
description like ―the table‖ used in the following sentence: 
(25) The table is covered with books 
implied the unique existence of one and only one table, then by uttering the sentence (25) 
on any present-day occasion the speaker would say something false because of the 
                                               
58 P. F. Strawson, ―On Referring‖, Mind 59, no. 235 (1950), p. 332. 
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existence of several tables in the world at the time of her utterance. But, according to 
Strawson that is not how ordinary speakers normally use the sentence (25) on various 
occasions; ordinary speakers often use the sentence (25) on various present-day occasions 
to say something true. Strawson thinks that a speaker can say something true by uttering 
the sentence (25) on a present-day occasion because when she uses the sentence (25) on 
an occasion she does not imply that there is one and only one table in existence; rather, 
what she does by uttering (25) on an occasion is to refer to some one particular table on 
the given occasion. Now, if the table, which is uniquely referred to by the speaker, is 
covered with books on that given occasion, then the speaker has said something true by 
her utterance of the sentence (25) on that occasion. This explains how on various present-
day occasions ordinary speakers often succeed in saying something true by using the 
sentence (25). Strawson thinks that the picture he is offering here is correct as it conforms 
to the normal uses of descriptive sentences such as the sentence (25) and the like; and the 
picture drawn by Russell is incorrect as it fails to explain how a speaker can say 
something true by using a sentence like the sentence (25) on various present-day 
occasions. 
 The gist of Strawson‘s above mentioned criticism is the following:  
Russell‘s uniqueness condition of definite descriptions is wrong as there 
are descriptive sentences containing such definite descriptions which fail to 
satisfy his uniqueness condition even though they—contrary to what 
Russell‘s theory says about them (according to Strawson)—can be used to 
say something true.  
It should be noted here that a definite description of the form ―the F‖ may fail to satisfy 
the uniqueness condition for two reasons: (i) there may be no object that fits the ―F‖ of 
―the F‖, or (ii) there may be several objects that fit the ―F‖ of ―the F‖. If several objects 
fit the ―F‖ of ―the F‖, then the relevant definite description of the form ―the F‖ is called 
an incomplete definite description.
59
 So, the problem Strawson mentions is actually a 
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 So, it seems that all incomplete definite descriptions fail to satisfy the uniqueness condition; but not all 
definite descriptions that fail to satisfy the uniqueness condition are incomplete. 
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problem related to incomplete definite descriptions. Hence, Strawson‘s criticism may 
now be summarized in the following way:  
Russell‘s theory cannot properly handle sentences containing incomplete 
definite descriptions as those sentences may often be used to say something 
true whereas according to Russell‘s theory they express false propositions. 
 Strawson not only mentions the problem of incompleteness in Russell‘s theory, he 
also investigates the root of Russell‘s alleged mistake. Strawson seems to think that on 
the Russellian picture the truth-value is a property of a sentence which is determined by 
the syntax of the sentence in question and by the meanings of the constituent parts of that 
sentence independently of the context in which the sentence is uttered. According to 
Strawson since Russell believes that the truth-value of a sentence is determined 
independently of the context in which the sentence is uttered, he (Russell) thinks that the 
truth-value of a descriptive sentence like the sentence (2), i.e. ―The present king of 
France is bald‖, is the same (false, in this case) on every occasion of its use. Strawson, 
then, explains why he disagrees with this Russellian view. To explain his points of 
disagreement with Russell, Strawson distinguishes between (i) a sentence and (ii) a use of 
a sentence.
60
 Strawson says that a sentence may be uttered at different times on different 
occasions to make different assertions. Each of these utterances of a particular sentence at 
a particular time on a particular occasion is what Strawson calls a use of a sentence. 
Strawson, then, claims that the same sentence may be used on different occasions to 
make different assertions about different objects. In particular, the same sentence may be 
used to make a true assertion about an object on one occasion and to make a false 
assertion about another object on another occasion. He says: 
... we cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but only of its being 
used to make a true or false assertion or (if this is preferred) to express a 
                                               
60 Strawson (1950), p. 325.; actually Strawson makes distinctions between (i) a sentence (ii) a use of a 
sentence (iii) an utterance of a sentence, and between (i*) an expression (ii*) a use of an expression (iii*) 
an utterance of an expression. For the sake of simplicity, I consider only the distinction between (i) and (ii). 
But my putting the other distinctions aside in no way indicates that they do not play any significant role in 
Strawson‘s theory. I just put them aside because the distinctions between (i) and (ii) is enough to serve the 
present purpose. 
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true or false proposition. And equally obviously we cannot talk of the 
sentence being about a particular person, for the same sentence may be 
used at different times to talk about quite different particular persons, but 
only of a use of the sentence to talk about a particular person.
61
 
To support his point, Strawson gives the example of the following sentence (he 
substituted the following sentence for Russell‘s example of ―The present king of France 
is bald‖): 
(26) The king of France is wise. 
The above sentence, (26), might be used in 1550 by a person and in 1660 by another 
person. Now, according to Strawson, these two different uses of the same sentence might 
involve two different assertions about two different persons; and it might be the case that 
one, say the person who used the sentence (26) in 1550, used it to make a true assertion 
about a unique king of France in 1550; and the other person, say the person who used the 
same sentence in 1660, used it to make a false assertion about the one and only one 
unwise king of France in 1660. On the basis of such considerations Strawson claims that 
a sentence is neither true nor false, but may be used to make a true assertion (on one 
occasion) or a false assertion (on another occasion). 
 From the above discussion, we see, Strawson emphasizes two points of 
disagreement between him and Russell. These are: 
(A) According to Strawson, a descriptive sentence may be used to make 
different assertions that involve different truth-values on different 
occasions. He thinks that Russell‘s theory cannot capture this 
phenomenon; rather it renders a descriptive sentence to have a truth-
value that remains the same on every occasion of its use. 
(B) According to Strawson, a sentence does not have a truth-value; rather, 
a speaker may use it to make a true or a false assertion. Strawson 
claims that since Russell fails to observe the difference between a 
sentence and a use of a sentence, he (Russell) wrongly thinks that it is 
the sentence, not a use of it, which has a truth-value.  
                                               
61 Ibid, p. 326 
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 Upon investigation it appears that the claim Strawson makes, in (A), about 
Russell is not justified. Russell is not committed to the view that a truth-value of a 
descriptive sentence remains the same on every occasion on which it is used. He, rather, 
allows that a descriptive sentence may involve different truth-values on different 
occasions. It happens when the sentence in question has an egocentric word. In his 
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Russell offers a list of egocentric words: 
Among obviously egocentric words are ―near‖ and ―far‖, ―past‖, ―present‖ 
and ―future‖, ―was‖, ―is‖ and ―will be‖, and generally all forms of verbs 
involving tense. ―This‖ and ―that‖ are obviously egocentric; in fact, ―this‖ 
might be taken as the only egocentric word not having a nominal 
definition.
62
 
In the same passage Russell includes ―I‖, ―you‖, ―here‖, ―there‖, ―now‖ in his list of 
egocentric words.
63
 Then, in the same book Russell mentions that when a sentence 
involves an egocentric word, it may denote different objects on different occasions of its 
use. He says: 
―This‖ denotes whatever, at the moment when the word is used, occupies 
the centre of attention. With words which are not egocentric what is 
constant is something about the object indicated, but ―this‖ denotes a 
different object on each occasion of its use: what is constant is not the 
object denoted, but its relation to the particular use of the word. Whenever 
the word is used, the person using it is attending to something, and the 
word indicates this something. When a word is not egocentric, there is no 
need to distinguish between different occasions when it is used, but we 
must make this distinction with egocentric words, since what they indicate 
is something having a given relation to the particular use of the word.
64
 
So, it is plain that Russell acknowledges the fact that a descriptive sentence containing an 
egocentric word may involve different truth-values on different occasions of its use as he 
                                               
62 Bertrand Russell (1948), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd,1948), p. 80. 
63
 Ibid., p. 80. 
64 Ibid., p. 86. 
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admits that an egocentric word may denote different object on each occasion of its use. 
Now, the word ―present‖ in the definite description ―the present king of France‖ is one of 
the egocentric words listed by Russell. So, the definite description ―the present king of 
France‖ may denote different persons on different occasions of its use, and consequently 
the sentence ―The present king of France is bald‖ may involve different truth-values on 
different occasions of its use. Russell does not deny it; rather, he allows it, and offers a 
theory to account for this phenomenon in his Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits
65
 
and in Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.
66
 Of course, Russell has not dealt with the issue 
of egocentric words in his ―On Denoting‖ as he thinks that the problem of definite 
descriptions and the problem of egocentricity are different problems and should be dealt 
differently.
67
 This, according to Russell, enables Strawson to think that he (Russell) has 
completely overlooked the problem of egocentricity and has proposed a theory of definite 
descriptions in which a truth-value of the sentence ―The present king of France is bald‖ 
remains the same on every occasion of its use. But, as it has been mentioned above, 
Russell neither overlooks the problem of egocentricity nor does he propose such a theory 
in which the sentence ―The present king of France is bald‖ has a constant truth-value 
independently of occasions of its use.  
 Russell observes that Strawson‘s criticism against his theory is founded on the 
egocentric word ―present‖ of his example of the sentence ―The present king of France‖. 
He, then, claims that if that egocentric word is replaced by a non-egocentric word, e.g. 
―in 1905‖, Strawson‘s criticism won‘t be applicable to his theory anymore. Thus, in his 
―Mr. Strawson on Referring‖ Russell claims: 
As regards ―the present King of France‖, he fastens upon the egocentric 
word ―present‖ and does not seem able to grasp that, if for the word 
―present‖ I had substituted the words ―in 1905‖, the whole of his argument 
would have collapsed.
68
 
                                               
65 Ibid., pp. 80-87. 
66 Bertrand Russell, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1940), pp. 
108-15. 
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 Bertrand Russell, ―Mr. Strawson on Referring‖, Mind 66, no. 263 (1957), p. 385. 
68 Ibid., p. 385. 
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Here, we can test whether or not Russell is correct in claiming that if the egocentric word 
―present‖ is replaced by the non-egocentric words ―in 1905‖ in the sentence (2), i.e. ―The 
present king of France is bald‖, then Strawson‘s argument regarding Russell‘s example of 
the sentence (2) collapses. After replacing the word ―present‖ by the words ―in 1905‖ in 
the sentence (2), we get the following sentence: 
(2b) The king of France in 1905 is bald. 
Now, according to Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions, on any occasion on which the 
sentence (2b) is used, the proposition expressed by it must be false simply because there 
was no king of France in 1905, i.e. the proposition expressed by the sentence (2b) is false 
because of its failure of satisfying the uniqueness condition. That means that the truth-
value of the sentence (2b) remains the same on every occasion of its use. So, Russell 
seems to be correct in claiming that when the word ―present‖ contained in (2) is replaced 
by the words ―in 1905‖, Strawson‘s criticism, particularly about Russell‘s example of the 
sentence (2), collapses. 
 A remark about Strawson‘s above mentioned criticism may be made here. 
Although by replacing the word ―present‖ by the words ―in 1905‖ Russell‘s particular 
example of the sentence (2) can avoid the problem Strawson mentioned, Strawson‘s 
general claim that a descriptive sentence may be used to make different assertions 
involving different truth-values seems to be true. But a Russellian does not need to deny 
it as we have already seen that Russell allows this phenomenon and discusses it in 
different papers (but not in his ―On Denoting‖). In short, Russell‘s theory is not 
inconsistent with the phenomenon that a descriptive sentence may involve different truth-
values on different occasions of its use.
69
 
 However, even though Russell‘s theory is compatible with the fact that a 
descriptive sentence (containing an egocentric word in it) may involve different truth-
                                               
69 About the second point of disagreement between Russell and Strawson, which has been mentioned in (B) 
above, I am not going to make any comment in the present chapter; but, concerning this point, something 
may be said in the fifth chapter where I wish to address the distinction between meaning and assertion. 
(see: the footnote-306 of this dissertation) 
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values on different occasions of its use, and even if Russell‘s view that the truth-value is 
a property of a sentence is taken to be a correct view, still his theory faces serious 
difficulties in dealing with descriptive sentences containing incomplete definite 
descriptions. As has been stated earlier, according to Russell‘s theory a simple descriptive 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description expresses a false proposition on 
every occasion of its use because of its failure to satisfy the uniqueness condition. But, it 
cannot also be denied that a speaker may say something true on various occasions by a 
descriptive sentence, e.g. ―The table is covered with books‖, which contains an 
incomplete definite description. This phenomenon leads many to think that Russell‘s 
theory in the way it is originally proposed cannot properly deal with the problem of 
incompleteness. Nothing of what Russell says in his reply to Strawson seems to succeed 
in resolving the problem of incompleteness. The problem of incompleteness still looks 
like a serious problem for the defenders of Russell‘s theory.  
 (b) The Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction: Keith Donnellan claims that 
there are actually two different sorts of use of definite descriptions—the attributive use 
and the referential use. In his ―Reference and Definite Descriptions‖ Donnellan first 
defines the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, and then offers a detail 
exposition of the distinction between them. In the same paper he discusses the 
implication of that distinction for Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. He observes 
that Russell‘s theory actually is inadequate because it fails to capture the distinction 
between the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions.
70
  
According to Donnellan, a definite description is said to be used attributively 
when the proposition expressed by the sentence containing it states something about 
whoever or whatever is the so-and-so; on the other hand, a definite description is said to 
be used referentially when by using the sentence containing it the speaker states 
something about a particular object she has in mind and wants her audiences to pick out 
whom or what she is talking about. In Donnellan‘s own words: 
                                               
70
 Keith Donnellan, ―Reference and Definite Descriptions‖, The Philosophical Review 75, no. 3 (1966), pp. 
292-93, 297. 
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I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the 
attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who uses a definite 
description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or 
whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description 
referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to 
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states 
something about that person or thing.
71
 
Donnellan‘s distinction can be illustrated with the following example: 
(27) Smith‘s murderer is insane. 
Now consider the following Scenarios:
72
 
The Scenario-1: A speaker who does not know who murdered Smith 
utters the sentence (27) observing the brutal manner of the killing. If one 
asks the utterer whom she is referring to, the utter may reply that she is not 
referring to any particular person; she is just saying that whoever had done 
such a brutal deed must be insane. 
The Scenario-2: Jones has been arrested and charged for the brutal murder 
of Smith. A speaker who is attending Jones‘ trial utters the sentence (27) 
observing Jones‘ odd behavioral pattern at his trial. Here, if one asks her 
whom she is referring to, she will reply that she is referring to Jones. 
Now, we see, in the Scenario-1 the speaker does not have any particular person in 
mind as the murderer of Smith when she utters the sentence (27). According to the 
Russellian view, here, the proposition expressed by the sentence the speaker utters is: 
exactly one person murdered Smith, and whoever murdered Smith is insane. That is, 
when a definite description is used in the above mentioned way, the sentence containing 
it expresses a general proposition. Donnellan calls this sort of use of a definite 
description the attributive use of it. He seems to agree that Russell‘s views (i.e. Russell‘s 
theses which have been codified as (D1)-(D4), the three-clause analysis of descriptive 
sentences, etc.) may be applicable to descriptive sentences of the form ―The F is G‖ when 
the definite description of the form ―the F‖ is used attributively.73  
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73 Ibid., p. 293. 
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 But the case is different in the Scenario-2. Here, the speaker, when she utters the 
sentence (27) has a particular person, namely Jones, in mind, and she uses the definite 
description intending to enable her audiences to pick out the person, i.e. Jones, whom she 
intends to refer to. That is, in this case, the definite description is used to pick out the 
intended individual so that a property may be predicated of it regardless of whether or not 
the definite description actually fits the individual in question. By using (27) in the 
Scenario-2, the speaker actually says something about Jones, namely that he is insane, 
and she successfully says so, even if Jones is not the murderer of Smith, i.e. even if the 
definite description does not fit the person Jones. So, it seems that when a definite 
description is used in the way mentioned above, the descriptive phrase acts like a 
referential term, and the sentence that contains it expresses a singular proposition.
74
 This 
sort of use of a definite description is what Donnellan calls the referential use of a 
definite description. Donnellan, then, claims that Russell‘s theory is inadequate because it 
overlooks the referential use of definite descriptions. Russell‘s theory, according to 
Donnellan, deals with definite descriptions in a way as if all definite descriptions are used 
attributively.
75
 According to Russell‘s theory, a sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ 
invariably expresses a general proposition of the following sort:  exactly one thing is an 
F, and whatever is an F is G. But that is not always the case, according to Donnellan. He 
seems to think that there are cases of the referential use of definite descriptions in which a 
sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ is used to express a singular proposition of the 
following sort: o (described as ―the F‖) is G. So, here, Donnellan thinks, Russell‘s theory 
fails; and that thought about Russell‘s theory leads him to think that the existence of the 
referential use of definite descriptions proves that Russell‘s theory is inadequate. 
 In his paper Donnellan identifies important differences between an attributive use 
of a definite description and a referential use of it. Some of those are worth mentioning 
here. One of these differences is the following:  in the case of an attributive use of a 
definite description, the speaker in some sense presupposes (in the Strawsonian analysis) 
                                               
74 Although Donnellan does not exactly say so, but it seems that what he has in mind is that the sentence 
(27) in such a case expresses a singular proposition like: Jones is insane, or That man, Jones, is insane, or 
That man over there is insane (if the speaker does not know the name of the accused person). 
75 Donnellan (1966), pp. 281-82, 293, 297. 
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or implies (in the Russellian analysis) that there is a unique object that satisfies the definite 
description in question; but no particular object is intended.
76
 For example, when the 
sentence (27) is used in the Scenario-1, no particular person (Jones or any other) is intended. 
Since in the case of an attributive use of a definite description no particular object is 
intended, there is no scope of misdescribing an object in such a case.
77
 For example, if 
someone disputes that a particular person, say Jones, is not the murderer of Smith, the 
speaker of (27) in the Scenario-1 may reply that she is not talking about Jones. On the 
other hand, when a definite description is used referentially, a particular object is intended 
as the referent of the definite description in question.
78
 For example, when the sentence 
(27) is used in the Scenario-2, Jones is referred to with the definite description ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖. So, here the sentence (27) is a sentence about a particular person, namely Jones, 
who is intended to be referred to. In such a case a misdescription may occur. It may be 
the case that Jones is not the unique murderer of Smith although he is described as the 
unique murderer of Smith. Here, if someone disputes that Jones is not the unique murderer 
of Smith, the speaker of the sentence may reply that what she actually means is this: that 
man, Jones, is insane. And, according to Donnellan, this is a perfectly good answer when 
the speaker referentially uses the definite description in question.
79
  
                                               
76 Ibid., pp. 286, 289. 
77 Ibid., p. 291. 
78 Donnellan thinks that a person can use a definite description referentially to refer to her intended referent even 
when she does not believe that her referent actually fits the definite description used. He says: ―Suppose the 
throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers 
as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions, "Is the king 
in his countinghouse?" I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he 
fits the definite description. It is not even necessary, moreover, to suppose that his followers believe him to 
be the king. If they are cynical about the whole thing, know he is not the king, I may still succeed in referring 
to the man I wish to refer to.‖ [pp. 290-91]. And, it is also possible that a speaker can use a definite description 
attributively even though the speaker believes that a certain object or person actually satisfies the definite 
description she uses. Donnellan gives the following example to support this claim: ―... suppose that Jones is 
on trial for the murder and I and everyone else believe him guilty. Suppose that I comment that the murderer 
of Smith is insane, but instead of backing this up ... by citing Jones's behavior in the dock, I go on to outline 
reasons for thinking that anyone who murdered poor Smith in that particularly horrible way must be insane. 
If now it turns out that Jones was not the murderer after all, but someone else was, I think I can claim to have 
been right if the true murderer is after all insane. Here, I think, I would be using the definite description 
attributively, even though I believe that a particular person fits the definite description.‖ [Ibid., p. 290.] 
79 Ibid., pp. 286, 289, 301. 
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 According to Donnellan, in the case of an attributive use of a definite description, 
a definite description is essential in the sense that the speaker fails to express a true 
proposition if nothing fits the definite description contained in the sentence she uses. But, 
in the case of a referential use of a definite description the speaker may succeed in saying 
something true of the object she refers to even if nothing fits the definite description 
contained in the sentence she uses. For, using the definite description in such a case is 
just one of the possible ways of making it clear which object is referred to; and the 
speaker may successfully do it even when the definite description she uses is not satisfied 
by anything. For example, in the Scenario-1, as we have already seen, if nothing satisfies 
the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, then the proposition expressed by the 
sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ is false (and the speaker fails to say something true 
by using the sentence in question). But, in the Scenario-2, if nothing satisfies the definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, still the speaker succeeds in saying something true of the 
person she refers to, i.e. Jones, provided that Jones is actually insane. That is why 
Donnellan thinks that definite descriptions are not essential when they are used 
referentially. Donnellan describes this point in the following way: 
In the first case [the attributive use of description] the definite description 
might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something 
about whatever or whoever fits the description; but in the referential use 
the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job—calling 
attention to a person or thing—and in general any other device for doing 
the same job, another description or name would do as well.
80
 
 Donnellan thinks that although it is possible that by using a definite description 
attributively a speaker may fail to refer to anything, the speaker cannot fail to refer to an 
object when she uses a definite description referentially except in some extreme cases. 
For example, if someone describes a rock as ―the man carrying a walking stick‖ and asks 
―Is the man carrying a walking stick the professor of history?‖, she does not fail to refer 
to anything; rather, she refers to something, namely the thing over there which happens to 
be a rock but which she takes to be a man carrying a walking stick.
81
 Of course, 
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Donnellan agrees that there may be some unusual and extreme cases in which a speaker 
may fail to refer to anything by using a definite description referentially. For example, 
suppose that there is nothing—no man, no rock—but the speaker asks ―Is the man 
carrying a walking stick the professor of history?‖ due to a trick of light that makes her 
think that there is a man carrying a walking stick. In this case, the speaker really fails to 
refer to anything by using the definite description referentially.
82
 But that requires a 
radically unusual circumstance; and the reason why the speaker fails to refer to anything 
in such a case involves other issues. Donnellan says: 
This failure of reference, however, requires circumstances much more 
radical than the mere nonexistence of anything fitting the description used. 
It requires that there be nothing of which it can be said, ―That is what he 
was referring to‖. Now perhaps also in such cases, if the speaker has 
asserted something, he fails to say anything true or false if there is nothing 
that can be identified as that to which he referred. But if so, the failure of 
reference and truth values does not come about merely because nothing fits 
the description he used.
83
 
 Thus, the distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite 
descriptions may be summarized as follows: 
In the case of the attributive use of a definite description: 
(A1): It is presupposed or implied that something fits the definite 
description; but no particular object is intended.  
(A2): In no way does the speaker misdescribe an object, although she 
may fail to refer to any object at all. 
(A3): The definite description occurs essentially in the sense that if 
nothing satisfies the definite description, then the sentence 
containing it fails to express a true proposition [Russell], or the 
speaker fails to express a proposition that is either true or false 
[Strawson].  
                                               
82 Ibid., p. 296.; but, is it true that she fails to refer to anything? Doesn‘t she refer to the visual image that is 
caused by the trick of light? Given what is said by Donnellan about the referential use of definite 
descriptions, it seems to me that even in such an extreme case the speaker succeeds to refer to something, 
namely the visual image that makes her to think that there is a man carrying a walking stick. 
83 Ibid., p. 296. 
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In the case of the referential use of a definite description: 
(R1): It is not always the case that the speaker presupposes or implies 
that something fits the definite description she uses; but a 
particular object is intended when she uses the definite 
description in question. Here, the speaker uses the definite 
description intending her audiences to be able to pick out (on the 
basis of the definite description used) whom or what she is 
talking about. 
(R2): The speaker may misdescribe an object by the definite 
description she uses; but even in that case the speaker succeeds 
in referring to something. Here, it is not possible to fail to refer 
to something except in some radically extreme cases. 
(R3): The definite description does not occur essentially in the sense 
that even if nothing satisfies the definite description, still the 
speaker, by using a sentence containing it, may say something 
true of the object she refers to. 
Now, according to Donnellan‘s view, Russell‘s theory cannot capture the phenomena 
described in (R1) to (R3). In the Russellian analysis, a descriptive sentence expresses a 
general proposition that does not refer to any particular object; so, no particular object is 
intended by a definite description. Hence, (R1) is not satisfied by Russell‘s theory. Again, 
Russell‘s theory does not allow that a speaker may misdescribe an object by the definite 
description she uses. So, Russell‘s theory does not conform to (R2). And, in Russell‘s 
theory, a definite description is essential in the sense that if nothing satisfies a definite 
description, then the proposition expressed by the sentence containing it must be false. 
Hence, Russell‘s theory does not conform to (R3). Thus, Donnellan contends, the fact 
that there really is the referential use of definite descriptions and that Russell‘s theory 
cannot capture this use of definite descriptions show that Russell‘s theory is inadequate. 
 Donnellan maintains that generally a definite description, e.g. ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖, contained in a sentence, e.g. the sentence (27), can be used in both ways, i.e. 
attributively and referentially (on different occasions); but there may be sentences in 
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which a definite description can be used only attributively or only referentially.
84
 For 
example, the definite description ―The student whom I do not know‖ in the following 
sentences can be used only attributively: 
(28) The student whom I do not know has sent me a mail. 
Although Donnellan presents an example of a sentence in which the relevant definite 
description can be used only attributively (he gives the example of the following 
sentence: ―Point out the man who is drinking my martini‖.), he is ―not so certain that any 
can be found in which the definite description can be used only referentially.‖85 He 
claims that even if such examples are found, they won‘t spoil the point that there are 
many sentences containing definite descriptions that can be used either way—
attributively or referentially (on different occasions, of course).
86
 In short, according to 
Donnellan, normally a definite description of the form ―the F‖ contained in a sentence of 
the form ―The F is G‖ can be used attributively (on one occasion) or referentially (on 
another occasion); and this phenomenon proves that Russell‘s theory is incorrect as 
Russell‘s theory treats definite descriptions in a way as if they can only be used 
attributively. Hence, Donnellan concludes: 
I conclude, then, that neither Russell‘s nor Strawson‘s theory represents a 
correct account of the use of definite descriptions—Russell‘s because it 
ignores altogether the referential use ...
87
 
A question may be raised here: how is it determined whether or not a particular 
use of a definite description is attributive or referential? In his paper, Donnellan mentions 
that it is the speaker‘s intention on a particular occasion which determines whether a 
definite description is used attributively or referentially. Donnellan says: 
                                               
84 Ibid., p. 297. 
85 Ibid., p. 298. 
86 Ibid., p. 298. 
87 Ibid., p. 297.; it may be noted here that according to Donnellan, Strawson‘s theory is inadequate too 
because it overlooks the attributive use of definite descriptions. He thinks that Strawson‘s theory deals with 
definite descriptions as if all definite descriptions are used referentially. Actually, there is an ambiguity, 
according to Donnellan, which is acknowledged neither by Russell nor by Strawson. Thus, both Russell 
and Strawson are mistaken in thinking that definite descriptions always work in one way.  
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In general, whether or not a definite description is used referentially or 
attributively is a function of the speaker‘s intention in a particular case.88 
Now, a Russellian can argue that the difference between an attributive and a referential 
use of a definite description mentioned by Donnellan is a kind of difference that is based 
on the speaker‘s intention on a particular occasion (on which the relevant definite 
description is used). But Russell‘s theory is a theory of meaning that deals with an 
expression‘s semantic properties—properties that are independent of the speaker‘s 
particular intention on a particular occasion (on which the speaker uses the definite 
description in question). Russell explicitly mentions that his theory does not concern the 
speaker‘s intention when she (the speaker) uses a descriptive sentence. In his ―Mr. 
Strawson on Referring‖ Russell makes his position clear: 
My theory of descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of 
mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions.
89
 
Now, in the study of the philosophy of language there is a notion of pragmatics which 
concerns the speaker‘s particular intention to communicate something to her audiences 
by her use of words/phrases/sentences on a particular occasion. While semantics deals 
with the relation between words and things independently of the speaker‘s particular 
intention on a particular occasion, pragmatics deals with words, things and the speaker‘s 
particular intention of communicating something to her audiences on a particular 
occasion. Charles Morris who first coined the term ―pragmatics‖ puts this point in the 
following way: 
... semantics deals with the relation of signs to designata ... ―pragmatics‖ is 
designated as the science of the relation of signs to their interpreter.
90
 
The Russellian now may claim that the distinction between an attributive and a referential 
use of a definite description shown by Donnellan is actually related to the speaker‘s 
intention and how she interprets it on a particular occasion. In other words, the Russellian 
may claim that the distinction between an attributive and a referential use of a definite 
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 Charles W. Morris, ―Foundations of the Theory of Signs‖, Writings on the General Theory of Signs (The 
Hague: Mouton, 1971), pp. 35, 43. 
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description concerns the relations of signs to their interpreter. So, the Russellian may 
conclude that the distinction shown by Donnellan is an issue of pragmatics, and not an 
issue of semantics. If that is the case, i.e. if it is true that the distinction shown by 
Donnellan is an issue of pragmatics rather than an issue of semantics, then Donnellan‘s 
distinction actually fails to undermine Russell‘s theory since his theory, as has already 
been mentioned, is a theory of meaning that deals with issues of semantics, and not with 
issues of pragmatics. 
 So, in order to weigh the import of Donnellan‘s distinction for Russell‘s theory it 
is important to examine whether the distinction he presents is an issue of semantics or an 
issue of pragmatics. Donnellan‘s distinction is interpreted in two ways. In one of its 
interpretations, it is said that Donnellan‘s distinction involves the claim that definite 
descriptions are semantically ambiguous. Let us call it the Semantic Interpretation. 
According to this interpretation what Donnellan actually suggests is the following: the 
descriptive sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ has two meanings—(i) exactly one 
person murdered Smith, and whoever murdered Smith is insane, and (ii) Jones (or Black, 
or Robinson, or any other particular person who is described as ―Smith‘s murderer‖) is 
insane. Here, in its first meaning the descriptive sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ 
expresses a general proposition; and in its second meaning the same sentence expresses a 
singular proposition (a proposition about a particular person, namely Jones). Now, when 
the descriptive sentence is used in its first meaning (as has been used in the Scenario-1), 
the definite description contained in it is said to be used attributively; and when it is used 
in its second meaning (as has been used in the Scenario-2), the definite description 
contained in it is said to be used referentially. According to the Semantic Interpretation of 
Donnellan‘s distinction, both meanings of the descriptive sentence mentioned in (i) and 
(ii) above are semantically significant meanings of the sentence in question. Thus, 
following the Semantic Interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction, it may be said that what 
Donnellan actually suggests by distinguishing between the attributive and referential uses 
of definite descriptions is the following: a descriptive sentence is actually semantically 
ambiguous in the sense that it has two types of semantically significant meanings one of 
57 
which is salient when the definite description contained in it is used attributively, and the 
other is salient when the definite description contained in it is used referentially. Now, if 
it is true that a descriptive sentence is actually semantically ambiguous, then this 
phenomenon severely undermines Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions since in this 
case one can reasonably claim that Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions fails to 
accommodate the semantic ambiguity involved in descriptive sentences. Commentators 
who interpret Donnellan‘s distinction in the above mentioned way argue that unless 
Donnellan had this sort of interpretation in his mind about the distinction between the 
attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, he would not so explicitly and 
confidently claim that Russell‘s theory is incorrect.91 
 According to the other interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction what he suggests 
by making the distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite 
descriptions is the following: by using a definite description attributively the speaker of 
that descriptive sentence intends to express a general proposition; and by using a definite 
description referentially the speaker intends to refer to a particular object she already has 
in mind. So, the distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite 
descriptions involves the speaker‘s intention. But speaker‘s intention, as has already been 
mentioned, is an issue of pragmatics; and hence, Donnellan‘s distinction, which is 
actually based on speaker‘s intention, is a distinction related to pragmatics, and not to 
semantics. Let us call this interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction the Pragmatic 
Interpretation. A defender of this interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction may cite the 
following words from Donnellan‘s paper in order to support her position: 
It does not appear plausible to account for this [two different uses (the 
attributive and referential uses) of definite descriptions], either, as an 
ambiguity in sentences. The grammatical structure of the sentence seems to 
me be the same whether the description is used referentially or 
attributively: that is, it is not syntactically ambiguous. Nor does it seem at 
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 Donnellan not only says that Russell‘s theory is inadequate, he explicitly says that Russell‘s theory is 
incorrect (see: Donnellan (1966), pp. 292, 297.) 
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all attractive to suppose an ambiguity in meaning of the words; it does not 
appear to be semantically ambiguous (perhaps we could say that the 
sentence is pragmatically ambiguous: the distinction between roles that the 
description plays is a function of the speaker‘s intention.)92 
Besides, it is interesting to observe that Donnellan has never claimed that an utterance of 
the sentence (27), i.e. ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖, in the Scenario-2 (in which the 
definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used referentially) expresses a true proposition 
when the person accused for Smith‘s murder is not the murderer of Smith but actually is 
insane. Rather, he just says that in such a case the speaker may still say something (e.g. 
―is insane‖) true of the person referred. We observe it in the following words from 
Donnellan‘s paper: 
But where the definite description is used referentially, something true may 
well have been said. It is possible that something true was said of the 
person referred.
93
 
Saul Kripke, in his ―Speakers Reference and Semantic Reference‖, has made a similar 
observation about Donnellan‘s thought and commented that Donnellan would hedge if he 
were asked whether or not the statement the speaker made by using the sentence (27) in 
the Scenario-2 was true, if the person charged was not really the murderer of Smith.
94
 
From these observations, it seems that what Donnellan has actually suggested is the 
following: even when a sentence containing a definite description expresses a false 
proposition, the speaker of that sentence may succeed in saying something true of her 
intended referent by using that sentence.
95
 But saying something true of an object is 
different from using an expression which is true. The former precisely is a property of 
communication and is related to pragmatics whereas the latter precisely is a property of 
linguistic expression and is related to semantics. So, it may be thought that by making the 
                                               
92 Donnellan (1966), p. 297. 
93 Ibid., p. 295. 
94 Saul Kripke, ―Speakers Reference and Semantic Reference‖, Midwest Studies in Philosophy II. (1977), p. 
261.; of course, Kripke does not favor the Pragmatic Interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction. 
95 Of course, Donnellan does not explicitly say that such a sentence expresses a false proposition. Had he 
said so, the pragmatic interpretation of his distinction would certainly be the correct interpretation of his 
distinction. 
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distinction between two different uses of definite descriptions Donnellan actually wants 
to raise an issue related to pragmatics. 
 So, it seems that although the supposition of a semantic ambiguity would 
seriously conflict with Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions, it cannot be ascribed with 
certainty to Donnellan. However, Kripke observes that Donnellan‘s apparent disclaiming 
of the ambiguity in definite descriptions runs against the grain of the most part of his 
paper. Donnellan spends so many words against Russell‘s theory and explicitly concludes 
that Russell‘s theory is incorrect; and now if it turns out that he does not want to claim 
ambiguity in definite descriptions, then he actually says nothing against Russell‘s theory; 
for, as Kripke mentions: 
If the sentence [containing a description, e.g. (27)] is not (syntactically or) 
semantically ambiguous, it has one analysis; to say that it has two distinct 
analyses is to attribute a syntactical or semantic ambiguity to it.
96
 
So, Kripke thinks that the disclaimer quoted from Donnellan‘s paper may be a mistake on 
Donnellan‘s part. That is why Kripke ignores the disclaimer and takes Donnellan to be 
arguing for the semantic ambiguity in definite descriptions.  
How, then, should Donnellan‘s position be understood? Should one go with the 
Semantic Interpretation of his distinction? Or, is it the Pragmatic Interpretation that 
reflects the suggestions originally made by Donnellan? For my part, I am inclined to go 
with Kripke in this regard. I think that to examine whether or not Donnellan‘s distinction 
undermines Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions it is better to take Donnellan‘s 
position to be arguing for ambiguity in definite descriptions (the Semantic Interpretation) 
because it is the position that can (if true) severely undermine Russell‘s theory.97   
 However, in this chapter two very important objections against Russell‘s theory of 
definite descriptions have been observed. If any of these objections is correct, then 
                                               
96 Kripke (1977), p. 262. 
97 When Donnellan is developing his point that the same definite description on different occasion may be 
used either way—attributively and referentially—he says: ―... there are many sentences, apparently not 
ambiguous either syntactically or semantically, containing definite descriptions that can be used either 
way.‖ (Donnellan (1966), p. 298.; my italic). Here, Donnellan‘s use of the word ―apparently‖ gives me the 
impression that he does not suspend the possibility that definite descriptions are somehow ambiguous. 
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Russell‘s theory is false (or, at least, inadequate). So, detailed examinations of these 
objections are required. In the following two chapters I wish to examine these objections 
in detail. But before I end the present chapter, I think, a point regarding the relationship 
between the referential use of definite descriptions and the incompleteness of definite 
descriptions may be mentioned. In most cases incomplete definite descriptions are used 
referentially. So, it may lead one to think that the incompleteness of a definite description 
is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the referential use of it. But that is not 
true; rather, the fact is that the incompleteness of a definite description is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the referential use of that definite description. A 
definite description may be used referentially even though it is not incomplete. For 
instance, consider Donnellan‘s example of the sentence (27), i.e. ―Smith‘s murderer is 
insane‖, used in the Scenario-2. Here, the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is 
plainly a complete definite description which is supposed to be satisfied (if any object 
satisfies the definite description in question at all) by a unique murderer of Smith. But the 
definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ on the given occasion is used referentially as by 
using it on the given occasion the speaker intends to refer to a particular person, namely 
Jones, she already has in mind. That is, here, the incompleteness of a definite description 
is absent, but the definite description is used referentially. Hence, it is proved that the 
incompleteness of a definite description is not a necessary condition for the referential 
use of that definite description. Again, it may happen that a definite description is not 
used referentially (rather, it is used attributively) even though the definite description in 
question is incomplete. For example, a professor who has just found that her dictionary 
has been stolen says: 
(29) The thief has stolen my dictionary. 
Here, the definite description ―the thief‖ is obviously incomplete as there are many 
persons in the world who fit the definite description ―the thief‖. But on the above 
mentioned occasion the definite description ―the thief‖ contained in the sentence (29) is 
used attributively as the professor does not refer to any particular person she has in mind 
as the referent of the definite description she uses. That is, here, the incompleteness of a 
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definite description is present, but the definite description is not used referentially. Hence, 
it is proved that the incompleteness of a definite description is not a sufficient condition 
for the referential use of that definite description. That is, the incompleteness of a definite 
description is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the referential use of it. To 
say this is not the same as to say that there is no relationship between them. There is a 
significant relationship between them; and we will observe this relationship later. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Responses to the Argument from Incompleteness 
In the previous chapter I have discussed two objections against Russell‘s theory of 
definite descriptions. These are: the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument 
from Donnellan‘s Distinction. In the present chapter I will examine two pro-Russellian 
responses to the Argument from Incompleteness. According to the first of these pro-
Russellian responses, a definite description such as ―the table‖ may be understood as a 
short form of a fuller description such as ―the table over there‖, or ―the table in front of 
me‖, etc.; or it may be understood with respect to a restricted domain over which the 
definite description ranges. This approach is called the Elliptical Approach. According to 
the other response, what is required by the definite description ―the table‖ is not that there 
be a unique table in the whole world but only that there be a unique table in the relevant 
contextually determined situation. I call it the Situation Semantics Approach. I will 
examine first the Elliptical Approach and then the Situation Semantics Approach. 
 1. The Elliptical Approach: According to the Elliptical Approach a sentence of 
the form ―The F is G‖ in which the definite description of the form ―the F‖ is incomplete 
does not require that there is a unique F in the whole universe; for, the definite 
description of the form ―the F‖ in such a case is either a short form of a fuller description 
of the form ―the F which is H‖, or it is limited to a certain context which determines the 
domain of discourse relevant to the definite description in question. That is, the following 
two options are open here: a speaker who utters a sentence containing an incomplete 
definite description may—if needed—explicitly add the unsaid part of the definite 
description and thereby complete the definite description in question; or the sentence 
should be understood in the following way: the speaker and her audiences are aware of 
the context that implicitly determines the objects that belong to the domain of the definite 
description in question. Following Stephen Neale
98
 we can call them the Explicit 
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Approach and the Implicit Approach, respectively. Now, let us see how these approaches 
deal with the Argument from Incompleteness. 
 (a) The Explicit Approach: The proponents of the Explicit Approach remark 
that there are many cases in which what a speaker says on a given occasion is determined 
by two factors—(i) the sentence the speaker uses, and (ii) the context in which the 
sentence in question is used. Here, (i) is uncontroversially true and easily understandable; 
(ii) is also true, but requires elucidation as this is the factor on which the Explicit 
Approach is founded. In order to show how the context in which a sentence is used 
contributes in determining what a speaker says on a given occasion R. M. Sainsbury, one 
of the proponents of the Explicit Approach, offers the following example
99
: suppose in 
the middle of her lecture a professor exclaims ―There‘s no more chalk‖ (when she is 
about to write something on the blackboard). Now, it is plain that her audiences won‘t 
take her to be claiming that there is no more chalk in the world. Rather, they will 
naturally take her to be claiming that there is no more chalk in the classroom in which she 
is giving her lecture. Here, it is the context (in which the professor uses the sentence in 
question) that determines (along with the factor (i)) what proposition is actually 
expressed by the sentence uttered by the professor. And, it can also be said that the 
sentence ―There‘s no more chalk‖ used on the given occasion actually is incomplete 
which may be completed in the following way: ―There‘s no more chalk in this classroom 
now.‖ Now, according to Sainsbury, what is said above about an ordinary sentence like 
―There‘s no more chalk‖ is also true of any sentence that contains an incomplete definite 
description. For example, suppose on a given occasion on which a cat is sitting on a 
person‘s lap a speaker says: 
(30) The cat is hungry. 
According to Sainsbury, in the above case the audiences of the speaker naturally won‘t 
take her to be claiming the existence of a unique cat in the world; rather, they will take 
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her to have used an incomplete definite description that may be completed as ―the cat on 
her lap‖; and thereby the sentence may be completed as ―The cat on her lap is hungry‖.100 
Here, the incomplete definite description ―the cat‖ may be understood as elliptical for the 
fuller description ―the cat on her lap‖. 
 Besides Sainsbury, Sellars
101
, Peter Ludlow and Stephen Neale
102
 are among 
others who endorse the Explicit Approach to defend Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions against the objection arising from the Argument from Incompleteness. 
Ludlow and Neale argue that on an occasion when a speaker utters a sentence like the 
sentence (25), i.e. ―The table is covered with books‖, her audiences generally know 
which table is meant on that occasion—it may be the only table that is visible on that 
occasion, or it may be the only table in front of the speaker on that occasion, or it may be 
the only table located near the window of a certain room on that occasion, etc. In such a 
case, the definite description ―the table‖ is just a short form of a fuller description which 
is claimed to be uniquely satisfied. Ludlow and Neale claim that by making the relevant 
fuller descriptions explicit one can solve the problem concerning incomplete definite 
descriptions. They argue that a descriptive sentence like (25) may be converted, for 
example, into the following sentence by making the fuller description explicit: 
(25a) The table near the window of this room is covered with books. 
Now, it is plain that on some occasions (25a) can be used to say something true. Here, 
according to the proponents of the Explicit Approach the sentence (25) is just a short 
form of (25a). So, according to them it is reasonable to say that on some occasions (25) 
may be used to say something true. Hence, they think, it is not true of Russell‘s theory 
that his theory renders sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions as sentences 
that express false propositions on every present-day occasion. So, the problem 
concerning incomplete definite descriptions is solved, according to the proponents of the 
Explicit Approach. 
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 (b) The Implicit Approach: According to the philosophers who endorse the 
Implicit Approach to defend Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions against the 
objection arising from the Argument from Incompleteness the context of utterance of a 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description determines the domain of 
quantification relevant to the definite description in question. William G. Lycan,
103
 Peter 
Ludlow and Stephen Neale are among those who endorse this approach to defend 
Russell‘s theory. Although each of them has his own specific theory regarding the matter, 
all of them endorse the following general line of thought: a definite description of the 
form ―the F‖ is a quantifier like ―all Fs‖, ―some Fs‖, ―most Fs‖ etc.; and for a sentence 
containing a definite description, the domain over which the relevant quantifier ranges 
does not need to be a universal one; rather, the domain over which the quantifier ranges is 
a particular class roughly presupposed in the relevant context, e.g. the class of all and 
only objects in the immediately shared perceptual environment of the speaker of the 
sentence and her audiences.
104
 That means that when a descriptive sentence is analyzed in 
the way Russell suggests, it is not the case that the quantifier involved in it is 
unrestricted; rather, the domain of the quantifier is fixed or restricted by the interest of the 
speaker (and/or her audiences as well) or by a contextual feature supplied by the context 
of utterance.
105
 Now, keeping this notion of quantifier-restriction in mind, a defender of 
the Implicit Approach may argue that in the case of a descriptive sentence like the 
sentence (25) the domain of the relevant quantifier is implicitly fixed in an appropriate 
way so that the sentence can entail that there is exactly one table that belongs to the 
restricted domain of discourse, e.g. a certain table near the window of a particular room at 
a particular time. In this way—the defender of the Implicit Approach may claim—one 
can avoid the demand that on the Russellian analysis the sentence (25) entails that there is 
exactly one table in the whole universe.  So, according to the proponents of the Explicit 
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Approach it may be the case that the sentence (25) expresses a true proposition on an 
occasion, if on that occasion there is exactly one table that belongs to the restricted 
domain of discourse and that table is covered with books (on that occasion). If the above 
analysis is correct, then here we have got an explanation of how a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description may express a true proposition on some occasions. And, 
this explanation, according to the defenders of Russell‘s theory, conforms to Russell‘s 
theory of definite descriptions. 
 Stephen Neale, one of the most prominent defenders of Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions, is confident that the Implicit Approach described above can deal with the 
problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness. He observes that like the case of 
definite descriptions the phenomenon of domain-restriction is true of all other quantifiers 
too.
106
 For example, consider the following sentences containing universal quantifiers: 
(31) All students are attending Professor Kripke‘s lecture today. 
(32) Everyone likes her. 
Now, it seems that the sentence (31) does not entail that all students of all levels in the world 
are attending Professor Kripke‘s lecture today (or, at least, the sentence is not used to imply 
something like that); rather, the domain of the universal quantifier ―all‖ actually is somehow 
fixed by some sort of contextual elements, e.g. all students of the philosophy department 
of Princeton University, or all students who have registered for a particular course taught 
by Professor Kripke, or both, etc. Similarly, (32) appears not to entail that everyone in the 
world likes the particular person referred to. The domain of the relevant quantifier is 
somehow unrestricted. All these examples show that the domain-restriction is a common 
feature of all sorts of quantifier. That is why Neale claims that if the domain-restriction is 
something problematic, then that problem is a general problem of all sorts of quantifier 
which poses no special objection to Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions.107 
 Ludlow and Neale mention that the Explicit Approach differs from the Implicit 
Approach in that the former approach focuses more on language whereas the latter 
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approach focuses more on the world. The former approach, as we have seen, looks for 
linguistic elements, e.g. words and phrases, to complete an incomplete definite 
description; and the latter approach limits a part of the world as the domain of discourse. 
Neale and Ludlow describe this difference in the following way: 
The difference between the explicit and implicit replies corresponds to a 
difference in focus and in the attitude taken to the two major parts of ‗the 
 ‘ Where we have incompleteness we have slippage between language 
and the world. There are only two things we can do about this slippage: 
tinker with language, or tinker with the world. When we tinker with 
language: we do something about the matrix  , availing ourselves of the 
explicit reply. When we tinker with the world, we do something about 
the objects that (potentially) satisfy the matrix, and hence restrict the 
range of either the unrestricted quantifier ‗the‘ or the restricted quantifier 
‗the  ,‘ availing ourselves of the implicit reply.108 
 Although Ludlow and Neale think that either one of the two forms of the 
Elliptical Approach, i.e. the Explicit Approach and the Implicit Approach, enables a 
Russellian to deal with the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness, they 
agree that the Implicit Approach faces a serious problem when it deals with a sentence 
that contains two superficially identical definite descriptions. Ludlow and Neale give the 
following example
109
 to show this problem: suppose, two friends have watched a boxing 
match between a Russian and a Swede. Both of them know that one of the eleven judges 
of the match is a Russian; and that no participating boxer is a member of the panel of 
judges. Now, upon hearing the announcement that the panel of judges has declared the 
Swede the winner by ten votes to one, one utters the following sentence: 
(33) The Russian has voted for the Russian. 
Here, what the utterer wants to say is that the Russian Judge has voted for the Russian boxer. 
And, it may be the case that the proposition expressed by (33) is true. This fact can easily 
be captured by the Explicit Approach. But the Implicit Approach cannot easily deal with 
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this fact as there can be no domain of discourse containing exactly one Russian with respect 
to which (33) can be evaluated and come out to be true.
110
 This, however, is not an 
unsolvable problem, according to Ludlow and Neale. They think that the Implicit Approach 
can overcome this problem by mimicking what the Explicit Approach would do in such a 
case. The Explicit Approach would solve the problem by explicitly mentioning the fuller 
descriptions for both occurrences of the definite description ―the Russian‖. That is, according 
to the Explicit Approach, the sentence (33) would be completed in the following way: 
(33a) The Russian judge of today‟s match has voted for the Russian 
boxer of today‟s match. 
So, the suggestion that Ludlow and Neale offers here is this: the Implicit Approach can 
overcome the problem mentioned above by allowing domains of the quantifier (actually 
two superficially identical quantifiers) be changed on the basis of two different 
occurrences of it in the single sentence. Ludlow and Neale say: 
If the implicit approach is to be saved, it will have to mirror what the 
explicit approach does by allowing different completions for superficially 
identical descriptions, and this means allowing the domain over which 
quantifiers range to shift within a sentence.
111
 
That is, on the picture suggested by Ludlow and Neale, the domain of the first occurrence 
of the definite description ―the Russian‖ ranges over all members of the panel of judges 
of the particular boxing match; and the domain of the second occurrence of the definite 
description ―the Russian‖ ranges over all boxers participating in that particular boxing 
match.
112
 And, in this way, according to Ludlow and Neale, the problem arising from two 
superficially identical definite descriptions occurring in a single sentence can be solved.  
At any rate, according to the defenders of the Elliptical Approach the Argument 
from Incompleteness poses no genuine problem for Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions. What a Russellian needs when she deals with the Argument from 
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Incompleteness is precision. And, according to the defenders of the Elliptical approach 
the needed precision can be achieved through either one of the two ways: by explicitly 
mentioning the fuller description that is abbreviated in the descriptive phrase in question 
(the Explicit Approach), or by implicitly fixing the domain—on the basis of the features 
supplied by the context of utterance of the descriptive sentence in question—over which 
the relevant quantifier ranges (the Implicit Approach). But the Elliptical Approach still 
faces some problems. These are: how a speaker manages to get away with so much 
incompleteness; exactly what can be counted as the correct fuller description of an 
incomplete definite description and how it is determined; how a quantifier gets restricted 
in a context; what determines the exact restricted domain of discourse; and, how the 
speaker‘s audiences manage to identify the right fuller description or the right domain of 
discourse so quickly and apparently so effortlessly. The proponents of the Elliptical 
Approach, however, treat the above mentioned problems as general problems of language 
which, according to them, do not pose a special problem for Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions.
113
 
Although the defenders of the Elliptical Approach confidently claim that either of 
the two ways mentioned above (i.e. the Explicit Approach and the Implicit Approach) 
succeeds in solving the problem arising from the incompleteness of definite descriptions, 
upon examination it appears that none of the proposed ways actually solves the problem. 
Let us begin by looking at the Explicit Approach. According to this approach an 
incomplete definite description can be completed by making the relevant fuller 
description explicit, and thereby the problem of incompleteness can be solved. But that 
actually does not solve the problem. For, on an occasion an incomplete definite 
description may be completed by many different non-synonymous and non-equivalent 
fuller descriptions. So, each time one replaces the incomplete definite description in 
question with a different fuller description, one obtains an expression that expresses a 
different proposition which may be non-synonymous and non-equivalent to other relevant 
propositions that could be found by completing the incomplete definite description in 
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question with other possible fuller descriptions. But no defender of the Explicit Approach 
has yet developed an account of how one of the many possible fuller descriptions can be 
selected as the correct one to complete an incomplete definite description on a particular 
occasion. To me, it seems that it is not only the case that no defender of the Explicit 
Approach has yet developed an account of how one can select the correct fuller 
description from a number of possible fuller descriptions to complete an incomplete 
definite description on a particular occasion, it is actually impossible to find a principled 
way of doing this simply because there is no such principled way at all. For, a defender of 
the Explicit Approach might expect that either the context of utterance or the intention of 
the speaker who utters a sentence containing an incomplete definite description would 
determine one from many possible fuller descriptions as the correct one that could 
complete the incomplete definite description on a given occasion. But, upon examination, 
it appears that neither the context of utterance nor the intention of the speaker provides a 
principled way of selecting one from many possible fuller descriptions as the correct one 
on a particular occasion. Howard K. Wettstein, a well-known critic of the Elliptical 
Approach, shows that the context of utterance of a sentence containing an incomplete 
definite description may fail to indicate which one of the possible non-synonymous and 
non-equivalent fuller descriptions is the correct one that can replace the relevant 
incomplete definite description and thereby complete the definite description in question. 
To show this Wettstein offers the following example
114
: in a particular context in which 
the sentence (25) is uttered the incomplete definite description ―the table‖ may be 
completed as 
┌
the table in room 2009 of Camden Hall at t
┐
, or as 
┌
the table at which the 
author of The Persistence of Objects is sitting at t
┐
, etc. Clearly, they are non-
synonymous and often non-equivalent; and hence, they lead the sentence (25) to express 
different propositions (on the basis of which fuller description is used to complete the 
definite description in question). Now, the question is: how can one select one of these 
fuller descriptions as the correct one on a particular occasion? It is plain that an appeal to 
the context of utterance won‘t help to answer this question as all of these possible fuller 
descriptions involve the same context. This is why Wettstein says:  
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... it is quite clearly wrong to suppose that, in many such cases, the 
circumstances of utterance put the listener in a position to select some 
one of these non-equivalent descriptions as the correct one, the one that 
actually captures what the speaker intended.
115
 
The other option for a defender of the Explicit Approach is to claim that it is not 
the context of utterance but the speaker‘s intention that determines which one of the 
various possible fuller descriptions is the correct one on a particular occasion. Wettstein 
addresses and then refutes this claim too. He shows that in many cases the speaker does 
not have any such determinate intention at all when she utters a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description; if the speaker is asked which of the possible fuller 
descriptions she has in mind as the completer of the incomplete definite description she 
uses, she may fail to select one as opposed to another. For example, in the case of ―the 
table‖ discussed in the previous paragraph, the speaker may say: 
'Although I meant to refer to that table' ... 'I don't think I meant to refer to 
it as the table in room 209 of Camden Hall at t1 as opposed to, say, as the 
table at which the author of The Persistence of Objects is sitting at t1 . 
Nor did I intend to refer to it as the table in 209 and the table at which 
the author ... as opposed to, say, just as the table in 209.'
116
 
Here, as Marga Reimer mentions, the speaker fails to select one fuller description as 
opposed to another (as the correct fuller description) not because she does not know 
which complete description she has in mind, but because she has no such determinate 
fuller description at all in her mind.
117
 And, if the speaker herself—at least in some 
cases—fails to select one of the many possible fuller descriptions as the correct one that 
completes the incomplete definite description she uses, then, as Wettstein says, it is 
implausible in the extreme to suppose that one of these actually is the correct completer 
of the relevant incomplete definite description.
118
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So, we see, neither the context of utterance nor the speaker‘s intention helps in 
selecting one of the possible fuller descriptions as the correct one by which the relevant 
incomplete definite description can be completed. So, it seems reasonable to claim that 
there is no principled way of deciding which one of the many possible fuller descriptions 
is the correct one that can complete the relevant incomplete definite description. The lack 
of any such principled way should be regarded as a serious problem for the Explicit 
Approach because it indicates that the Explicit Approach is, in fact, unfounded or, at 
least, unworkable. But Ludlow and Neale do not take it as a serious problem for the 
Explicit Approach and for Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions as well. They observe 
that there is no principled way of selecting one of many possible completers as the 
correct one when one deals with other quantifiers such as ―all‖, ―some‖, ―many‖ etc. For 
example, consider the sentence ―All students must attend today‘s lecture‖ uttered by a 
professor. The quantifier involved in this sentence may be completed in many different 
ways: ―all students registered for the course Phil-4001‖, ―all students of the Department 
of Philosophy‖, ―all students who are majoring in philosophy‖ etc. And, it may be the 
case that there is actually no principled way of selecting one of these as the correct one to 
complete the quantifier. This, according to them, indicates that the above mentioned 
problem, i.e. the problem arising due to the lack of any principled way of selecting one 
from a number of possible completers of a determiner phrase (DP)
119
, is a general 
problem of language which does not pose any special problem for the Explicit Approach. 
They say:  
Some philosophers have objected to the explicit approach on the grounds 
that there fails to be a principled basis for determining the content of 
completions. ... If there is a genuine complaint here it is one that carries 
over to the interpretation of incomplete descriptions used attributively 
and, indeed, to quantified DPs quite generally, which suggests very 
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strongly that the requirement of a principled basis is too strong a 
condition to impose on any account of  interpretation.
120
 
But the above answer does not seem to be a convincing answer to the problem arising 
from the incompleteness of definite descriptions. After all, Ludlow and Neale are 
proposing a theory, i.e. the Explicit Approach, according to which the problem of 
incompleteness can be solved by explicitly mentioning the correct fuller description in 
the place of the incomplete definite description in question. Such a theory is required to 
explain how a fuller description is chosen as the correct fuller description that can replace 
the relevant incomplete definite description and why a particular fuller description—not 
another of the other possible fuller descriptions—is counted as the correct one. And, now 
if Ludlow and Neal say that their theory cannot explain these, then one may reasonably 
claim that their theory actually does nothing to solve the problem arising from the 
incompleteness of definite descriptions. 
 Of course, the above is not the only answer to the critics of the Explicit Approach 
on Neale‘s part. In his Descriptions Neale objects to Wettstein‘s criticisms against the 
Explicit Approach on the ground that Wettstein fails to consider the possibility of 
completing incomplete definite descriptions using referring expressions or indexicals. 
Following Scott Soames
121
, Neale suggests that it is very natural for incomplete definite 
descriptions such as ―the mayor‖, and ―the murderer‖ that they can be completed by fuller 
descriptions 
┌
the mayor of a
┐
 and 
┌
the murderer of b
┐, respectively, where ―a‖ is replaced 
by the name of the relevant town and ―b‖ is replaced by the name of the murdered victim.122 
So, the incomplete definite description ―the mayor‖ may be completed as ―the mayor of 
Calgary‖ and the incomplete definite description ―the murderer‖ may be completed as 
―the murderer of Smith‖. Although in both cases the fuller descriptions involve referential 
expressions, according to Neale, that does not pose a problem for a Russellian because to say 
that a definite description contains a referential expression is different from saying that 
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that definite description requires to be interpreted referentially.
123
 At any rate, the 
completers of the above mentioned incomplete definite descriptions are found so easily 
because for each of them ―an additional argument place [designated by ―of a‖ and ―of b‖, 
respectively] can be made available for a particular individual specified by the context of 
utterance.‖124 Neale, then, admits that with respect to a definite description like ―the table‖, 
―there is no natural argument position to be made available.‖125 This sort of definite 
descriptions, according to Neale, can be dealt with following Sellars. According to Sellars 
a definite description like ―the table‖ can be thought as elliptical for ―the table over here‖ 
or ―the table over there‖.126 Both of these completers contain indexicals sensitive to what 
Neale calls ―the spatial coordinates‖ of utterance.127 And, Neale seems to agree with 
Sellars‘ position as he explicitly claims that although in the above examples incomplete 
definite descriptions are completed using referential expressions or indexicals, there is 
nothing wrong in it because: 
The semanticist who regards (utterance of) incomplete quantifiers—
including incomplete descriptions—as elliptical for complete quantifiers 
is under no obligation to treat the ellipsed material as free of referring 
expressions and indexicals.
128
 
 Neale seems to think that if incomplete definite descriptions are allowed to be 
completed with referential expressions and indexicals, then the problem of selecting one 
from a number of possible non-synonymous and non-equivalent fuller descriptions can be 
avoided because in that case there won‘t be many possible fuller descriptions on a 
particular occasion. The basis of this assumption about Neale‘s position is his idea that by 
completing incomplete definite descriptions using referring expressions and indexicals 
one can avoid ―the problem raised by nonequivalent codenoting descriptions.‖129 Marga 
Reimer has a similar observation about Neale‘s account. Reimer says: 
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[Perhaps, Neale thinks that] by adhering to such a stipulation [the 
stipulation that incomplete descriptions can be completed with referring 
expressions and indexicals], the number of possible completions of an 
incomplete description will be narrowed down to just one. In this way, 
the problem of having to choose from among a variety of complete 
descriptions is eliminated.
130
 
But it seems that even if, following Neale, one allows incomplete definite descriptions to 
be completed with indexicals and referring expressions, the problem of incompleteness 
does not go away. For, it is not always true that by allowing an incomplete definite 
description to be completed with an indexical or referential expression the number of 
possible completers can be narrowed down to just one. For example, consider the 
sentence (25) again. Suppose we agree that the incomplete definite description involved 
in this sentence is allowed to be completed with an indexical or referring expression. 
Still, there may be more than one possible completers of the definite description in 
question. It may be completed as ―the table I own‖ or as ―the table over there‖. The 
former completer picks out a person, namely the speaker, whereas the latter completer 
picks out a location to complete the incomplete definite description ―the table‖. These 
possible completers of the incomplete definite description ―the table‖ are clearly non-
synonymous. Each of these possible completers seems to be a good candidate for being 
counted as the correct completer of the incomplete definite description in question; and 
neither of them seems to be a better candidate for being counted as the correct completer 
than the other. So, it seems reasonable to think that there are at least two equally strong 
possible completers of the incomplete definite description ―the table‖ even when it is 
allowed to be completed with an indexical or referring expression. Hence, Neale‘s 
proposal does not help to narrow down the number of possible completers of an 
incomplete definite description to just one. 
Furthermore, it is plain that not every incomplete definite description can be 
completed with an indexical or a referential expression. The incomplete definite description 
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―the man‖ cannot always be completed as ―the man over there‖ or as ―the man over here‖ 
(with indexicals); sometimes it may require to be completed as ―the man wearing a red 
hat‖ or as ―the man who loves driving‖ (with descriptive expressions). Now, it seems to 
be an arbitrary matter when and what incomplete definite description is to be completed 
with an indexical or referring expression and when and what incomplete definite 
description is to be completed with a descriptive expression. An appeal to the context of 
utterance or to the speaker‘s intention won‘t provide a good ground on the basis of which 
one could decide that such and such incomplete definite descriptions might be completed 
with indexicals or referential expressions and such and such incomplete definite descriptions 
might be completed with descriptive expressions (as we have already seen that an appeal 
to the context of utterance as well as an appeal to the speaker‘s intention do not, in fact, 
provide an adequate way of selecting the correct fuller description for an incomplete 
definite description). Neale does not suggest any principled way either by which one can 
know which incomplete definite description should be completed with an indexical or 
referring expression and which should be completed with a descriptive expression. And, 
there seems to be no such principled way at all. Hence, this proposal makes no progress 
in solving the problem. So, it seems reasonable to reject the Explicit Approach. 
 Now, let us examine the Implicit Approach. Against the Implicit Approach a critic 
may be tempted to argue that the notion of domain fixation is not workable when one 
deals with a descriptive sentence that contains more than one occurrence of the same 
incomplete definite description. But such a criticism won‘t be a justified one as we have 
seen that Ludlow and Neale (in their ―The Russian has voted for the Russian‖ example) 
have already addressed and then solved this problem allowing that the domain of the 
quantifier be changed on the basis of the different occurrences of the same definite 
description in a single sentence. So, I won‘t advance with this criticism. Rather, I prefer 
to advance my examination by asking how the domain of the quantifier of a descriptive 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description is fixed. While defending the 
Implicit Approach Neale suggests that the context of a particular utterance of a 
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descriptive sentence fixes the domain of the relevant quantifier.
131
 And, according to him, 
the context of utterance, C, might be understood as a quadruple < s, a, t, p >
132 where: 
s = the speaker 
a = the addressee  
t = the time of utterance 
p = the place of utterance 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, we grant Neale‘s position that the domain of the 
quantifier contained in a descriptive sentence is determined by the context of the utterance 
of the sentence in question. Now, consider the following situation: Jones and Black are at 
a library. The library has two librarians; one works on the check-out desk located at the exit 
point in the basement, and the other works on the check-out desk located at the exit point 
on the main floor. Jones and Black are waiting on the main floor to check out a book. Now 
Jones says to Black (seeing the long queue toward the check-out desk):  
(34) The librarian is very busy today. 
 Clearly, the definite description ―the librarian‖ in the sentence (34) is an incomplete 
definite description as there are many librarians in the world (even the library in which 
Jones and Black are waiting to check out a book has two librarians). So, the domain of 
the quantifier involved in the sentence (34) uttered by Jones requires to be fixed. 
Suppose, following the suggestion made by Neale we consider the context of Jones‘ 
utterance in order to fix the domain of the quantifier involved in the sentence in question. 
The context of Jones‘ uttering the sentence (34) is the following: 
s = Jones 
a = Black 
t = 11 a.m. (February 10, 2012) 
p = the main floor of the library x 
i.e. C = <Jones, Black, 11 a.m. (February 10, 2012), the main floor of the 
library x> 
Now, according to Neale‘s position the domain of the quantifier involved in the sentence 
(34) requires to be fixed on the basis of C. Here, it is interesting to note that in the above 
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 Neale (1990), p. 95. 
132 Ibid., p. 69. 
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analysis of the context, C, there is no mentioning about the existence of a particular 
librarian. But, that does not pose a problem for Neale‘s analysis.133 Neale may say that 
the sentence (34) expresses a true proposition if there is one and only one librarian in the 
immediately shared perceptual environment of the speaker and her addressee in C and 
that librarian is busy in C. So, Neale may claim, here we have got an explanation of how 
one can say something true by using a sentence containing an incomplete definite 
description. Up to now Neale‘s explanation seems to be satisfactory. But, suppose we 
modify the scenario in the following way: Jones and Black are on the third floor of the 
library. They both know that whenever any of them checks out a book from the library, 
he checks it out through the check-out desk located at the exit point of the main floor. 
For, they may know of only one check-out desk of the library, or the check-out desk 
located on the main floor is the most convenient location for them to check out their 
books. Now, Jones utters the sentence (34). Here, the immediately shared perceptual 
environment of the speaker and her addressee in C* (C* = <Jones, Black, 11 a.m. 
(February 10, 2012), the third floor of the library x>) does not help to show how Jones 
may say something true by using the sentence (34) in C*. For, there is no librarian at all 
in the immediately shared perceptual environment of Jones and Black in C*. But still, in 
C* Jones may say something true by using the sentence (34). This problem may be 
solved by appealing to the knowledge (relevant to the matter) shared by Jones and Black 
as both of them know that they usually check out books through the check-out desk 
located at the exit point of the main floor and that there is exactly one librarian working 
there (and that both of them know that they are talking about that librarian). That is, it 
may be said here that the sentence (34) expresses a true proposition if there is exactly one 
                                               
133 It is understandable why there is no mentioning of a particular librarian in the analysis of C. According 
to the Russellian analysis a definite description is not a referring term; so, even if a particular object as a 
matter of fact fits a definite description, still that particular object is not a component of the definite 
description in question. Hence, the one and only librarian visible to the immediately shared perceptual 
environment of Jones and Black is not a component of Jones‘ utterance. Furthermore, Neale does not claim 
that the context of utterance by itself contains the denoted object if something actually fits the definite 
description in question; what he in fact claims is the following: the context of utterance fixes the domain of 
the quantifier against which the sentence in question requires to be evaluated. The domain of a quantifier 
involved in a sentence is not the same as the context of utterance of that sentence, although the context of 
utterance plays a significant role in identifying the domain of the sentence in question. 
79 
librarian in the shared knowledge (relevant to the matter) of Jones and Black in C*, and if 
that librarian is busy in C*. So, it appears that the context of utterance of a sentence 
containing an incomplete definite description does not automatically fix the domain of 
the quantifier involved in the sentence in question; rather, one or more of the various 
contextual supplementations, e.g. the immediately shared perceptual environment of the 
speaker and her addressees, or the knowledge (relevant to the matter) shared by the 
speaker and her addressees, etc., play a significant role in fixing the domain of the 
quantifier involved in the sentence in question. And, it may happen that on an occasion 
two or more of such contextual supplementations are equally relevant; but they—when 
they are taken as domain fixers—may result in different non-equivalent propositions. So, 
what is needed here is a principled way of selecting one contextual supplementation from 
a number of possible contextual supplementations as the one that can be used to fix the 
domain of the quantifier involved in the sentence in question. Neale or any other defender 
of the Implicit Approach has not yet proposed any such principled way. And, actually 
there seems to be no such principled way at all by which one can select the correct 
domain fixer from a number of relevant contextual supplementations. That is, just like the 
Explicit Approach, the Implicit Approach lacks a principled way by which one can select 
a particular contextual supplementation as the one that fixes the domain of the quantifier 
in question. Indeed, the lack of any such principled way is a big flaw of the Implicit 
Approach which actually makes this approach implausible. 
 Of course, a defender of the Implicit Approach may claim—differing from what 
Neale says about domain-fixation—that it is not the context but the speaker‘s intention 
(on an occasion) that determines the domain of the quantifier involved in the sentence in 
question. So, she may argue that in both of the above mentioned cases the domain of the 
quantifier involved in (34) requires to be fixed by the intention of Jones when he utters 
the sentence (34). And, in both cases Jones actually intends to say something about 
exactly one and only one librarian working at the check-out desk located in the exit point 
of the main floor. So, if the librarian working there is really busy at the time when (34) is 
uttered by Jones, then the sentence (34) expresses a true proposition. This solution seems 
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to appeal to the referential use of definite descriptions as it allows that by using the definite 
description ―the librarian‖ Jones (the speaker) intends to say something about a particular 
object he already has in mind and wants Black (his addressee) to pick out the object he 
intends to refer to. But that is not a problem for a Russellian as a Russellian does not need 
to deny that a descriptive sentence may be used referentially; what a Russellian must deny 
is the claim that a descriptive sentence has two types of meaning—one is its attributive 
meaning and the other is its referential meaning. Still the above mentioned solution is 
problematic. Marga Reimer mentions various problems for this solution. She argues
134
: 
first, it is not clear that a speaker of a sentence containing an incomplete definite description 
always has a domain of quantifier in mind against which the proposition expressed can be 
evaluated; second, the appeal to the intention of the speaker involves what the speaker 
means by her sentence, not necessarily what is expressed (proposition) by the sentence 
uttered. And, it is a well-known fact that what is meant by the speaker and what is expressed 
by the sentence the speaker utters often diverge. So, the appeal to the intention of the 
speaker is prone to conflate what is expressed by a sentence and what is meant by the 
speaker who uses that sentence on an occasion.  One further problem—not mentioned by 
Reimer—may be pointed out here: the appeal to the speaker‘s intention in the above 
mentioned case seems to suggest a non-Russellian approach. Russell‘s theory is a theory 
of meaning that deals with an expression‘s semantic properties—properties that are 
independent of the speaker‘s particular intention on a particular occasion (on which the 
speaker uses the descriptive sentence in question). Russell clearly states that his theory 
does not concern the speaker‘s intention when she (the speaker) utters a descriptive 
sentence.
135
 So, although a Russellian does not need to deny the fact that a speaker may 
intend to refer to something when she uses a sentence containing a definite description, a 
Russellian analysis of a descriptive sentence should not appeal to such intention as 
Russell‘s theory precisely is a theory about the meaning of a descriptive sentence, and not 
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about ‗the state of mind‘ of the speaker of that sentence.136 So, the appeal to the speaker‘s 
intention may lead the defender of the Implicit Approach to a non-Russellian position. But 
the Implicit Approach is developed to defend Russell‘s theory against the problem posed 
by the Argument from Incompleteness. Hence, like the previous one, this option is not a 
viable option for the defender of the Implicit Approach who actually is a Russellian too.  
 So, it appears that the Explicit Approach is not workable to defend Russell‘s 
theory against the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness. And the 
Implicit Approach does no better. That is, both forms of the Elliptical Approach fail to 
save Russell‘s theory from the problem arising from incompleteness of incomplete 
definite descriptions. Hence, both approaches, i.e. the Explicit Approach and the Implicit 
Approach, deserve the same treatment: rejection. 
2. The Situation Semantics Approach: Jon Barwise and John Perry developed 
their own theory of meaning in their paper ―Situations and Attitudes‖ published in 1981, 
and in their book Situations and Attitudes published in 1983. In these publications they 
have designed a framework in which the treatment of definite descriptions is built on the 
concept of situation semantics. According to the concept of situation semantics the meaning 
of a descriptive sentence has to be understood on the basis of the situations in which the 
sentence is uttered—the meaning of a sentence is, roughly, a relation between the utterance 
of that sentence and the situations relevant to that utterance.  Suppose, for example
137
, in 
a room full of people—some of whom are sleeping and some of whom are awake—one 
says: ―No one is sleeping‖. Now, what is meant by the speaker‘s utterance of the above 
sentence is to be understood on the basis of what situation the speaker is describing. If the 
speaker describes the whole situation including all the people in the room, then what she 
has said is false. But, suppose, the speaker actually is an assistant of an experiment and is 
                                               
136 Remember Russell‘s words quoted in the previous chapter from his ―Mr. Strawson on Referring‖. There 
Russell explicitly mentions that his theory is not meant to give an analysis of speakers‘ intention when they 
utter a descriptive sentence. He says: ―My theory of descriptions was not intended as an analysis of the 
state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions.‖ (Russell (1957), p. 388.) 
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 Jon Barwise and John Perry, Situations and Attitudes (Cambridge and Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1983), p. 160. (The example is used here with some modifications.) 
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responsible to see whether or not other assistants who are supposed to monitor the sleeping 
people are awake. And, suppose, she utters the above mentioned sentence in response to 
the question: ―Are you guys working?‖ Here, the speaker actually describes not the whole 
situation that includes everyone in the room but a part of the situation that includes only 
the assistants of the experiment. So, the meaning of her utterance is to be understood not 
on the basis of the whole situation of the room but on the basis of the partial situation 
described. In that case, what she has said may be true. Since according to Barwise and 
Perry‘s framework the meaning of a sentence is to be understood as a relation between 
the utterance of that sentence and the situation described, their theory is often called the 
Relation Theory of Meaning. 
At the heart of Barwise and Perry‘s Relation Theory of Meaning is their idea of 
situations. Situations are complexes of objects, properties that are had by the objects, 
relations between the objects and their properties, and the spatiotemporal locations at 
which they (the objects, their properties and relations between the objects and their 
properties) are instantiated.  According to Barwise and Perry situations construct the 
parts, and consequently, the whole of reality. Barwise and Perry describe situations in the 
following way: 
Reality consists of situations—individuals having properties and 
standing in relations at various spatiotemporal locations. We are always 
in situations; we see them, cause them to come about, and have attitudes 
toward them. ... We begin by pulling out of real situations the basic 
building blocks of the theory; individuals, properties and relations, and 
locations.
138
 
Now, following Barwise and Perry, a situation can be defined in the following way: 
Situation (s): a situation relevant to an utterance is a set of certain sort 
that includes spatiotemporal locations, objects referred to by the 
utterance, properties and relations attributed to those objects. 
So, if Molly barks at a spatiotemporal location l, then this situation s can be represented as: 
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in s: at l: barks, Molly; yes 
(where, barks = property attributed to the object referred to; Molly = the 
object referred to; l = location (the time and place) at which the object 
having the property attributed is instantiated; yes = claimed to be true) 
It should be noted here that many situations can be of the same type. To capture the fact 
that two or more situations can be of the same type Barwise and Perry emphasize the 
internal structure of situations—situation-types—in terms of their spatiotemporal location.139 
As mentioned earlier, a spatiotemporal location of an utterance is the times and places 
where the objects referred to and the properties and relations attributed to them are 
instantiated. So, if Molly barked at one‘s backyard day before yesterday at 10 a.m., and 
she barked at the same backyard at 11 a.m. yesterday, then though the place where the 
object and its properties were instantiated was the same, times of the instantiation of the 
object and its properties were different. That is why Barwise and Perry mention that 
locations may overlap in time and space, or that they may be years and miles apart.
140
   
 A situation-type in which an utterance is claimed to be instantiated is called the 
described situation. In Barwise and Perry‘s framework, the described situation relevant to 
an utterance of a sentence is the interpretation of that sentence on the relevant occasion. 
Barwise and Perry say: 
The leading idea of situation semantics is that the meaning of a simple 
declarative sentence is a relation between utterances and described 
situations. The interpretation of a statement made with such a sentence 
on a specific occasion is the described situation.
141
 
Here, by ―statement‖ Barwise and Perry mean the utterance of an indicative sentence.142 
So, following Barwise and Perry, it can be said that in a given context the interpretation 
of a statement made with a sentence in that context is the situation-type in which the 
statement is claimed to be instantiated. And, as has been stated earlier, the meaning of a 
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sentence in Barwise and Perry‘s analysis is the relation between the utterance of that 
sentence and the described situation. So, the meaning of a sentence now may be defined 
as a relation between the statement made with that sentence in a context and the 
interpretation of the statement made. 
 So far we have understood situations as real situations. But there are sentences 
that are not uttered yet. So, there are no real situations relevant to them with respect to 
which they can be evaluated. But those sentences are meaningful. An adequate theory of 
meaning requires to account for the meaningfulness of those sentences too. Furthermore, 
it happens that the same object and its properties may appear again and again in different 
locations.
143
 To account for these phenomena Barwise and Perry present a set theoretical 
model called abstract situations to play the role of potential situations. Abstract situations 
are not presented as things that oppose real situations; rather, real situations are elements 
of abstract situations. In other words, some of these abstract situations correspond to real 
situations, though others do not.
144
 In Barwise and Perry‘s framework, an abstract 
situation is built from the location and situation-type relevant to an utterance.
145
 For 
example, consider a potential situation in which Molly barks at 10 a.m. on February 15, 
2012 at Jones‘ backyard, and Jackie does not bark on that spatiotemporal location. Now, 
this potential situation can be understood as the following abstract situation: 
in s: at 10 a.m. on February 15, 2012 at Jones‘ backyard: barks, Molly; yes 
at 10 a.m. on February 15, 2012 at Jones‘ backyard: barks, Jackie; no 
Now, if this abstract situation corresponds to some real situation, then it is said to be a 
factual situation. It should be noted here that a factual situation is a correct but not 
necessarily a complete representation of the real situation.
146
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146 Barwise and Perry divide situations into three categories: actual, factual and non-factual situations. An 
actual situation is a situation that corresponds to the real situation. A factual situation is a situation that 
classifies the real situation though not represents the whole real situation; it is a part of the actual situation. 
So, in general there are lots of factual situations (there will always be as many factual situations as there are 
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Given that abstract situations play the role of potential situations, the meaning of a 
sentence, S, is then seen as a relation between the abstract situation representing the 
potential context of utterance and a set of abstract situations at least one member of 
which represents a situation in which the utterance is claimed to be instantiated.
147
 This 
latter sort of set of abstract situations is what Barwise and Perry have called the 
interpretation of a sentence in a context. So, it can now be said that: 
A sentence S uttered in a context C is true iff the interpretation I of the 
sentence contains at least one abstract situation in which the statement 
made with the utterance of the sentence S is instantiated. In other words, 
S in C is true iff at least one member of I of S in C is factual (i.e. at least 
one of the abstract situations is factual). 
Now, Barwise and Perry think that the above analysis can account for the 
phenomenon that a sentence like 
┌
The F is G
┐
 containing an incomplete definite 
description 
┌
the F
┐
 can express a true statement, even though the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
, in such a case, does not determine a unique referent when evaluated in the whole 
of reality. For example, consider the following sentence that contains an incomplete 
definite description ―the man in a red vest‖: 
(35) The man in a red vest is a fool. 
On Barwise and Perry‘s analysis this sentence can be used referentially to express the 
statement that Lee is a fool, even though the definite description ―the man in a red vest‖ 
is incomplete and for that reason cannot determine a unique referent, namely Lee, when 
evaluated in the whole of reality. But the truth of the statement made by the utterance of 
(35) can now be accounted for in the following way: there is a potential situation in 
which Lee is the only person wearing a red vest and he has the property of foolishness in 
a spatiotemporal location (l). This spatiotemporal location may consist of (i) the spatial 
location where the utterance is made (e.g. the location where Lee is appeared in front of 
                                                                                                                                            
parts of actual situations) though there may be only one actual situation. And, a non-factual situation is a 
situation that does not correspond to any factual situation. [Barwise and Perry (1983), pp. 50, 55, 60-61.] 
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the speaker and her audiences‘ immediately shared perceptual environment), and (ii) the 
temporal location, i.e. the time of utterance. Now, this potential situation can be 
represented by the following set theoretical model of abstract situations: 
(a) in s: at l: only man wearing a red vest, Lee; yes 
at l: foolishness, Lee; yes 
Now, when Lee appears wearing a red vest (not necessarily the only man in the world 
wearing a red vest at that time) and has the property of foolishness, then the abstract 
situation (a) is factual as it corresponds to some real situation (though not the real 
situation as a whole). That is, the interpretation I of the sentence (35) in the given context 
C contains a set of abstract situations at least one member of which, i.e. (a), represents a 
situation in which the statement made by an utterance of (35) is instantiated.
148
 In other 
words, the utterance of (35) in C expresses a true statement because at least one member 
of I of the statement made by (35), i.e. (a), is factual. 
So, we see, Barwise and Perry account for the phenomenon that a speaker can 
referentially use the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 containing an incomplete definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 to express a true statement even though the definite description 
┌
the F
┐ 
contained 
in the sentence in question fails to determine a unique object when evaluated in the whole 
of reality. They have done it by replacing the idea that 
┌
the F
┐
 is used to talk about a 
unique F in the reality as a whole with the idea that 
┌
the F
┐
 is used to talk about a unique 
F in some part of the reality. They think that their idea that 
┌
the F
┐
 is used to talk about a 
unique F in some part of the reality—not in the reality as a whole—is significant because 
it explains how speakers can use sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions to 
express true statements. They say: 
It is an advantage of our approach that we can naturally explain the fact 
that definite descriptions manage to pick out individuals without finding 
describing conditions that are uniquely satisfied in the whole world.
149
 
                                               
148 According to Barwise and Perry in Russell‘s theory of descriptions the describing condition, but not the 
described object, is put into the interpretation; on the other hand, in Strawson‘s theory the described object, 
but not the describing condition, is a constituent of the interpretation. (Barwise and Perry (1983), p. 146.) 
149 Barwise and Perry (1983), p. 153. 
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And, to mention the implausibility of the idea that 
┌
the F
┐
 is used to talk about a unique 
F in the reality as a whole, they say: 
... if we required that the world [the reality as a whole] were in the 
interpretation of an utterance, then neither of the true examples above 
[examples like ―The F is G‖, ―No F is G‖, ―Every F is G‖, ―I am the cook‖ 
etc. which can be used to express true statements] would count as true.
150
 
So, apparently Barwise and Perry have proposed a solution to the problem posed 
by the Argument from Incompleteness. However, the examples Barwise and Perry so far 
deal with are examples of referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions.
151
 But 
incomplete definite descriptions can also be used attributively. For example, after 
entering in her office and looking at her bookshelf a professor utters the sentence (29), 
i.e. ―The thief has stolen my dictionary‖. Here, the professor uses the incomplete definite 
description ―the thief‖ attributively having no particular person in her mind as the 
referent of the definite description she uses. An adequate account of incomplete definite 
description must be capable of handling this type of cases too. So, the following question 
is relevant here: can Barwise and Perry‘s account handle the cases in which incomplete 
definite descriptions are used attributively? Initially, Barwise and Perry‘s account faces 
difficulties when it deals with incomplete definite descriptions used attributively. It 
appears that in their framework a statement made with an utterance of a sentence S in a 
context C is true iff the interpretation I of the sentence uttered in the context contains at 
least one abstract situation which is factual. That is, Barwise and Perry‘s truth-
characterization (T) of a sentence S is as follow: 
(T) S is true relative to C iff some members of the interpretation of S is 
factual. 
Here, we see, according to (T), the truth-conditions of the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 in which 
┌
the F
┐
 is used attributively is the same as the truth-condition of the sentence 
┌
An F is 
                                               
150 Ibid., p. 160. 
151 Barwise and Perry originally use the following examples up to this point of their discussion: ―The 
President of the U.S. is sneezing‖, ―The dog growled at the rabbit that sneezed‖, ―The man in a red vest is a 
fool‖, etc., all of which are supposed to be used referentially. 
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G
┐
; 
┌
The F is G
┐
 is true if any of many Fs is G because in that case the interpretation of 
┌
The F is G
┐
 will contain a factual situation whose unique F is G, and the same is true of 
the truth condition of the sentence 
┌
An F is G
┐
. But this result is not acceptable—the 
uniqueness claim associated with the definite article ―the‖ must be semantically 
incorporated and the definite article should involve different truth-conditions than those 
of indefinite articles. Barwise and Perry recognizes this problem. They describe this 
problem in the following way: 
Consider the interpretation P of my utterance of Ί am the cook'. 
P= {e\d,c [[I AM THE COOK]] e} 
If e P, then e will have just one person (me) doing the cooking at the 
relevant location l = c (COOK). But any such e will be part of other e
/
 
which have more than one person cooking there. Such e
/
 will not belong 
to P because there will be no person who is the cook. So P is not 
persistent. This raises a problem for our account of truth in the following 
way. Suppose my wife and I collaborate on cooking for a party. And 
suppose at a certain point in the party I say, "I am the cook," referring to 
l. Is what I have said true or not? 
The answer is, "It depends on which situation I am describing." First, 
suppose someone comes up to me and says, "The food at this party is 
delicious! Who is the cook?" If I say, "I am the cook," I have clearly not 
described things accurately. I have claimed to be the person who did the 
cooking for the party. But suppose instead someone comes up to me 
eating a piece of my famous cheesecake pastry and says, "Who made 
this?" Then I may truly say that I am the cook. 
The first case shows that the account we gave of truth for persistent 
statements does not work for nonpersistent statements. For in that case 
there is a factual situation, part of the situation referred to by the guest, 
where I am the unique cook. So there will be a factual (maybe even an 
actual c.o.e. [situation]) in P, and on our earlier account of truth, my 
statement would be true, whereas in fact it isn't. But surely nonpersistent 
statements can be true, for in the second case, what I said was true. A 
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theory that did not allow this would be unfair to me. So we need an 
account of truth that can be applied to nonpersistent statements.
152
 
Two terms are needed to be clarified here—persistent statements and nonpersistent 
statements (remember that, for Barwise and Perry, a statement is an utterance of a 
sentence in a context): 
# Persistent Statements: a persistent statement is one whose 
interpretation I is such that for every sI, if s is a part of a larger 
situation s
*
, then s
*I. That is, a persistent statement is such that if it is 
true in a part of the reality, it is true in all larger parts of the reality.
153
 
In other words, a persistent statement is such that if it is true in a part 
of the reality, it is true in the reality as a whole. ―The author of 
Waverley is G‖, ―The first child born in the 21st century is G‖, etc. are 
examples of sentences that express persistent statements. 
# Nonpersistent Statements: a nonpersistent statement is one whose 
interpretation contains at least one abstract situation which is factual, 
but not all members of its interpretation, i.e. not all abstract situations 
contained by the statement‘s interpretation, are factual. That is, a 
nonpersistent statement is such that it is true in one or more parts of the 
reality, but not true in the reality as a whole. ―The murderer is insane‖, 
―I am the cook‖ are examples of sentences that express nonpersistent 
statements. Both, persistence and nonpersistence are properties of 
statements, not of sentences.
154 
Now, it seems that Barwise and Perry have found a truth-characterization that provides 
the truth-conditions (different from that which is appropriate for indefinite descriptions) 
that is specific to sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions. They adopt a 
position according to which ―the context of utterance provides not only the basis for an 
interpretation of the sentence uttered, but also a situation that the speaker is using the 
sentence to refer to or talk about.‖155 They claim that the position they have taken is 
founded on a view of J. L Austin. They say: 
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The crucial insight needed goes back to Austin. As Austin put it, a 
statement is true when the actual situation to which it refers is of the type 
described by statement.
156
 
However, according to the position that Barwise and Perry defend referring to Austin a 
sentence S is true in a context C iff the interpretation I of S in C contains the actual 
situation that the speaker is talking about. So, the following truth-characterization seems 
to be appropriate for nonpersistent statements: 
(T*): a nonpersistent statement S is true relative to a context C iff there 
is an actual situation r such that the agent of C is using S to refer to 
r, and r is a member of the interpretation of S in C. 
Now, as mentioned earlier, a descriptive sentence containing a complete definite description 
expresses a persistent statement, and hence, when it is true, it is true in the whole of reality; 
but a descriptive sentence containing an incomplete definite description expresses a 
nonpersistent statement, and hence, when it is true, its truth is a nonpersistent truth which 
is relative to the context of utterance and the relevant interpretation. So, (T*) is the truth-
characterization that is applicable to sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions. 
(T*) accounts for the phenomenon that a sentence containing an incomplete definite 
description may, on some occasions, express true statement provided that the agent who 
uses the sentence in a context refers to an actual situation and that actual situation is a 
member of the interpretation of the sentence in that context. Furthermore, the truth-
conditions provided by (T*) does not grant that the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐ 
expresses a 
true statement iff any of many Fs is G, as according to (T*) a statement is true if the 
agent uses the sentence that expresses the statement in question to refer to an actual 
situation, and if that actual situation is a member of the interpretation of the statement in 
the relevant context. So, if any one of many Fs is G, but the agent does not refer to the 
situation in which that F is instantiated (along with its property G), then that particular 
real situation in which that F (along with its property G) is instantiated won‘t be a member 
of the interpretation of the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 used by the agent. In such a case, although 
                                               
156 Barwise and Perry (1983), p. 160. 
91 
the sentence 
┌
An F is G
┐ 
will express a true statement (and its truth can be accounted by 
(T)), but the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐ 
may not express a true statement because of its failure 
to satisfy the conditions mentioned in (T*). In this way by adopting (T*) in order to analyze 
sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions Barwise and Perry‘s account can 
avoid the criticism that their account assimilates the truth-conditions of  sentences 
containing a definite descriptions to sentences containing indefinite descriptions. And, one 
more advantage of (T*) is that it is equally applicable to both sort of use of incomplete 
definite descriptions, namely the referential and the attributive use of incomplete definite 
descriptions. Hence, it seems that Barwise and Perry have provided a general
157
 solution 
to the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness. 
 It may be noted here that Barwise and Perry‘s proposed solution to the problem 
posed by the Argument from Incompleteness is different from the solution offered by the 
proponents of the Explicit Approach. The proponents of the Explicit Approach adopt the 
strategy of supplying the linguistic supplementation to the incomplete definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 to complete it. So, a proponent of the Explicit Approach may argue to complete 
the definite description ―the thief‖ used attributively in the sentence ―The thief has stolen 
my dictionary‖ as ―the thief who entered my room last night‖, ―the thief who entered my 
room in my absence‖ (without knowing who the thief was) etc. But Barwise and Perry 
leave the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 unsupplemented; they, rather, adopt a strategy in 
which the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 as a whole gets contextually supplemented, as the whole 
sentence, in their framework, carries an implicit reference to a contextually determined 
situation.
158
 Observing this one may be tempted to treat Barwise and Perry‘s account as 
another version of the Implicit Approach. But I think that is not the case. The Proponents 
of the Implicit Approach adopt a strategy of delimiting the domain of the definite description 
in question. And, this domain-fixation is done on the basis of elements supplied by the 
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context of the utterance of the sentence in question. So, it may be said that according to 
the Implicit Approach contextual supplementations work at the level of descriptions which 
are constituents of relevant sentences; but according to the framework that Barwise and 
Perry develop contextual supplementation, as we have seen, work at the level of sentences 
as a whole. So, Barwise and Perry‘s account is different from the Implicit Approach, 
though it seems to be closer to the Implicit Approach than it is to the Explicit Approach. 
 However, Barwise and Perry‘s solution to the problem of incompleteness is not 
satisfactory. Scott Soames shows some of the difficulties with their solution. According 
to Soames the most obvious difficulty with Barwise and Perry‘s account is that it fails to 
incorporate the results of contextual supplementation into a theory of propositional 
contents.
159
 We have seen that the truth of a statement in Barwise and Perry‘s account is 
made dependent on certain features of the relevant context. If it is so, then, according to 
Soames, what is asserted by uttering a sentence like the following: 
(36) The murderer is insane 
should also be made dependent on features of the context in which it is uttered.
160
 But 
Barwise and Perry‘s account does not do it. Soames illustrates his point by the following 
example: 
x upon discovering Smith‘s foully murdered body attributively utters the 
sentence (1) [(36)], i.e. ―The murderer is insane‖; and x does not know 
who the murderer is. Again, y upon discovering Brown‘s foully 
murdered body attributive utters the sentence (1) [(36)]; and y does not 
know who the murderer is. Suppose, the utterances are made referring to 
distinct situations s and s
/
, respectively.
161
 
Now, in their book Situations and Attitudes Barwise and Perry adopt a position according 
to which the objects of assertions are the semantic interpretations of utterances.
162
 But this 
gives us an unacceptable result in the above case, according to Soames. The problem is like 
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this: both of the utterances (made by x and y) have the same interpretation: the utterance 
of (36), in each case, is instantiated in a situation, namely in the following situation: 
in s: at l: only murderer, insanity; yes 
Here, Barwise and Perry‘s account does not allow the definite description ―the murderer‖ 
to be supplemented by contextual element the victim Smith (when (36) is uttered by x), or 
by contextual element the victim Brown (when (36) is uttered by y). So, the utterance of 
(36) made by x, and the utterance of (36) made by y have the same interpretation, and 
hence, in Barwise and Perry‘s account both of the utterances result the same assertion. 
But utterances of (36) may involve different truth-values, e.g. when the murderer of 
Smith is not insane the utterance of (36) by x results a false assertion, and when the 
murderer of Brown is insane the utterance of (36) by y results a true assertion (and, 
Barwise and Perry‘s account accounts for this difference in truth-values). Thus, we get 
the unacceptable result that utterances of (36) made by x and y differ in truth-values while 
saying the same thing.
163
 Hence, this account is unsatisfactory. 
 Besides, Barwise and Perry‘s idea that contextual supplementations work at the 
level of sentences themselves—and not at the level of their sub-sentential constituents 
(e.g. definite descriptions)—involves serious difficulty. Soames explains this problem by 
using several examples. We can mention here one of his examples
164
: consider the 
following sentence: 
(37) The cook is more experienced than the cook who prepared the main 
course. 
The sentence (37) can be used attributively to express a truth in an appropriate context. 
But this does not fit with Barwise and Perry‘s analysis. According to Barwise and Perry‘s 
analysis, the interpretation of (37) in the context is the type-of-situation that 
(i) there is exactly one individual, o, who is a cook (at the relevant 
spatiotemporal location) in s; 
(ii) there is exactly one individual, o
/
, who is a cook who prepared the 
main course (at the same spatiotemporal location) in s; and 
(iii) o is more experienced than o
/
 in s. 
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Here, as Soames shows, the spatiotemporal location of the cook in (i) and the spatiotemporal 
location of the cook in (ii) are the same. Hence, o must be identical with o
/
. But that is 
impossible because no individual can be more experienced than himself or herself.
165
 
Thus, Barwise and Perry‘s account leads us to decide that the sentence (37) must express 
a false statement. But that is a wrong result. It is wrong because the sentence (37) can be, 
and often is, used to express true statements in appropriate contexts. 
 According to Soames the lesson we learn from the above observation is the fact 
that contextual supplementations work at the level of constituents of sentences rather than 
at the level of sentences themselves.
166
 If contexts supplement the contents of constituents 
of sentences (e.g. definite descriptions), then the interpretation of ―the cook‖ in (37) will 
be something like a unique individual who cooked the dessert, or a unique individual 
standing here who cooked cheesecake, etc. Similarly, the interpretation of ―the murderer‖ 
in (36) will be something like a unique murderer of Smith, or a unique murderer of Brown, 
or a unique murderer of him, etc., if contexts supplement the contents of constituents of 
sentences. And, when one accepts this idea that contexts supplement the contents of 
constituents of sentences, one can account for the truths expressed by sentences like (36) 
and (37) in various contexts. Since Barwise and Perry‘s framework offered in Situations 
and Attitudes fails to account for the truths of the assertions made by using sentences like 
(36) and (37), it deserves to be rejected, according to Soames. 
 In a paper titled ―Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes‖,167 based on Barwise 
and Perry‘s interview, Barwise and Perry have made some changes in their framework. 
One of the changes they have made in their framework is types-of-situations are no 
longer identified with set theoretical model of abstract situations. They have made this 
change because of some set-theoretic problems associated with the set theoretical model 
of abstract situations.
168
 In their modified framework types-of-situations are regarded as 
                                               
165 Ibid., p. 357. 
166 Ibid., p. 357. 
167 Jon Barwise and John Perry, ―Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes‖, Linguistics and Philosophy 8, no. 
1 (1985), pp. 105-61 
168 Ibid., p. 127. 
95 
theoretical primitives to be thought of, roughly, as properties of real situations.
169
 And, a 
new concept—the concept of types-of-things—is introduced. Barwise says about their 
concept of types-of-things: 
We also have a notation for types of things that might be useful later on. 
Just as one uses ―{x | ... x ...}‖ to denote the set of things that satisfy the 
condition ... x ..., we will use the notations ―[x | ... x ...]‖ to denote the 
type of thing that satisfies the condition. This works out neatly with a 
new notation for roles: write ―x | ... x ...‖ to denote the role of being an x 
such that ... x .... Then for any role x we can form the type [x] of thing 
that can play that role.
170
 
Besides, Barwise and Perry‘s conception of propositions is introduced in this new 
framework. Here, propositions are given non-set-theoretic structure. Barwise and Perry 
claim that their conception of propositions actually is not introduced in their ―Shifting 
Situations and Shaken Attitudes‖; they had talked about propositions in their Situations 
and Attitudes though there propositions were given a set theoretical structure which they 
now want to avoid. Barwise says in response to a comment of the interviewer: 
I [interviewer]: I thought you guys didn't believe in propositions. 
B [Barwise]: What ever makes you think that? In our papers, we tried to 
model propositions with collections of abstract situations, but this got us 
into set-theoretic hot water. But, once you get away from trying to build 
everything up from a fixed stock of primitives in set theory, and see the 
task as that of understanding the relations between all that is, it frees you 
from having to construct propositions.
171
 
While a type-of-situations is not a sort of thing that is either true or false, a proposition is 
either true or false.  
Barwise and Perry then explain the new framework they introduced in their 
―Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes‖ with the following example:172 
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(38) ―Hesperus‖ referred to a heavenly bodyi and ―Phosphorus‖ referred to iti. 
The interpretation of (38) is the type-of-situation s such that: 
in s: at p; co-instantiated , [x], [y]; yes 
where p is a location temporarily precedes the location of utterance; and [x] is the type-
of-thing x such that: 
in s: at p: heavenly body, x ; yes 
and [y] is the type-of-thing y such that 
in s: at p: refers to, ―Hesperus‖, y; yes 
in s: at p: refers to, ―Phosphorus‖, y; yes 
Thus, (38) is true, if there is a real situation in which [x] and [y] are co-instantiated.
173
 
Although Barwise and Perry do not apply this new framework to their treatment 
of definite descriptions, Soames applies it to the analysis of definite descriptions in order 
to determine whether or not Barwise and Perry‘s new framework—if it is applied to the 
analysis of definite descriptions—can provide correct results about the use of definite 
descriptions. To observe how Soames applies it, we can consider the sentence 
┌
The F is 
G
┐
 again. In Barwise and Perry‘s new framework, the interpretation of this sentence is 
the type-of-situation s such that: 
[S/ in s: at l; co-instantiated, [x], [y]; yes 
uniquely instantiated, [x]; yes] 
where l is the spatiotemporal location of utterance; and [x] and [y] are: 
[x/ in s: at l; being F, x; yes] 
[y/ in s: at l; being G, y; yes] 
Now, let us consider the attributive use of the sentence (36), i.e. ―The murderer is insane‖ 
in which the definite description used is an incomplete definite description. In Barwise 
and Perry‘s new framework the interpretation of (36) is the type-of-situation s such that: 
[S/ in s: at l; co-instantiated, [x], [y]; yes 
uniquely instantiated, [x]; yes] 
where l is the spatiotemporal location of utterance; and [x] and [y] are: 
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[x/ in s: at l; murderer, x; yes] 
[y/ in s: at l; insanity, y; yes] 
Now, as Soames shows, if we grant Barwise and Perry‘s new framework to be correct, 
then in order for (36) to be true the property of being murderer (of the victim) and the 
property of being insane must be uniquely instantiated in a real situation to which the 
speaker refers. That is, in Barwise and Perry‘s new framework, the sentence (36) is true if 
the unique murderer (who is also insane) is somehow included in the interpretation of 
(36).
174
 But this is problematic. For, when the sentence (36) is used attributively, the 
speaker of (36) may not know who the murderer is. Hence, as Soames mentions, although 
the victim may correctly be considered as a constituent of what the speaker says when 
she utters (36), the unique murderer cannot be considered as a constituent of what the 
speaker says when she utters (36).
175
 So, the unique murderer cannot be included in the 
interpretation of (36). But the speaker of the sentence (36) may use it attributively to say 
something true. Hence, it can be said that Barwise and Perry‘s new framework fails to 
account for the phenomenon that a speaker can attributively use a descriptive sentence 
like the sentence (36) to say something true on some occasions even though the unique 
referent of the definite description contained in the sentence in question is not included in 
the interpretation of that sentence. This point can be made clearer by the following 
example: suppose, Jones is the unique murderer of the victim and is insane. Then, the 
speaker‘s utterance of (36) is true even though she may not know that it is Jones who 
murdered the victim. Again, suppose, the victim was murdered by a unique individual 
who was insane but was not Jones. In such a case, the speaker‘s utterance of (36) is still 
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true as the speaker attributes the property of insanity not particularly to Jones but to a 
unique person whoever murdered the victim. This confirms that the utterance of (36), 
when the definite description contained in it is used attributively, does not contain Jones 
(or any other particular person as the murderer of the victim) as a constituent of it. So, 
again, it is proved that the unique murderer of the victim cannot be included in the 
interpretation of (36). But, as has been mentioned earlier, Barwise and Perry‘s new 
framework includes the unique murderer of the victim in the interpretation of (36) when 
(36) expresses a true statement. Hence, their new framework, like the framework they 
proposed earlier in their Situations and Attitudes, is wrong. 
So, we see, although Barwise and Perry‘s idea of partial reality initially appears as 
a very attractive view with seeming capability of solving the problem of incompleteness 
of definite descriptions, after examination it appears that their idea of partial reality is 
founded on a wrong framework and is actually incapable to deal with many of descriptive 
sentences containing incomplete definite descriptions, especially when they are used 
attributively. Hence, like the Elliptical Approach, Barwise and Perry‘s Situation 
Semantics Approach deserves to be rejected as a solution to the problem posed by the 
Argument form Incompleteness. 
Hence, it turns out that none of the above strategies succeeds in solving the 
problem emerging from the incompleteness of definite descriptions. The strategies 
discussed above are semantic as the main aim of all of those strategies is to show that a 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description can, on some occasions, express 
propositions that are true. So, it may be said that all prominent semantic strategies to 
solve the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness fail. But that is not the 
only thing that can be said about the matter; there may be other non-semantic strategy 
which is able to deal with this problem. In the chapter next to the following I will return 
to the issue again to see whether there is any such non-semantic strategy that can help us 
to solve the problem. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Responses to the Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction 
In the previous chapter I have examined various responses to one of the two main 
objections against Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. In the present chapter I will 
examine various responses to the other objection, namely the objection arises from the 
Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction. According to the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 has two meanings: (i) exactly one thing is an F, 
and whatever is an F is G, and (ii) o (where o is a particular object which is described by 
┌
the F
┐
) is G. Now, when the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 is used attributively, the 
sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 is used in its first meaning (and the proposition expressed by it is a 
general proposition); and when 
┌
the F
┐
 is used referentially, the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 is 
used in its second meaning (and the proposition expressed by it is a singular proposition 
which refers to a particular object, say o). Some philosophers, Michael Devitt for 
example, call the former meaning of 
┌
The F is G
┐
 the attributive meaning of 
┌
The F is 
G
┐
, and the latter meaning the referential meaning of it.
176
 Both of these meanings of 
┌
The F is G
┐
, according to them, are semantically significant meanings of the descriptive 
sentence in question. On the basis of this idea those philosophers claim that a descriptive 
sentence is actually semantically ambiguous; it has two semantically significant meanings 
one of which is salient when the definite description involved in it is used attributively, 
and the other is salient when the definite description involved in it is used referentially. 
But in its analysis of descriptive sentences Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions fails 
to accommodate the above mentioned ambiguity. So, the defenders of the Argument from 
Donnellan‘s Distinction claim that Russell‘s theory is inadequate. 
 Philosophers who defend Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions against the 
objection arising from the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction do not generally deny 
the existence of the referential/attributive distinction; they agree that a definite description 
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contained in a descriptive sentence may be used referentially as well as attributively. What 
they deny is the claim that descriptive sentences have two different types of semantic 
meanings. They, rather, claim that descriptive sentences have one type of semantic meaning, 
and that meaning is correctly analyzed by Russell‘s theory; whether a definite description 
involved in a sentence is used attributively or referentially, the meaning of the sentence 
containing the definite description in question is equivalent to what the defenders of the 
Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction call the attributive meaning of it; so, descriptive 
sentences actually are not semantically ambiguous. Those defenders of Russell‘s theory 
generally maintain that the so-called referential meaning of descriptive sentences arising 
from Donnellan‘s distinction raises an issue relevant to pragmatics and can well be 
accounted for by a theory of pragmatics; but since Russell‘s theory is a theory of semantics, 
and not of pragmatics, this issue is irrelevant to Russell‘s theory. Hence, according to 
them, Donnellan‘s distinction fails to undermine Russell‘s theory. This sort of defense of 
Russell‘s theory may be called the Pragmatic Defense of his theory. The most significant 
Pragmatic Defense of Russell‘s theory is that of Kripke to which I now turn. 
 In his ―Speaker‘s Reference and Semantic Reference‖177 Kripke argues that 
Donnellan‘s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite 
descriptions can be accounted for by a general pragmatic theory of speech acts;
178
 and so, 
it shows nothing against Russell‘s theory as Russell‘s theory is a theory of semantics and 
not of pragmatics. Kripke takes H. P. Grice‘s distinction between utterer‘s meaning and 
sentence-meaning as a basic apparatus in his way of defending Russell‘s theory. Grice, in 
his paper ―Meaning‖,179 published in 1957, indicates that in addition to the literal 
meaning that a word or a sentence has there is also a sense in which the speaker of that 
word or sentence may mean something. Grice, then, extends and revises this view in his 
―Utterer‘s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning‖180 and ―Utterer‘s Meaning 
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and Intention‖181 published in 1968 and 1969, respectively. The view Grice offers in 
these papers, roughly, is: what a speaker means by uttering a sentence on an occasion 
may be different from the sentence‘s own meaning. For example182, suppose a speaker 
says to her listener ―You are the cream in my coffee.‖ Here, what the speaker‘s sentence 
means is: the listener is a fatty substance of milk existing in the speaker‘s beverage 
consisting of an infusion of ground coffee beans (and the proposition expressed by the 
speaker‘s sentence is false since the listener is a person, not a fatty substance of milk 
existing in the speaker‘s beverage). But that is not what the speaker really means by using 
her sentence. What the speaker means by her sentence may be this: the listener is the 
speaker‘s source of pride and joy (and it may be the case that what the speaker means by 
her sentence is true of the listener). So, here we observe a divergence between what a 
sentence means (sentence-meaning) and what the utterer means (utterer‘s meaning) by 
that sentence. But how does a speaker succeed to mean something (in the sense of 
utterer‘s meaning) by uttering a sentence when what she means is different from the 
meaning of the sentence (sentence-meaning) she utters? Grice initially analyzes this 
phenomenon in the following way: a speaker succeeds in meaning something, e.g. that p, 
by uttering a sentence, e.g. x, if by uttering x she intends to induce the belief that p in her 
audiences, and her audiences form the belief that p on the basis of the sentence uttered by 
her.
183
 But Grice then finds that his above mentioned initial analysis does not work as it 
fails to capture the difference between telling someone something and deliberately and 
openly letting her know something.
184
 For, in an instance of genuine telling, it is not 
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enough that the utterer intends her audiences to believe something, e.g. to believe that p; 
rather, to be a genuine act of telling it must be the case that the utterer intends her 
audiences to come to believe that p at least in part because of their recognition of the fact 
that that p is what she (the utterer) intends them to come to believe. So, for a successful 
act of meaning something (in the sense of utterer‘s meaning) it is important that the 
utterer‘s audiences recognize her intention to mean what she wants to mean. Grice says: 
Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by x 
as follows. A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he 
must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these 
intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play 
its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will 
have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A‘s intention.185 
So, Grice‘s revised account of utterer‘s meaning may be formulated in the following way: 
A means (in the sense of utterer‘s meaning) that p by her utterance of x 
iff A utters x with the intention of getting her audiences to believe that p 
by recognizing her (A‘s) intention of getting them (her audiences) to 
believe that p. 
On the other hand, what a sentence means—when it is used on an occasion—depends on 
various linguistic conventions and procedures of the language (that contains the sentence 
in question) used by the concerned linguistic group. Grice defines, roughly, sentence-
meaning in the following way: for a linguistic group G, a sentence x means that p iff (i) at 
least some (actually many) members of G have, in their repertoires, the procedure of 
uttering x if, for some audiences A (A belong to the group G), they want A to believe that 
they believe that p, and (ii) they will continue to retain this procedure in their repertoires 
                                                                                                                                            
instance of act of telling. For, although the photograph shower deliberately lets Mr. X know what she 
intends him to know, Mr. X may know it without recognizing the photograph shower‘s intention that she 
wants him to know the matter and that she wants him to know that she has such intention. [Grice (1957), pp. 
382-83.]. On the other hand, if in reply to Mr. X‘s question ―What do you know about the relationship 
between my wife and Mr. Y?‖ the photograph shower shows the photograph, then it will be a genuine act of 
telling as, in this case, she not only intends that Mr. X knows about the matter, she also (i) intends that Mr. 
X recognizes her intention, and (ii) intends that Mr. X recognizes that she intends that he recognizes her 
intention.  
185 Ibid., p. 383-84. 
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only if some members of G have and had have the same procedure in their repertoires.
186
 
For example, suppose a user of English utters the following sentence: ―Russell is a 
brilliant philosopher‖. Now, the sentence she uttered means (in the sense of sentence-
meaning) that Russell is a brilliant philosopher, because: (i*) the competent users of 
English have in their idiolect the procedure of uttering the same sentence if they want 
their audiences to believe that Russell is a brilliant philosopher, and (ii*) competent users 
of English will continue to retain this procedure in their idiolect as users of English have 
and have had the same procedure in their repertoires. So, Grice‘s notion of sentence-
meaning may be expressed in the following simplified way: 
In a language E a sentence x means that p iff the users of E, in their 
idiolect, have (and have had) a standard procedure of using x to induce 
the belief that p in her audiences. 
So, we see, even if a sentence x, in a language, means (in the sense of sentence-meaning) 
that p, a speaker of that language may, on some occasions, mean q by uttering x iff she 
utters x with the intention of getting her audiences to believe that q by recognizing her 
(the speaker‘s) intention of getting them (the speaker‘s audiences) to believe that q. In 
short, according to Grice, it may be the case that although the sentence x means (in the 
sense of sentence-meaning) p in a given language, a speaker of that language may, on 
some occasions, mean q by uttering x. So, what we learn from Grice‘s distinction between 
utterer‘s meaning and sentence-meaning is that by uttering a sentence, on an occasion, a 
speaker may mean something which is different from the sentence‘s own meaning. 
 Inspired by Grice‘s above mentioned distinction between utterer‘s meaning and 
sentence-meaning, Kripke distinguishes between semantic reference and speaker‘s 
reference (of an expression). He describes his distinction between speaker‘s reference and 
semantic reference in the following way: 
Let us now speak of speaker‘s reference and semantic reference ... If a 
speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his 
idiolect (given various facts about the world) determine the referent in 
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the idiolect: that I call the semantic referent of the designator. ... In a 
given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) 
is given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object 
whenever the designator is used. The speaker‘s referent is given by a 
specific intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object.
187
  
That is, according to Kripke, the semantic referent of an expression is the object 
determined by the linguistic meaning of the expression whereas the speaker‘s referent of 
an expression is the object about which the speaker means to be talking by using that 
expression on a given occasion. And, the speaker‘s referent of an expression may, on an 
occasion, differ from its semantic referent. Kripke says: 
The speaker‘s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, 
though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect.
188
 
To make his distinction between speaker‘s reference and semantic reference clearer and 
to account for Donnellan‘s referential/attributive distinction in terms of speaker‘s 
reference and semantic reference, Kripke offers the following example
189
: 
(39) Her husband is kind to her. 
Now, in the case of (39), the semantic referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ 
is the person who is married to her. This referent is determined by the general linguistic 
conventions of use of English. But, on a particular occasion, the speaker may use it, though 
mistakenly, to refer to someone who is not her husband but, for example, her lover or 
friend. And, by uttering the sentence (39), on that occasion, the speaker may well succeed 
to refer to the person she intends to refer. In such a case, the particular person whom the 
speaker refers to is the speaker‘s referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ on that 
particular occasion. Here, the referent is determined not by the semantic meaning of the 
words the speaker used but by her specific intention, on the given occasion, to refer to a 
certain person. The semantic referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ used in (39), 
even on the above mentioned occasion, is the person (if there is any) who is married to her. 
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So, the semantic reference of an expression remains unchanged even when the speaker‘s 
reference of that expression is different from its semantic reference. Now, Donnellan‘s 
example of Smith‘s murderer (discussed in the second chapter) can be analyzed in terms 
of speaker‘s reference and semantic reference. According to the Kripkean analysis the 
semantic referent of the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, i.e. the unique person 
who murdered Smith, contained in the sentence (27), is the same object in both of the 
Scenarios presented by Donnellan. So, it seems that no semantic ambiguity is actually 
established by Donnellan‘s example of Smith‘s murderer. According to Kripke since 
Donnellan‘s referential/attributive distinction (which is illustrated by the example of 
Smith‘s murderer) fails to prove that there is a semantic ambiguity in sentences containing 
definite descriptions, it fails to undermine Russell‘s theory because, as Kripke mentions, 
if a descriptive sentence does not involve a semantic ambiguity, then it has only one 
analysis which is given by Russell.
190
 
 In support of his view that the phenomenon arising from Donnellan‘s distinction 
fails to undermine Russell‘s theory Kripke, then, shows that the fact that a definite 
description can be used in two different ways (i.e. attributively and referentially) does not 
constitute a genuine counterexample to Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentences. 
Furthermore, he claims that there are many methodological considerations that favor a 
unitary hypothesis, like Russell‘s, over an ambiguity hypothesis, like Donnellan‘s. In 
addition to these, according to Kripke, there is what he calls a specialized and localized 
phenomenon
191—different from methodological considerations—that favors the 
Russellian analysis of descriptive sentences. To show that the phenomenon that definite 
descriptions can be used in two different ways cannot be counted as a counterexample to 
Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentences, Kripke designs a test in which he (i) stipulates 
                                               
190 Kripke (1977), p. 262. In his ―Vacuous Names‖ Grice makes a similar comment. He says, descriptive 
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that Russell‘s theory is correct for some hypothetical language, and (ii) endorses the 
following principle: if the phenomenon in question would still arise in a community that 
spoke such hypothetical language (which may not be English), then the fact that it arises 
in English cannot disprove the hypothesis that the analysis is correct for English.
192
 Now, 
Kripke imagines three different languages
193
: 
(1) The weak Russell language: This is a language which is similar to 
English except that in this language the truth-conditions of sentences 
containing definite descriptions are stipulated to coincide with the 
truth-conditions assigned to them by Russell‘s theory. For example, 
in this language the sentence ―The present king of France is bald‖ 
expresses a true proposition iff exactly one man at present is a king 
of France and whoever at present is a king of France is bald. 
(2) The intermediate Russell language: This is a language which is 
similar to the weak Russell language with the additional assumption 
that in this language sentences containing definite descriptions have 
the same meanings as those posited by Russell‘s theory. For 
example, in this language the sentence ―The present king of France is 
bald‖ means that exactly one man at present is a king of France and 
whoever at present is a king of France is bald.   
(3) The strong Russell language: In this language the use of definite 
descriptions is banned and the Russellian paraphrases are used in 
their places. For example, instead of saying ―Her husband is kind to 
her‖, speakers of this language say ―Exactly one man is married to 
her, and who is married to her is kind to her‖. 
Now, Kripke considers the following questions
194
:  
(i) Can we expect that the phenomenon Donnellan mentions will arise in 
communities that speak these languages?  
(ii) Can we not say that users of these languages may, on some 
occasions, say something true of the objects they refer to by using 
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descriptive sentences or their Russellian paraphrases (in cases of the 
strong Russell language) even when their intended referents are 
actually misdescribed by the definite descriptions contained in the 
relevant descriptive sentences or by their Russellian paraphrases?  
Kripke thinks that the answers to both of these questions must be affirmative.
195
 Speakers 
of the weak Russell language can find themselves in a party and mistakenly think of a 
man that he is the husband of the woman with whom he is talking; and one of them may 
utter the sentence ―Her husband is kind to her‖, although the man is not her husband but a 
friend or lover. In this case, the person who utters this sentence thinks, though 
mistakenly, that the definite description she used is appropriate to refer to her intended 
referent and the proposition expressed by her sentence satisfies the Russellian truth-
conditions. In spite of this mistake the speaker of the above mentioned sentence may say 
something true of the man referred to by her utterance of the sentence in question 
provided that the man who is referred to is kind to the woman with whom he is talking in 
the party. So, the answers to the above mentioned two questions seem to be affirmative in 
the case of weak Russell language. The same is true of the intermediate Russell language 
too. A speaker of the intermediate Russell language may utter the above mentioned 
sentence in a party to mean that exactly one man is married to her (the topical woman) 
and who is married to her is kind to her, but refer to her lover or friend by the definite 
description ―her husband‖. And, again, what the speaker says may be true of the man 
referred to by her. So, we see, the answers to the above mentioned questions are 
affirmative in the case of the intermediate Russell language too. Kripke claims that even 
in the strong Russell language, in which the explicit use of definite descriptions is 
banned, the same phenomenon can occur.
196
 Instead of saying ―Her husband is kind to 
her‖, a speaker of this language will say ―Exactly one man is married to her, and who is 
married to her is kind to her‖. But she may, though mistakenly, refer to the woman‘s 
friend or lover, not her husband. And, she may succeed to refer to her intended referent 
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and say something true of her referent. At this point Kripke offers an example
197
 of such 
a use (in natural English) of what may be called a Russellian paraphrase of a descriptive 
sentence. A speaker of English may use a sentence like ―Exactly one person is drinking 
champagne in that corner, and I hear he is romantically linked with Jane Smith‖ to refer 
to a particular person she has in mind. In such a case the speaker may well succeed to 
refer to the person she intends to refer to even if he (the speaker‘s referent) is drinking 
sparkling water, not champagne. Of course, the use of the above sort of sentences is rare 
in natural English, but it is not the case that there is no such use. Speakers use this sort of 
sentences when they wish to achieve a prissy and arch effect. Kripke claims that although 
this kind of ―arch‖ use of the above sort of sentences is extremely rare in natural English, 
it will be very common in the strong Russell English because the use of definite 
descriptions is banned there.
198
 That means that the phenomenon mentioned by 
Donnellan will arise in the case of the strong Russell language too; and a speaker (who 
speaks the strong Russell language) of this sentence may well succeed to refer to a 
particular object she has in mind by using a Russellian paraphrase of a descriptive 
sentence even when her intended referent is misdescribed by the sentence she uses. So, in 
the case of the strong Russell language, like the cases of the weak and intermediate 
Russell languages, the answers to the questions (i) and (ii) are affirmative.  
 So, we see, the phenomenon mentioned by Donnellan arises in all Russell languages; 
and, as Donnellan shows and Kripke agrees, it is a fact that the same phenomenon arises 
in English. Thus, by the principle endorsed in Kripke‘s test, it can be said that the fact that 
definite descriptions can be used in two different ways (attributively and referentially) in 
English does not provide any argument for the claim that English is not a Russell language, 
i.e. one cannot claim that Russell‘s analysis is not correct for English.199 
Kripke, then, advances to show the methodological considerations which favor 
Russell‘s unitary hypothesis in the face of Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis. Here, 
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Kripke stipulates another set of hypothetical languages that he calls D-languages.
200
 He 
stipulates that in D-languages it is accepted that the attributive and referential uses of 
definite descriptions have different semantic meanings that affect their truth-conditions. 
The unambiguous D-language contains two distinct words, ―the‖ and ―ze‖, to capture 
these two different meanings. The descriptive phrase 
┌
the F
┐
 is used to capture the 
definite description‘s so-called attributive meaning; and the descriptive phrase ┌ze F┐ is 
used to capture its so-called referential meaning. The ambiguous D-language is like the 
unambiguous D-language except that 
┌
the F
┐
, ambiguously, can be interpreted as to 
mean either what is meant by 
┌
the F
┐
, or what is meant by 
┌
ze F
┐
.  Now, according to 
Kripke, what Donnellan is arguing for in his paper is that English is the ambiguous D-
language.
201
 If English is the ambiguous D-language, then in English the definite 
description 
┌
the F
┐
 has two meanings: (i) a meaning which is captured by the phrase 
┌
the 
F
┐
 in unambiguous D-language, and (ii) a meaning which is captured by the phrase 
┌
ze 
F
┐
 in unambiguous D-language. That means that if English is the ambiguous D-language, 
then English is not a Russell language as a Russell language does not accommodate these 
two different meanings of 
┌
the F
┐
. In this way Kripke lays down two rival hypotheses 
about English only one of which may be correct for English. These rival hypotheses are: 
(i) English is a Russell language (unitary hypothesis), and (ii) English is the ambiguous 
D-language (ambiguity hypothesis).
202
 Now, the question that arises here is whether we 
have any reason to favor the unitary hypothesis over the ambiguity hypothesis. Kripke 
thinks that there are at least three methodological considerations that favor the unitary 
hypothesis over the ambiguity hypothesis. These are: (1) the unitary hypothesis, e.g. 
Russell‘s, can deal with Donnellan‘s referential/attributive distinction by the apparatus 
like the Gricean notions of sentence-meaning (as well as Kripke‘s notion of semantic 
reference) and utterer‘s meaning (as well as Kripke‘s notion of speakers‘ reference) 
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without postulating any semantic ambiguity in a descriptive phrase. Besides, some of the 
apparatus can be applied to solve various other problems, such as a specific problem 
about proper names shown by Kripke (we will see it bellow), without postulating any 
ambiguity. On the other hand, the ambiguity hypothesis, e.g. Donnellan‘s, tries to deal 
with such problems by postulating ambiguity in expressions/sentences in question. 
According to Kripke, when we face trouble in accounting for the meaning of an 
expression/sentence, it is not a good way to posit ambiguity in that expression/sentence 
when we have other ways to account for the meaning of that expression/sentence. He 
thinks that positing ambiguities when in trouble is a lazy man‘s approach in philosophy 
which should be avoided whenever there is a way of avoiding it. He says: 
It is very much the lazy man‘s approach in philosophy to posit 
ambiguities when in trouble. If we face a putative counterexample to our 
favorite philosophical thesis, it is always open to us to protest that some 
key term is being used in a special sense, different from its use in the 
thesis. We may be right, but the ease of the move should counsel a policy 
of caution: Do not posit an ambiguity unless you are really forced to, 
unless there are really compelling theoretical or intuitive grounds to 
suppose that an ambiguity really is present.
203
 
Kripke wants to keep himself faithful to the Policy of Caution he mentioned above. That 
is why he endorses a principle of economy which is the same as what Grice calls 
Modified Occam‘s Razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.204 On the 
basis of this principle of economy Russell‘s unitary hypothesis deserves to be favored 
over Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis as Russell‘s unitary hypothesis does not postulate 
ambiguity when there is apparatus (e.g. the distinction between utterer‘s meaning and 
sentence-meaning, the distinction between speaker‘s reference and semantic reference as 
well as a pragmatic explanation of the referential/attributive distinction) that can be used 
to deal with the problem arising from the referential/attributive distinction. (2) In order to 
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account for all attributive and referential phenomena a defender of the ambiguity 
hypothesis would have to posit ambiguities in such cases where positing an ambiguity is 
not at all plausible, e.g. the case of proper names.  Kripke shows this with an interesting 
example. His example, roughly, is as follow
205
: suppose two men, A and B, see Smith at 
a distance and have the following colloquy:  
A: What is Jones doing? 
B: Raking the leaves.  
Here, in the common language of A and B the proper name ―Jones‖ is the name of the 
person Jones, and it never names the person Smith. But still, B has said something true of 
Smith provided that the person referred to was raking the leaves. Kripke explains this in 
the following way: 
Yet, in some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the 
dialogue have referred to Smith, and the second participant has said 
something true about the man referred to if and only if Smith was raking 
the leaves (whether or not Jones was).
206
  
 Now, how can this phenomenon be accounted for? If we grant ambiguity hypothesis, then 
we need to grant that the name ―Jones‖ is ambiguous—it may (attributively) mean Jones; and 
it may also (referentially) mean Smith. But it will be ridiculous to claim that a proper name 
like ―Jones‖ is an ambiguous term. A unitary hypothesis can account for this phenomenon 
simply by using apparatus like speaker‘s reference and semantic reference. Here, the person 
Jones is the semantic reference of the name ―Jones‖ used in the conversation and the 
person Smith is the speaker‘s reference of that name. That is, a unitary hypothesis can deal 
with the phenomenon arising from Smith/Jones example without postulating an ambiguity. 
Now, according to Kripke, the phenomenon arising from Donnellan‘s referential/attributive 
distinction is similar to the phenomenon arising from Smith/Jones example, and hence, 
like the phenomenon arising from Smith/Jones example, Donnellan‘s referential/attributive 
distinction can be explained in terms of speaker‘s reference and semantic reference.207 For 
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example, the semantic reference of the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the 
sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ (when the definite description in question is used 
referentially to refer to Jones, the person the speaker has in mind) is the unique person 
who murdered Smith (if there is any); and the speaker‘s reference is Jones. So, no semantic 
ambiguity is needed to be postulated. That is, we see, the metalinguistic apparatus 
invoked in the unitary hypothesis can deal with Donnellan‘s referential/attributive 
distinction as well as many other cases, such as proper names. On the other hand, the 
ambiguity invoked in the ambiguity hypothesis is unnecessary—if it is absent, we can 
explain everything (by means of the apparatus mentioned above) we wish to explain. So, 
Kripke thinks that the so-called separate referential meaning of a definite description 
(when it is used referentially) postulated by ambiguity hypothesis is just an idle while that 
does no work.
208
 Hence, according to Kripke, the unitary hypothesis should be preferred 
over the ambiguity hypothesis. (3) For a term which is ambiguous in one language, say in 
English, we expect that that term is disambiguated by separate and unrelated terms in some 
other languages. For example, the word ―bank‖ in English is ambiguous—it may mean a 
riverside; and it may mean a financial institution. Now, according to Kripke it is expected 
that there are languages in which two different words are used to capture the two different 
meanings of the word ―bank‖ in English.209 Were ―the‖ an ambiguous word, we would 
similarly expect that in some languages other than English there would be two different 
words for ―the‖ (in English) to capture the alleged two different meanings of that word. 
But, as Kripke mentions, it will be surprising if we find a language, say Eskimo‘s, in which 
two different words, say ―the‖ and ―ze‖, are used in order to capture the alleged two 
different meanings of ―the‖ (in English).210 Two different points are made here. First, our 
expectation for having a language in which the alleged ambiguous word is disambiguated 
indicates that our linguistic intuitions are really intuitions of a unitary concept.
211
 Second, 
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the empirical fact that there is no language in which we observe two different words for 
―the‖ (in English) indicates that ―the‖ (in English) actually is not an ambiguous word.212 
These points, according to Kripke, provide additional reasons to favor the unitary 
hypothesis, e.g. Russell‘s, over the ambiguity hypothesis, e.g. Donnellan‘s.213 
 Besides the above mentioned methodological considerations which favors 
Russell‘s unitary hypothesis over Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis, Kripke searches for 
possible direct evidence that favors Russell‘s unitary hypothesis. He claims that he has 
found a piece of direct evidence that actually favors Russell‘s unitary hypothesis. Kripke 
describes this alleged direct evidence in the following way: there are cases in which the 
ambiguity hypothesis cannot make sense of some terms but the unitary hypothesis can do 
it properly. For example, consider the following dialogue
214
: 
Dialogue-I:   A: ―Her husband is kind to her.‖ 
B: ―No, he isn‘t. The man you‘re referring to isn‘t her 
husband.‖ 
Dialogue-II: A: ―Her husband is kind to her.‖ 
B: ―He is kind to her, but he isn‘t her husband.‖ 
Both of the above dialogues are plainly proper. Russell‘s unitary hypothesis can easily 
explain the properness of these in the following way: in both of the dialogues the 
sentence ―Her husband is kind to her‖ (uttered by A) semantically means that a unique 
person who is married to her is kind to her; and a unique person who is married to her (if 
there is any) fits the definite description ―her husband‖. Now, in the Dialogue-I, the 
pronoun ―he‖ (in the sentence uttered by B) refers to the person who uniquely fits the 
definite description ―her husband‖. And, in the Dialogue-II, both occurrences of the 
pronoun ―he‖ refer not to the person who uniquely fits the definite description ―her 
husband‖ but to the topical woman‘s kind friend or lover. At any rate, who is referred to 
by the pronoun ―he‖ in each of the dialogues is clear; both of the dialogues are proper. On 
the other hand, Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis cannot account for the properness of 
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the Dialogue-I, although it can account for the properness of the Dialogue-II. If we grant 
the ambiguity hypothesis, then we need to grant that in both of the dialogues the definite 
description ―her husband‖ is used referentially which semantically refers to the topical 
woman‘s kind friend or lover. Here, both of the occurrences of the pronoun ―he‖ (in the 
sentence uttered by B) in the Dialogue-II refers to the topical woman‘s kind friend or 
lover. But who is referred to by the pronoun ―he‖ (in the sentence uttered by B) in the 
Dialogue-I? Clearly, here ―he‖ does not refer to the topical woman‘s kind friend or lover; 
for, it is plain from the Dialogue-I that B is not saying here that the topical woman‘s 
friend or lover is not kind to her. But, here, ―he‖ cannot refer to the topical woman‘s 
actual husband (i.e. a unique person who is married to her) either as according to the 
ambiguity hypothesis the topical woman‘s actual husband is irrelevant when the definite 
description ―her husband‖ is used referentially. This shows that Donnellan‘s ambiguity 
hypothesis cannot account for the properness of the Dialogue-I. But the Dialogue-I, just 
like the Dialogue-II, is proper. So, there is something seriously wrong in Donnellan‘s 
ambiguity hypothesis. Kripke explains the above mentioned problem, i.e. the inability of 
accounting for the properness of the Dialogue-I, of Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis in 
terms of his apparatus like speaker‘s reference and semantic reference. His explanation of 
the above problem runs in the following way: when Russell‘s unitary hypothesis is 
granted, it can be said then that in the Dialogue-I the pronoun ―he‖ (in the sentence 
uttered by B) refers to the semantic referent (i.e. a unique person who is married to her) 
of the definite description ―her husband‖; and, in the Dialogue-II both occurrences of 
―he‖ (in the sentence uttered by B) refer to the speaker‘s referent (i.e. the topical 
woman‘s kind friend or lover) of the definite description ―her husband‖. On the other 
hand, when we grant Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis, both the semantic referent and 
the speaker‘s referent215 of the definite description ―her husband‖ is the topical woman‘s 
kind friend or lover in both of the dialogues, provided that the definite description ―her 
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husband‖ is used referentially in the Dialogue-I as well as in the Dialogue-II. Now, in the 
Dialogue-II, both occurrences of the pronoun ―he‖ refer to the speaker‘s referent of the 
definite description ―her husband‖ (i.e. the topical woman‘s kind friend or lover). But, in 
the case of the Dialogue-I, the pronoun ―he‖ (in the sentence uttered by B) neither refers 
to the semantic referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ nor to the speaker‘s 
referent of the definite description in question. Here, the pronoun ―he‖ does not refer to 
the semantic referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ because the semantic 
referent of the definite description ―her husband‖, when it is used referentially, is 
irrelevant (according to the ambiguity hypothesis); it does not refer to the speaker‘s 
referent of the definite description ―her husband‖ either because it is plain from the 
Dialogue-I that B is not suggesting that the topical woman‘s friend or lover is not kind to 
her. That means that if Donnellan‘s ambiguity hypothesis is true, then the use of the 
pronoun ―he‖ (in the sentence uttered by B) in the Dialogue-I does not make any sense—
it is an improper use of the pronoun ―he‖, and, thus, the Dialogue-I is improper. But, as 
Kripke correctly mentioned, the Dialogue-I is proper, and the use of the pronoun ―he‖ (in 
the sentence uttered by B) in the Dialogue-I is a proper use of that pronoun. So, Kripke 
claims that the ambiguity hypothesis is wrong as it is incapable to account for the 
properness of the proper use of the pronoun ―he‖ in the Dialogue-I. Kripke‘s above 
mentioned observation can be expressed in the following way: 
If the Dialogue-I is proper, then the ambiguity hypothesis is wrong. 
The Dialogue-I is proper. 
Therefore, the ambiguity hypothesis is wrong.  
Kripke considers the above argument as direct evidence that favors Russell‘s theory of 
definite descriptions over Donnellan‘s theory. 
So, we see, according to Kripke Donnellan‘s distinction cannot establish any 
semantic ambiguity in definite descriptions; the phenomenon that definite descriptions 
can be used in two different ways, i.e. attributively and referentially, cannot be counted as 
a counterexample to Russell‘s theory. Furthermore, Kripke has shown some 
methodological considerations that provide reasons to favor Russell‘s theory over 
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Donnellan‘s. In addition to these, he has provided what he calls direct evidence which 
seems to show that Russell theory is more plausible than Donnellan‘s theory. Kripke, 
however, admits that Donnellan‘s distinction has raised an important issue in the study of 
philosophy of language: a speaker may use a definite description referentially to refer to a 
particular object (whether or not it fits the definite description in question) she has in 
mind. But this issue can be dealt with using the notion of speaker‘s reference. Speaker‘s 
reference actually is an issue of pragmatics, not of semantics. So, the issue Donnellan has 
raised is relevant to pragmatics and can be accounted ―by a general pragmatic theory of 
speech acts, applicable to a very wide range of languages‖.216 Kripke claims: 
They [his arguments and the primary lessons we learn therefrom] show 
in the present case that the argument Donnellan actually presents in his 
original paper shows nothing against a Russellian or other unitary 
account, and they make it highly probable to me that the problem 
Donnellan handles by semantic ambiguity should instead be treated by a 
general theory of speech acts.
217
 
So, it may be concluded here that despite its importance in the study of philosophy of 
language, Donnellan‘s referential/attributive distinction is irrelevant to Russell‘s theory 
of definite descriptions as Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions is a theory of 
semantics and not of pragmatics. In short, the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction 
does not pose a real threat to Russell‘s theory. 
 Now, if it is the case that the phenomenon mentioned by Donnellan actually raises 
an issue of pragmatics, not an issue of semantics, then Kripke‘s conclusion that 
Donnellan‘s argument shows nothing against Russell‘s theory is correct. So, it is 
important here to examine whether the phenomenon mentioned by Donnellan is actually 
relevant to pragmatics and not to semantics. In order to examine this, we need to make a 
clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Traditionally, the distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics is made in this way: semantics deals with the lexical 
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 Ibid., p. 267. 
217 Ibid., p. 271. 
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meanings of an expression/sentence and its constituent parts (e.g. words, phrases) 
whereas pragmatics deals with various contextual features (e.g. the speaker‘s particular 
intention to convey particular information by using an expression/sentence on a particular 
occasion, etc.) of the occasion on which an expression/sentence is used; the semantic 
meaning of an expression/sentence is determined by the lexical meanings of its 
constituent parts and syntactic structure whereas what a speaker means by an 
expression/sentence on a particular occasion (the pragmatic meaning with which the 
expression/sentence is used by the speaker on a particular occasion) is determined by 
various contextual features of the occasion on which the expression/sentence in question 
is used. Against this distinction it may be argued that the semantic meaning of a sentence 
does not depend only on the lexical meanings of its constituent parts and syntactic 
structure; it, at least partly, depends on some contextual features, e.g. who uses the 
sentence in question and where and when she uses it. For example, what proposition
218
 is 
expressed by the sentence ―I am tired‖ and the truth or falsity of the proposition 
expressed by it depend not only on the lexical meanings of ―I‖ and ―am tired‖ and the 
syntactic structure of the sentence in question but also on various contextual features like 
who utters it and when she utters it. When the sentence in question is uttered by, for 
example, Jones, then the proposition expressed by the sentence in question is that Jones is 
tired, and it may be found true; when the same sentence is uttered by, for example, Black, 
then the proposition expressed by it is that Black is tired, and it may be found false. 
Again, it may be the case that the proposition expressed by the sentence ―I am tired‖ is 
true when the sentence is uttered by Jones at 3 pm (on a particular day) and false when 
uttered by the same person Jones at 9 pm (on that particular day). That means that the 
same sentence may have different semantic meanings based on different contextual 
features related to the use of the sentence in question. So, it may be claimed that various 
contextual features related to an utterance of a sentence contribute to the semantic 
meaning of that sentence and enter into the specification of truth-conditions of the 
proposition expressed by the sentence in question. But, this observation is not true of all 
                                               
218 Traditionally, it is thought that the semantic meaning of a sentence is the proposition expressed by it. 
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sentences. For example, the proposition expressed by the sentence ―The only even prime 
number is less than 7‖ does not depend on who, where and when utters that sentence. 
Rather, what proposition is expressed by the above sentence depends on how users of 
English regularly use the expressions ―the only even prime number‖ and ―is less than 7‖ 
(and the proposition expressed by the above sentence is true independently of contextual 
features of the occasion on which the sentence in question is uttered). That means that the 
semantic meaning of the above sentence is independent of any contextual feature of the 
particular occasion on which the sentence in question is uttered.  Rather, here the 
semantic meaning of the sentence in question is determined on the basis of some 
linguistic regularities existing in the language in question (English). So, the concept of 
linguistic regularity is important here. If one takes a closer look at the example of ―I am 
tired‖, one will find that even when various contextual features contribute in determining 
the semantic meaning and truth or falsity of the proposition expressed by that sentence, 
they do this without violating the linguistic regularities related to how users of English 
regularly use expressions ―I‖ and ―am tired‖ on various occasions of their use. Users of 
English regularly use the expression ―I‖ to mean the speaker (Jones, or Black, or whoever 
utters the expression “I”) and ―am tired‖ to mean is being in the state of tiredness. These 
linguistic regularities are not violated even though some contextual features related to the 
occasion on which the sentence ―I am tired‖ is uttered contribute in determining the 
semantic meaning of the sentence in question. From this observation it may be said that: 
A semantic meaning of an expression/sentence in a language is 
determined by the linguistic regularities of how, in that language, the 
expression/sentence is used to mean something on different occasions of 
its use; various contextual features may or may not contribute in 
determining such a meaning. 
This sort of meaning of an expression/sentence may be called the conventional meaning 
of that expression/sentence. And, it is the conventional meaning of an expression/sentence 
which is a subject of semantics. 
 Now, let us turn to a purely pragmatic consideration. Suppose, by the sentence ―I 
am tired‖ a speaker, on a particular occasion, means that she is willing to resign from her 
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post which plainly is not the semantic meaning of the sentence she utters. Suppose, again, 
that the speaker‘s audiences, on the given occasion, know what the speaker intends to 
mean by her utterance of ―I am tired‖. So, by uttering the above sentence on the given 
occasion the speaker succeeds in communicating that she is willing to resign from her 
post. Here, we see, the speaker‘s meaning of the sentence ―I am tired‖ is different from 
the semantic meaning of that sentence. And, it is pragmatics that deals with the speaker‘s 
meaning of an expression/sentence. So, the above example gives us a way of setting a 
criterion for distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics. We see, in the above 
example, that the semantic meaning of the sentence ―I am tired‖ is determined by the 
conventional meanings of the constituent parts of the sentence in question whereas, on 
the given occasion, the pragmatic meaning (if this term is preferred) with which the 
sentence ―I am tired‖ is used by the speaker is not determined by the conventional 
meanings of the sentence‘s constituent parts but by various contextual features related to 
the particular occasion on which the sentence is uttered by the speaker. So, it can be said 
that on an occasion a pragmatic meaning with which an expression/sentence is used by a 
speaker may be different from the conventional meaning of that expression/sentence. On 
the basis of this observation the distinction between semantics and pragmatics may be 
made in the following way: 
Semantics deals with the conventional meaning (or meanings, if the 
expression/sentence in question has more than one conventional meaning 
in the given language) of an expression/sentence, whereas pragmatics 
deals with the sort of meaning with which the expression/sentence in 
question is used by a speaker on a particular occasion; the meanings with 
which pragmatics deals are non-conventional meanings with which the 
relevant expressions/sentences are used by speakers on particular 
occasions and which are determined not by linguistic regularities existing 
in the relevant language but by various contextual properties related to 
the particular occasions on which the expressions/sentences are used. 
But, still, there is a problem. So far I have treated the conventional meaning of an 
expression/sentence in the following way: 
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That p is a conventional meaning of the expression/sentence e in a 
language L if there is a linguistic regularity of using e, in L, to mean that 
p on various occasions on which e is used; and various contextual 
properties related to the occasions on which e is used may or may not 
contribute in determining the meaning of e in L; and even if they 
contribute in determining the meaning of e on various occasions, they do 
it without violating the linguistic regularity associated with the use of e 
on various occasion. 
A conventional meaning (of the above sort) of an expression/sentence, as has been 
claimed, is a semantic meaning of that expression/sentence. Now, the problem is: there 
are some clear cases in which a linguistic regularity of using an expression/sentence to 
mean something (in that language) does not actually determine a semantic meaning of 
that expression/sentence in the language in question. For example, consider the following 
conversation: 
A: What is Jane doing? 
B: She is in the kitchen. 
The semantic meaning of the sentence uttered by B is: Jane is in the space designated for 
cooking. This meaning of the above sentence conforms to the conventional meaning of its 
constituent part ―is in the kitchen‖. But, in English, there is a sort of linguistic regularity 
of using the sentence ―She is in the kitchen‖ to mean that she is cooking. The latter sort 
of linguistic regularity, I think, does not determine a semantic meaning of the relevant 
expression/sentence. This sort of linguistic regularity should be excluded from those 
which I take to be the ones that determine conventional meanings of 
expressions/sentences. For, I intend to restrict the term conventional meaning in a way so 
that it includes only semantic meanings of expressions/sentences and excludes non-
semantic meanings of them. That is why a qualification for the conventional meaning 
must be added. To add such a qualification for the conventional meaning of an 
expression/sentence I borrow an apparatus from H. P. Grice. The apparatus I borrow from 
Grice is his cancellability test. In order to fit this apparatus with my purpose, I will use it 
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in a slightly different way than the way Grice uses it. But I will keep Grice‘s original 
spirit intact (in devising this test).
219
 
Now, let us consider how the cancellability test helps in setting qualifications for 
a meaning with which a sentence is used for being counted as a conventional meaning of 
that sentence. Suppose that in a language L, the sentence e is used to mean that p. Now, 
the cancellability test can be applied in the following way: if, in L, it is coherent to say: 
―e but [and] it is not the case that p‖, then that p is a cancellable meaning with respect to 
e in L. And, if, in L, it is incoherent to say: ―e but [and] it is not the case that p‖, then that 
p is a non-cancellable meaning of e in L.
220
 Now, if a meaning with which a sentence is 
used is a non-cancellable meaning of that sentence in a language, then that meaning is the 
semantic meaning of that sentence in the language in question. But what happens if a 
meaning with which a particular sentence is used is a cancellable meaning with respect to 
that sentence? It cannot plainly be said that if a meaning with which a particular sentence 
is used is cancellable with respect to that sentence, then that meaning is not a semantic 
                                               
219 Grice devises this test to distinguish between conventional and conversational implicatures. An implicature 
generated by an utterance of a sentence is a proposition that is intentionally communicated by the utterance, 
but not a part of what is said by the sentence. A conventional implicature is generated by the conventional 
meaning of the words uttered. For example, someone asks: ―Who are above forty?‖ And, one replies: ―I am 
forty-five‖. Here, the replier conventionally implicates that she is above forty. This implicature is generated by 
the conventional meaning of the word ―forty‖. So, it is a conventional implicature. On the other hand, a 
conversational implicature is generated by the conversational context although the conventional meaning of 
the words used may play some role in it. In my example of ―She is in the kitchen‖ the utterance of ―She is 
in the kitchen‖ conversationally implicates that she is cooking. Conversational implicatures are issues of 
pragmatics whereas conventional implicatures are issues relevant to semantics. It is important to note here 
that conventional implicatures are not conventional meanings of the relevant expressions. They may be the 
part of conventional meanings of the relevant expressions. According to Grice conversational implicatures 
are cancellable (and detachable), but conventional implicatures are not. (For details: H. P. Grice 
(1975/1989), pp. 22-40.  
220 Jerrold M. Sadock proposes a similar test. His test is known as the reinforceablity test. The 
reinfoceability test may be expressed in the following way: if, in L, it is not redundant to say: ―e, and [in fact] 
p‖, then that p is a reinforceable meaning of e; and if, in L, it is redundant to say: ―e, and [in fact] p‖, then 
that p is not a reinforceable meaning of e. According to Sadock conversational implicatures are reinforceable 
but conventional implicatures are not. (For details: Jerrold M. Sadock, ―On Testing for Conversational 
Implicatures‖, Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole (New York, San Francisco and London: 
Academic Press, 1978) pp. 281-97). Sadock‘s reinforceability test could be used in the place of Grice‘s 
cancellability test. I think had I used it in the place of Grice‘s cancellability test, it would serve my purpose 
in the same way as does Grice‘s cancellability test.  
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meaning of that sentence in the language in question. For, there are cases in which a 
meaning of an expression/sentence is clearly a semantic meaning of the expression/sentence 
in question but is a cancellable meaning of that expression/sentence. Take, for example, 
the word ―bank‖. As mentioned earlier, in English the word ―bank‖ is an word which has 
two semantic meanings—a riverside and a financial institution. Consequently, the sentence 
―I went to a bank yesterday‖ is ambiguous—it may mean that I went to a riverside yesterday; 
it may also mean that I went to a financial institution yesterday. Both of these meanings 
are plainly semantic meanings of the sentence in question. But both of them, individually, 
are cancellable meanings of the sentence on different particular occasions. For example, 
on a particular occasion (on which the speaker is talking about a financial institution) it is 
coherent to say: ―I went to a bank yesterday, but it is not the case that I went to a riverside 
yesterday.‖ That is, that I went to a riverside yesterday is a cancellable meaning of the 
sentence ―I went to a bank yesterday‖ on the given occasion though it is a semantic meaning 
of the sentence in question. Again, on another particular occasion (on which the speaker 
is talking about a riverside) it is coherent to say: ―I went to a bank yesterday, but it is not 
the case that I went to a financial institution yesterday.‖ That is, that I went to a financial 
institution yesterday is a cancellable meaning of the sentence ―I went to a bank yesterday‖ 
on the given occasion though it is a semantic meaning of the sentence in question. So, it 
may be said that: 
If that p is a non-cancellable meaning of e in L, then that p is the 
semantic meaning of e in L; and if that p is a cancellable meaning with 
respect to e in L, then that p may be a semantic meaning of e in L if e is 
ambiguous in L. 
Now, return to my earlier example of the sentence ―I am tired.‖ In that example, 
we see that the speaker, by using the sentence ―I am tired‖, succeeds in communicating 
that she is willing to resign from her post even though that is not what the sentence she 
has uttered semantically means. Although that she is willing to resign from her post is not 
the semantic meaning of the sentence the speaker uses, it is what the speaker intends to 
mean by uttering the sentence in question on the given occasion. It may also be added 
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here that on the given occasion the speaker expects that her audiences are capable of 
recognizing her intention to mean what she means by using the sentence in question. All 
these provide an interpretation of how that she is willing to resign from her post is counted 
as a pragmatic meaning with which the speaker uses the sentence ―I am tired‖ on the given 
occasion. Call this interpretation the pragmatic-interpretation.
221
 Now, when a sentence 
is used by a speaker with a pragmatic meaning on a particular occasion, it is natural that a 
pragmatic-interpretation of the above sort is available on the given occasion. Besides this, 
a pragmatic meaning with which a sentence is used by a speaker is always a cancellable 
meaning with respect to the sentence used. For example, that she is willing to resign from 
her post is a cancellable meaning with respect to the sentence the speaker uses on the given 
occasion as it is coherent to say: ―I am tired but it is not the case that I am willing to resign 
from my post.‖ The same is true of any other pragmatic meaning with which a speaker 
uses a particular sentence on a particular occasion. So, we find: 
When that p is a cancellable meaning with respect to e in L on an 
occasion, then— 
either    (A) e is ambiguous in L, 
or          (B) there is a pragmatic-interpretation for that p on which it 
counts as a meaning with which the speaker uses e on 
the given occasion. 
Now, following Grice‘s Modified Occam‘s Razor (i.e. senses [semantic meanings] are 
not to be multiplied beyond necessity) and Kripke‘s Policy of Caution (i.e. do not posit 
ambiguity unless you are really forced to, unless there are really compelling theoretical 
and intuitive grounds to suppose that an ambiguity really is present) it can be claimed that 
when (B) is true, one should not go for an ambiguity hypothesis for p (where that p is a 
                                               
221 In the second chapter of this dissertation the term ―pragmatic interpretation‖ (without a hyphen between 
―pragmatic‖ and ―interpretation‖) has also been used. There it has been used to refer to a particular 
interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction, namely the pragmatic interpretation of Donnellan‘s distinction. In 
the present chapter the term ―pragmatic-interpretation‖ (with a hyphen between ―pragmatic‖ and 
―interpretation‖) is used to refer to various pragmatic features that constitute an interpretation on which a 
claimed meaning counts as a meaning (even though that meaning is cancellable with respect to the relevant 
expression/sentence) with which a speaker uses an expression/sentence on a particular occasion. So, the use 
of the term ―pragmatic-interpretation‖ (of a claimed meaning) should not be mingled with the term 
―pragmatic interpretation‖ (of Donnellan‘s distinction). 
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cancellable meaning with respect to e in L). That is, a claimed meaning which is a 
cancellable meaning with respect to a relevant sentence and which has a pragmatic-
interpretation on which it counts as a meaning with which the speaker uses the sentence 
in question is a pragmatic meaning with which the relevant sentence is used by a speaker 
on a particular occasion. So, in my ―I am tired‖ example, that she is willing to resign 
from her post is a pragmatic meaning with which the speaker uses the sentence ―I am 
tired‖ on the given occasion; for, as has been already shown, the claimed meaning is 
cancellable with respect to the sentence in question, and a pragmatic-interpretation is 
available on which it (that she is willing to resign from her post) counts as a meaning 
with which the speaker uses that sentence on the given occasion. Similarly, in the 
example of ―She is in the kitchen‖, that she is cooking is a cancellable meaning with 
respect to the sentence ―She is in the kitchen‖, and a pragmatic-interpretation is available 
on which it (that she is cooking) counts as meaning with which the speaker uses the 
sentence in question on the given occasion. So, it is also a pragmatic meaning with which 
the sentence in question is used by the speaker on the given occasion. 
 From the above discussion it appears that a semantic meaning of a sentence is either 
the non-cancellable meaning of that sentence, or (if it is cancellable with respect to the 
relevant sentence) a meaning that does not have a pragmatic-interpretation on which it 
counts as a meaning with which the speaker uses the sentence in question even though 
that is a meaning of that sentence (the speaker uses it with that meaning but without 
having a pragmatic-interpretation of the above sort). In the former case the sentence of 
which the claimed meaning is the semantic meaning is an unambiguous sentence; in the 
latter case the sentence of which the claimed meaning is a semantic meaning is an 
ambiguous sentence—in this case we are actually forced to posit an ambiguity as the claimed 
meaning of the sentence is a cancellable meaning with respect to the sentence in question 
but there is no pragmatic-interpretation of the required sort available on the occasion. 
What is said here about a sentence, its meaning(s) and possible pragmatic-interpretation 
is also true of an expression, its meaning(s) and possible pragmatic-interpretation. 
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 Now, as I have mentioned earlier, I am inclined to restrict the term conventional 
meaning in a way so that it includes only semantic meanings of expressions/sentences. 
So, I adopt the above mentioned qualifications (of the semantic meaning) as qualificatory 
conditions for a meaning of an expression/sentence to be counted as a conventional 
meaning of that expression/sentence. By adding the above mentioned qualificatory 
conditions I now redefine the term conventional meaning in the following way: 
That p is a conventional meaning of e in L iff (i) in L there is a linguistic 
regularity of using e to mean that p on various occasions, and (ii) either it 
is incoherent, in L, to say: ―e but [and] it is not the case that p‖, or 
although that p is a meaning of e (i.e. (i) is satisfied by p) and a speaker 
uses e—or can use it—to mean that p on various occasions, there is no 
pragmatic-interpretation on which that p counts as a meaning with which 
the speaker uses e—or can use it—on various occasions (i.e. the speaker 
uses e—or can use it—to mean that p when no pragmatic-interpretation 
is available to use it with that meaning). 
If a meaning with which a speaker uses a particular expression/sentence on a particular 
occasion is not a conventional meaning of that expression/sentence, then that meaning is 
a non-conventional meaning with which the speaker uses the expression/sentence on the 
particular occasion. 
 Granting the above definition of conventional meaning I offer the following two 
distinguishing criteria (henceforth, DC) the first of which distinguishes between 
semantics and pragmatics and the second of which distinguishes between a semantic 
meaning of a sentence and a pragmatic meaning with which a sentence is used by a 
speaker on an occasion. 
DC-1: Semantics deals with the conventional meanings of 
expressions/sentences in a language whereas pragmatics deals with—in 
addition to various contextual features of an occasion on which an 
expression/sentence is used—the non-conventional meanings with which 
expressions/sentences are used by speakers on particular occasions. 
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DC-2: A semantic meaning of an expression/sentence is either a non-
cancellable meaning of that expression/sentence or (if the claimed 
meaning is cancellable with respect to the expression/sentence) a 
meaning that does not have any pragmatic-interpretation on which it 
would count as a meaning with which the speaker uses the 
expression/sentence in question even though that is a meaning of the 
expression/sentence in question (a speaker may use it with that meaning 
but without having a pragmatic-interpretation of the above sort). On the 
other hand, a pragmatic meaning with which an expression/sentence is 
used by a speaker on a particular occasion is a cancellable meaning with 
respect to the expression/sentence used and has a pragmatic-
interpretation on which it counts as a meaning with which it is used by a 
speaker on the particular occasion. 
Armed with DC-1 and DC-2 we can now reexamine Kripke‘s evaluation of 
Donnellan‘s distinction. It is easily observable that Kripke‘s semantic reference of an 
expression is determined by the conventional meaning of the relevant expression as (i) it 
is determined by the linguistic regularity of how users of English regularly use the 
expression in question on various occasions of its use, i.e. it satisfies the condition (i) of 
the conventional meaning, and (ii) it satisfies the condition (ii) of the conventional 
meaning as it passes the cancellability test. For example, the semantic reference of the 
phrase ―her husband‖ in Kripke‘s example of the sentence ―Her husband is kind to her‖ is 
fixed by taking a unique person who is married to her as the meaning of the definite 
description ―her husband‖. This conforms to how users of English regularly use the 
definite description ―her husband‖ on various occasions. So, it satisfies the condition (i) 
of the conventional meaning. Now, in English, it is incoherent to say: ―Her husband is 
kind to her, but it is not the case that a unique person who is married to her is kind to 
her.‖ So, by the definition of the conventional meaning proposed in this dissertation, a 
unique person who is married to her is the conventional meaning of the definite 
description ―her husband‖. Hence, by DC-1, Kripke‘s semantic reference is an issue of 
semantics. On the other hand, Kripke‘s speaker‘s reference of an expression is not fixed 
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by the conventional meaning of the relevant expression as (i) it is not determined by the 
linguistic regularity of how users of English regularly use the expression in question on 
various occasions of its use, i.e. it fails to satisfy the condition (i) of the conventional 
meaning, and (ii) it fails to pass the cancellability test and has a pragmatic-interpretation 
on which it counts as a meaning with which the speaker uses the expression on a 
particular occasion, i.e. it fails to satisfy the condition (ii) of the conventional meaning. 
For example, the speaker‘s reference of the expression ―her husband‖ in Kripke‘s 
example is the person Jones. But it is not the case that in English there is a regularity of 
using the phrase ―her husband‖ to mean Jones (or any other particular person) on various 
occasions on which the phrase in question is used. So, it does not satisfy the condition (i) 
of the conventional meaning. Again, it does not pass the cancellability test as in English it 
is not incoherent to say: ―Her husband is kind to her but it is not the case that Jones is 
kind to her‖; and there is a pragmatic-interpretation on which it counts as a meaning with 
which the speaker uses the phrase ―her husband‖ on the particular occasion. This 
pragmatic-interpretation includes, with other things, the speaker‘s specific intention to 
refer to the particular person Jones by her use of the expression ―her husband‖ (contained 
in the sentence ―Her husband is kind to her‖) on the given occasion, the speaker‘s 
expectation that her audiences are able to recognize her above mentioned intention, etc. 
At any rate, Kripke‘s speaker reference does not satisfy the condition (ii) of the 
conventional meaning; it, rather, is a non-conventional meaning with which the speaker 
uses the relevant expression on the given occasion. So, by DC-1, Kripke‘s speaker‘s 
reference is an issue of pragmatics. And, by DC-2, Kripke‘s semantic reference is the 
semantic meaning of the relevant phrase as his semantic reference is a non-cancellable 
meaning of the relevant phrase whereas his speaker‘s reference, again by DC-2, is a 
pragmatic meaning with which the speaker uses the relevant expression on the given 
occasion as it is a cancellable meaning with respect to the expression used by the speaker 
and a pragmatic-interpretation is available on which it counts as a meaning (with which 
the speaker uses the expression) on the given occasion (i.e. in this case we are not forced 
to posit a semantic ambiguity). Now, it is plain that the alleged different meaning (other 
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than the meaning specified by Russell) of a sentence containing a definite description 
(used referentially) arising from Donnellan‘s distinction concerns the speaker‘s reference 
of the definite description on a particular occasion. Hence, by DC-1, it is an issue of 
pragmatics, not of semantics; and, by DC-2, the alleged different meaning is a pragmatic 
meaning with which the speaker uses the sentence in question on the particular 
occasion—it is not the semantic meaning of the sentence used but the meaning with 
which the speaker uses the relevant sentence on the particular occasion. So, Donnellan‘s 
distinction does not establish any semantic ambiguity in sentences containing definite 
descriptions. What it does is to raise an issue of pragmatics. But Russell‘s theory, as 
mentioned earlier, is not a theory of pragmatics; hence, it does not need to address that 
issue. So, Donnellan‘s distinction seems to be irrelevant to Russell‘s theory; and that is 
why it fails to undermine Russell‘s theory. At any rate, Kripke‘s evaluation of 
Donnellan‘s distinction appears to be correct, and the argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction does not pose any real threat to Russell‘s theory.   
The line of thought Kripke advances seems to me the correct way of evaluating the 
Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction. I am actually inclined to conclude, agreeing with 
Kripke, that the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction poses no real threat to Russell‘s 
theory of definite descriptions. But it will be unjust if Donnellan‘s later defense of his 
distinction made in his 1978 paper titled ―Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora‖222 
is not addressed before making a final statement about his distinction. In his 1978 paper 
Donnellan argues for the semantic significance of the referential/attributive distinction as, 
he believes, if this distinction does not have any semantic significance, then ―it is not clear 
what importance we should attach to the distinction in the philosophy of language‖.223 In 
order to show the semantic significance of the referential/attributive distinction Donnellan 
                                               
222 Keith Donnellan, ―Speaker Reference, Descriptions and Anaphora‖, Syntax and Semantics 9: 
Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole (New York, San Francisco and London: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 47-68.; it is 
interesting to note here that many of the arguments Donnellan offers in this paper appear as if they are 
devised in reply to Kripke‘s arguments offered in his ―Speaker‘s Reference and Semantic Reference‖ 
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offers arguments derived from a consideration of the phenomenon of anaphoric uses of 
definite descriptions (as well as pronouns). His main argument runs in the following way: 
consider the sentence (40) that contains two sentences in which, according to Donnellan, 
the initial sentence serves to introduce a particular person about whom the speaker wishes 
to make further assertions, and the subsequent sentence involves an anaphoric pronoun 
that refers to the person introduced in the initial sentence:
224
 
(40) A man came to the office today. He tried to sell me an encyclopedia. 
Here, according to Donnellan, the particular person who is introduced by the speaker‘s 
use of the initial sentence of (40) is not essentially the only person who came to the office 
on the given day.
225
 However, the pronoun ―he‖ contained in the second sentence of (40) 
is anaphoric and is linked with the phrase ―a man‖ contained in the initial sentence of (40); 
they refer to the same person. If they referred to two different persons, then (40) would 
have the same reading as that of (41): 
(41) A man came to the office today. A man tried to sell me an 
encyclopedia. 
But it is natural to think that (41) has a different reading than that of (40); (41) says of 
two potentially distinct persons (one who came to the office on the given day, and 
another who tried to sell an encyclopedia to the speaker) whereas (40) says of one person 
(who came to the office and tried to sell an encyclopedia to the speaker).
226
 Now, 
Donnellan seems to think that the proposition expressed by the initial sentence of (40) is 
true only if the particular person who is introduced by the (initial) sentence came to the 
office on the given day.
227
 So, in Donnellan‘s analysis, the particular person introduced 
by the (initial) sentence is the semantic referent of the phrase ―a man‖ (indefinite 
description) of the initial sentence of (40). Again, the truth of the proposition expressed 
by the second sentence (containing the pronoun ―he‖) of (40) depends on whether or not 
the particular person who is the semantic referent of the phrase ―a man‖ of the initial 
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sentence of (40) tried to sell an encyclopedia to the speaker. That is, the semantic referent 
of the phrase ―a man‖ of the initial sentence of (40) is the semantic referent of the 
pronoun ―he‖ of the second sentence of (40) too. In other words, the anaphoric pronoun 
(i.e. ―he‖) of the second sentence of (40) has as its semantic referent the person 
introduced by the initial sentence of (40). Here, it is important to note that according to 
Donnellan even if the particular person introduced in the first sentence of (40) does not 
have the property that is attributed to him (e.g. if the man referred to actually came to the 
office one day before the day indicated in the speaker‘s utterance), the speaker may still 
succeed in introducing that particular person about whom she may make a true assertion 
in the latter sentence. Of course, in that case the initial sentence of (40) will express a 
false proposition.
228
 At any rate, whether or not the initial sentence of (40) expresses a 
true proposition, the anaphoric pronoun ―he‖ contained in the second sentence has the 
particular person introduced in the initial sentence of (40) as its semantic referent. 
 Now, consider the following sentences
229
: 
(40a) A man came to the office today. The man tried to sell me an 
encyclopedia. 
(40b) A man came to the office today. The man who came to the office 
today tried to sell me an encyclopedia. 
According to Donnellan (40a) and (40b) are equivalent; the only difference between them 
is that (40b) contains an expansion of the definite description ―the man‖ contained in 
(40a), and this difference does not affect their truth-conditions.
230
  Donnellan claims that 
the sentences containing anaphoric descriptions, i.e. (40a) and (40b), are equivalent to the 
corresponding sentence containing anaphoric pronoun, i.e. (40). For, in each of (40a) and 
(40b), by substituting a definite description in the place of the pronoun ―he‖ what is 
added in the relevant sentence is nothing but a simple repetition of the same information; 
this addition does not have a bearing on their truth-conditions. Donnellan says: 
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[These sort of] repetition of information makes the discourse sound like 
the awkward language of a children‘s first reader; the equivalence 
nevertheless hold.
231
 
So, according to Donnellan (40) is equivalent to (40a) as well as to (40b). But, as 
Donnellan has argued, in the case of (40) the anaphoric pronoun ―he‖ has the person 
introduced in the initial sentence of (40) as its semantic referent. Now, Donnellan seems 
to think, the phenomena that (40) is equivalent to (40a) and (40b), and that (40a) and 
(40b) are obtained just by substituting the anaphoric pronoun of (40), i.e. ―he‖, by 
definite descriptions (that contain the same information), i.e. ―the man‖ and ―the man 
who came to the office today‖ respectively, indicate that the anaphoric definite 
descriptions used in (40a) and (40b) have as their semantic referent the particular person 
(who is the semantic referent of ―he‖ in (40)) who is introduced in the initial sentence of 
(40). Again, Donnellan has argued that whether or not the particular person introduced in 
the initial sentence of (40) is the unique person in the relevant context, or whether or not 
that particular person satisfies the definite description in question at all, he remains as the 
semantic referent of the anaphoric pronoun.
232
 This indicates that according to Donnellan 
in the cases of (40a) and (40b) the particular person introduced in their respective initial 
sentences remains the semantic referent of their subsequent sentences even if the person 
introduced fails to satisfy the uniqueness condition or if he fails to satisfy the definite 
description which is used to refer to him. That means that Donnellan regards anaphoric 
definite descriptions semantically referential.
233
 Now, if anaphoric definite descriptions 
used in (40a) and (40b) are semantically referential, then each of the second sentences of 
(40a) and (40b) expresses a singular proposition that attributes to the particular person 
whom the speaker is referring to (the person who is introduced in the relevant initial 
sentence) the property of trying to sell the speaker an encyclopedia. In short, according to 
Donnellan, a sentence containing a referentially used anaphoric description semantically 
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expresses a singular proposition that attributes a property to the object (usually somehow 
introduced in the context of conversation) the speaker has in mind and wants to refer to 
by means of the definite description used. 
 After arguing for the claim that a sentence containing a referentially used 
anaphoric definite description semantically expresses a singular proposition that 
attributes a property to the particular object the speaker has in mind and wants to refer to 
by means of the definite description used, Donnellan claims that the difference between a 
referentially used anaphoric definite description and a referentially used non-anaphoric 
definite description is nothing but a matter of the speaker‘s intentions and expectations to 
her audiences. Donnellan says: 
First let me say something about how I view these two constructions—
the definite description introduced tout court and the definite description 
anaphorically linked. In referential contexts, those where speaker 
reference is present, the choice of which construction to use is, I believe, 
a matter of the speaker's expectations and intentions toward his audience: 
does he expect and intend that they will recognize who or what he has in 
mind? If he does, then he will use a definite description with no further 
introduction. If not, he will begin with an introduction via an indefinite 
description. What the latter does, so to speak, is to announce that the 
speaker intends to speak about a particular thing or particular things 
following under a certain description- for example he intends to speak of 
a particular king or a particular man or particular men who came to the 
office. There is no implication in most cases that he will speak of 
everything falling under the description. Having done this, he can then 
go on to use a definite description or a pronoun to refer to what he wants 
to talk about. Where the speaker intends and expects his audience to be 
able to recognize what he speaks about from the description used (plus 
attendant circumstances), such an introduction is otiose.
234
 
That is, when a speaker intends and expects her audiences to be able to recognize the 
object she speaks about from the definite description she uses, she won‘t need to use an 
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initial sentence to introduce the particular object she wants to talk about. In this case she 
uses the definite description non-anaphorically. But, if the speaker thinks that her 
audiences may not be able to recognize her intended referent from the definite description 
she wants to use, then she begins with an introduction (in the initial sentence) of her 
intended referent via an indefinite description. In that case she uses the definite 
description anaphorically. According to Donnellan this difference is not a significant 
difference as it does not have any import in the truth-conditions of the relevant sentences 
or in the determination of the semantic referent of the relevant definite descriptions. In 
short, according to Donnellan, there is no real difference between a referentially used 
anaphoric definite description and a referentially used non-anaphoric definite description 
with respect to the truth-conditions of the sentences containing them or with respect to 
the semantic referent they refer to.
235
 
 Now, since there is no real difference between a referentially used anaphoric 
definite description and a referentially used non-anaphoric definite description with 
respect to the truth-conditions of the sentences containing them or with respect to the 
semantic referent they refer to, a sentence containing a referentially used non-anaphoric 
definite description, just like the corresponding sentence containing a referentially used 
anaphoric definite description, semantically expresses a singular proposition that attributes 
a property to the particular object the speaker has in mind and wants to talk about. And, a 
sentence containing an attributively used definite description (anaphoric or non-anaphoric) 
semantically expresses a general proposition. So, the referential/attributive distinction 
bears semantic significance. This is how Donnellan, in his 1978 paper, argues for his 
views (i) that a sentence containing a referentially used definite description expresses a 
singular proposition, and (ii) that the referential/attributive distinction bears semantic 
significance.  
 In order to examine whether or not Donnellan‘s arguments really provide good 
grounds for his views stated in (i) and (ii) above, let us restate the whole of his arguments 
in the following way: 
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P1: If a referentially used anaphoric definite description semantically 
refers to a particular object the speaker (of the sentence containing 
that anaphoric definite description) has in mind and intends to talk 
about, then a sentence containing a referentially used anaphoric 
definite description semantically expresses a singular proposition 
about a particular object the speaker has in mind and intends to talk 
about. 
P2: A referentially used anaphoric definite description semantically refers 
to a particular object the speaker (of the sentence containing that 
anaphoric definite description) has in mind and intends to talk about. 
C1: Therefore, a sentence containing a referentially used anaphoric 
definite description semantically expresses a singular proposition 
about a particular object the speaker has in mind and intends to talk 
about. 
P3: If C1, then a sentence containing a referentially used non-anaphoric 
definite description semantically expresses a singular proposition 
about a particular object the speaker has in mind and intends to talk 
about.
236
 
P4: C1 
C2: Therefore, a sentence containing a referentially used non-anaphoric 
definite description semantically expresses a singular proposition 
about a particular object the speaker has in mind and intends to talk 
about. 
P5: If C2, then the referential/attributive distinction is semantically 
significant.
237
 
P6: C2 
C3: Therefore, the referential/attributive distinction is semantically 
significant. 
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 Now, without questioning the validity of Donnellan‘s arguments it can be claimed 
that the truth of his conclusions, i.e. C1, C2 and C3, are not guaranteed; they are actually 
false. Let us consider first his first argument stated in P1-C1 above. The argument seems 
to be valid. But the argument does not establish the truth of its conclusion. In fact, the 
conclusion of this argument is false. To show that this argument fails to establish the truth 
of its conclusion, i.e. the truth of C1, what is needed is to show that at least one of its 
premises, i.e. P1 or P2, is false. My target here is P2. For, there are clear cases in which, 
we see, a speaker who referentially uses an anaphoric definite description (or an 
anaphoric pronoun) does not have a particular object in mind as the referent of the 
anaphoric definite description (or the anaphoric pronoun) she uses, and so no particular 
object is semantically referred to by her use of the anaphoric definite description (or the 
anaphoric pronoun). For example, consider the following conversation: 
A: A thief entered my home yesterday while I was not at home. The thief 
stole my laptop, and I am afraid he will be back. 
B: I think, you are right that he will come back. But he will come back to 
return your laptop. For, I believe that he is not a thief but one of your 
friends. He must be doing a practical joke with you. What do you think? 
A: That is not impossible. 
The above conversation is proper. And it is clear from the conversation that none of the 
participants of the conversation has a definite idea about who the intruder was; they are 
not actually talking about any particular person. A‘s last sentence, i.e. ―That is not 
impossible‖, makes it clearer that she does not have any particular person in mind as the 
referent of her referentially used anaphoric definite description ―the thief‖ or the 
anaphoric pronoun ―he‖. The same is true of B‘s uses of the anaphoric pronoun ―he‖. The 
phenomenon that they do not have any particular person in mind as the referent of their 
referentially used anaphoric definite description ―the thief‖ and the anaphoric pronoun 
―he‖ does not prevent them from properly using these. So, it can reasonably be claimed 
that it is not true that a referentially used anaphoric definite description (or a referentially 
used anaphoric pronoun) always semantically refers to a particular object the speaker has 
in mind. Hence, P2 is false. So, the truth of C1 is not confirmed.  
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To show that C1 is actually false I borrow an example (with some modifications) 
from Soames‘ ―Donnellan‘s Referential/Attributive Distinction‖238: 
Suppose that a speaker A assertively utters the sentence (40) or (40a) to 
her audience B. Suppose again that A realizes that B is not in a position 
to recognize the particular person she has in mind, and B actually does 
not recognize the particular person A has in mind. 
Here, B—though she has no idea about the particular person that A has in mind—should 
be able to report what A has said (after hearing A‘s utterance of (40) or (40a)). That is, 
(42), as said by B, should be true: 
(42) A said that a man came to the office today. A also said that he (the 
man) tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
And (42a) which reports B‘s assertion should also be true: 
(42a) B asserted that A said that a man came to the office today. B also 
asserted that A said that he (the man) tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
Now, Soames contrasts the above observations with a case in which the speaker assertively 
utters a sentence containing a non-anaphoric pronoun (accompanied by an appropriate 
gesture pointing to the person she has in mind) attempting to assert a genuine singular 
proposition about the person she referred to even though her audience is not in a position 
to recognize the particular person the speaker refers to. Soames‘ description of the case, 
roughly, is as follows:
239
 
A assertively utters the sentence ―He is obnoxious‖, without any 
anaphoric linking, attempting to assert the singular proposition about the 
particular person m that m was obnoxious. Suppose, her audience B is 
not in a position to see, locate, or identify m in any way. That is, B 
cannot recognize the person A has in mind in uttering the above sentence 
which expresses the singular proposition that m is obnoxious. 
Now, in the case just mentioned above A‘s audience B is not in a position to report the 
singular proposition A has asserted, namely the singular proposition that m is obnoxious.
240
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But the thing is different in the case involving A‘s use of (40) or (40a). In this case the 
audience B can successfully report A‘s assertion (i.e. (42)) even though she is unable to 
recognize the particular person about whom A might have asserted a singular proposition. 
This phenomenon suggests that in the case involving A‘s use of (40) or (40a) the 
proposition asserted by the speaker actually is not a singular proposition but rather a 
general one which is available to both—the speaker A and her audience B (otherwise B 
would not be able to report what A said by uttering (40) or (40a)). Here, (40a) involves a 
referentially used anaphoric definite description. So, it is proved that a sentence containing 
a referentially used anaphoric definite description may not express a singular proposition. 
To reconfirm this, i.e. that a sentence containing a referentially used anaphoric definite 
description may not express a singular proposition, consider again (42a) which reports 
B‘s assertion about what was said by A‘s utterance of (40) or (40a). If (42a) is true and 
the second sentence of (40) or (40a) expresses a singular proposition about a particular 
person A had in mind, then the following sentences are true
241
: 
(43) There is some man such that B asserted (of that man) that A said that 
he tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
(43a) B asserted that A said that you tried to sell her an encyclopedia. 
[Addressing the particular person A had in mind when she uttered 
(40) or (40a)] 
But, since in the given scenario B had no idea about whom A was talking (other than the 
idea that the person about whom A was talking was a male person as A was using the 
anaphoric pronoun ―he‖ or the anaphoric definite description ―the man‖), when she confronts 
with any person she won‘t agree that she asserted of that particular person that A said 
anything about him.
242
 So, (43) is not true. The same will happen if B confronts with the 
person A had in mind when she uttered (40) or (40a); B won‘t agree that she asserted of 
him that A said something about him by uttering (40) or (40a). So, like (42), (43a) is also 
false. Since (43) and (43a) are false, either (42a) is false or the second sentence of (40) or 
(40a) does not express a singular proposition. But, as we have seen earlier, in the given 
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scenario (42a) is not false. Hence, the second sentence of (40) or (40a) does not express a 
singular proposition.
243
 And, the second sentence of (40) or (40a) is the sentence that 
contains a referentially used anaphoric pronoun or an anaphoric definite description. So, 
again, it is proved that a sentence containing a referentially used anaphoric definite 
description may not express a singular proposition. Hence, C1 is false. Since C1 is false, 
the truth of the conclusion C2 of the argument stated in P3-C2 is not guaranteed as C1 is 
used as a premise (the premise P4) of the argument in question. Again, since the truth of 
C2 is not guaranteed, the truth of the conclusion C3 of the argument stated in P5-C3 is not 
guaranteed either as C2 is used as a premise (the premise P6) of the argument in question. 
So, we see, Donnellan‘s arguments offered in his 1978 paper neither establish the idea 
that a sentence containing a referentially used definite description expresses a singular 
proposition, nor does it establish the view that the referential/attributive distinction bears 
semantic significance. In short, Donnellan‘s arguments offered in his 1978 paper provide 
no real defense for his views. 
 Although Donnellan has failed to establish the views that a sentence containing a 
referentially used definite description may express a singular proposition and that his 
referential/attributive distinction bears semantic significance, there are other philosophers 
who have defended these ideas. Michael Devitt is one of the strong defenders of the above 
views. Devitt, in his ―The Case for Referential Descriptions‖, argues for the semantic 
significance of what he calls referential descriptions (RD).
244
 He observes that in English 
there is a regularity of using the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 in the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 
to express a singular thought about a particular object the speaker has in mind; and her 
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(the speaker‘s) audiences can understand immediately and directly which object she means 
to refer. Devitt claims that this sort of regularity of using a definite description like 
┌
the F
┐
 
in a sentence like 
┌
The F is G
┐
 to express a singular thought about a particular object 
provides strong evidence for the idea that there is a convention of using a definite description 
to express a singular thought about a particular object.
245
 So, in Devitt‘s analysis there are 
two sorts of convention regarding the use of 
┌
the F
┐
: (i) there is a convention of using 
┌
the 
F
┐—with a certain sort of meaning—that concerns whatever (if there is any) uniquely fits 
the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
. This sort of use of definite descriptions is what is called 
attributive use of definite descriptions. And, (ii) there is a convention of using 
┌
the F
┐—with 
a certain sort of meaning—that concerns a particular object the speaker already has in mind 
and intends to talk about. This sort of use of definite descriptions is what is called referential 
use of definite descriptions. Now, according to Devitt, if the first convention is semantic 
(and it is generally agreed that it is semantic), then there is no reason to deny that the 
second convention is also semantic. Devitt says: 
When a person has a thought with a particular F object in mind, there is a 
regularity of using ‗the F‘ to express that thought. ... This regularity is 
strong evidence that there is a convention of using ‗the F‘ to express a 
thought about a particular F, that this is a standard use. This convention 
is semantic, as semantic as the one for an attributive use. In each case, 
there is a convention of using ‗the F‘ to express a thought with a certain 
sort of meaning/content.
246
 
That means that, in Devitt‘s analysis, a definite description used in a sentence may have 
the following two sorts of meaning: 
(i) Attributive meaning: the attributive meaning of a definite description 
is salient when the definite description is used attributively in a 
sentence to express a general thought that concerns whatever (if there 
is any) uniquely fits the definite description in question. The 
attributive meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
 (when 
┌
the F
┐
 is used attributively in 
the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
) is: whatever is alone in being F.
247
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(ii) Referential meaning: the referential meaning of a definite description 
is salient when the definite description is used referentially in a 
sentence to express a singular thought about a particular object the 
speaker has in mind and intends to talk about. The meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
 
(when 
┌
the F
┐
 is used referentially in the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
) is: o 
(where o is the particular object the speaker has in mind and intends 
to talk about).
248
 
Devitt thinks that both of the above sorts of meaning of a definite description have the 
same status of semantic significance since both of them are products of linguistic 
conventions existing in the language in question. 
 Devitt anticipates that a critic of his view has two possible options: (1) she may 
respond by denying that definite descriptions are regularly used referentially. But this 
response will be implausible as Donnellan and many other philosophers have shown with 
lot of examples that we do regularly use sentences containing referentially used definite 
descriptions to express singular thoughts about particular objects. So, this option is not a 
good option for her. (2) She may accept that there is a regularity of using sentences 
containing referentially used definite descriptions to express singular thoughts, but she 
may claim that this phenomenon can be explained in the Gricean way. Grice, in his 
―Logic and Conversation‖, has shown that on an occasion a speaker may use a sentence 
to mean (―implicate‖ in the Gricean terminology) something which is not the literal 
meaning of that sentence. In such a case, the speaker‘s audiences may well understand 
that what is meant by the speaker is not the literal meaning of the sentence she utters but 
something else. They know it on the basis of: (i) the conventional meaning of the 
sentence the speaker utters (although what is meant by the speaker is different from the 
conventional meaning of the sentence she uses), (ii) some conversational maxims and 
cooperative principles, (iii) the context of utterance, (iv) various items of background 
knowledge, and (v) the fact that (i)-(iv) is available to the speaker and her audiences, and 
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that both parties know this fact.
249
 Actually, by (i)-(v), the speaker‘s audiences make a 
derivation by which they get to know what is meant (implicated) by the speaker on the 
given occasion. Consider, for example
250
, the following conversation: 
A: Smith doesn‘t seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
Here, what B‘s sentence literally means is that Smith has made a number of visits to New 
York in the recent past. But that is not what B means by his sentence. What B means by 
his sentence is that Smith has, or may have, girlfriend in New York. And, by (i)-(v), A 
gets to know it. Here, what is conversationally meant by B is called conversational 
implicature (―implicature‖ is the noun related to the verb ―implicate‖).251 It should be 
noted here that the generation of a conversational implicature is a kind of convention by 
which what a speaker implicates by using a sentence on an occasion is derived by her 
audiences. But, still, the generation of a conversational implicature is an issue of 
pragmatics as it deals with the sort of meaning which is derived from various contextual 
features (e.g. conversational maxims, cooperative principles, items of background 
knowledge, etc.) related to the occasion on which the relevant expression/sentence is 
used. Now, Devitt anticipates that armed with the Gricean ideas the critic of his view may 
argue that in the case of a referential use of a definite description a Gricean derivation 
may yield a conversational implicature, and thereby, what is implicated by the speaker, 
on the occasion on which she uses a sentence containing a referentially used definite 
description, can be derived from various factors mentioned in (i)-(v) above. And, as is 
mentioned above, the generation of conversational implicature is an issue of pragmatics, 
not of semantics. So, the critic may conclude in the following way: there is no need to see 
the convention of using definite descriptions referentially (to express a singular thought) 
as a semantic convention; rather, it can be seen as a derived pragmatic convention. 
Devitt, however, does not agree with this line of thought. He thinks that the above 
mentioned line of thought is based on the following view: 
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... where an utterance has a conventional meaning and we can derive a 
speaker meaning (implicature) from this conventional meaning with the 
help of appropriate assumptions about the context and mind of the 
speaker, there is no need to suppose that this derived meaning is another 
conventional meaning.
252
 
According to Devitt there is something deeply wrong with this view. To show that there is 
something wrong with this view Devitt gives examples of what he calls dead metaphors.
253
 
A metaphorical term has a speakers‘ meaning which is different from its literal meaning. 
The speakers‘ meaning that a metaphorical term has is derived from its conventional 
meaning which can be explained in terms of the generation of a Gricean implicature. But 
a metaphor may die in the sense that what was once a metaphorical (derived) meaning of 
an expression may, in time, become that expression‘s conventional meaning. Here, Devitt 
borrows the example of the verb ―incense‖ from Marga Reimer.254 The verb ―incense‖ 
literally means to make fragrant with incense. Once this word was metaphorically used to 
mean to make very angry. A metaphorical meaning is not a literal but a sort of speakers‘ 
meaning. However, nowadays the verb ―incense‖ is commonly used to mean to make very 
angry. That is, what once was the metaphorical meaning of the verb ―incense‖ has become 
its conventional meaning now. On the basis of this observation Devitt claims that it is wrong 
to think that a meaning of an expression which is derived from a speakers‘ meaning cannot, 
in time, become another conventional meaning of that expression. But, according to Devitt 
the line of thought taken by his anticipated critic is founded on the above mentioned 
wrong view, i.e. the view that a derived meaning of an expression cannot, in time, become a 
conventional meaning of that expression. So, Devitt thinks that his critic‘s line of thought 
deserves to be rejected. Furthermore, although even now one can make a Gricean derivation 
to show that that to make very angry once was a speakers‘ meaning of the verb ―incense‖, 
and then, in time, it has become a derived meaning of that expression, but, according to 
Devitt, that is not how speakers of English now grasp the verb ―incense‖ as to mean to make 
                                               
252 Devitt (2004), p. 284. 
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 Ibid, p. 285. 
254 Reimer (1998), pp. 97-98. 
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very angry. Rather, according to Devitt, speakers of English now grasp the verb ―incense‖ 
as to mean to make very angry immediately and directly because that is the meaning the 
verb ―incense‖ now conventionally has. In the same way people, Devitt claims, grasp what 
a speaker means by a referentially used definite description (i.e. the alleged referential 
meaning of a referentially used definite description) immediately and directly without 
making a Gricean derivation. People grasp the referential meaning of a referentially used 
definite description immediately and directly because that is the meaning that a referentially 
used definite description conventionally has. And, Devitt sees no good reason to deny that 
this convention of using a definite description referentially with its referential meaning is not 
a semantic convention. Supporting Devitt‘s position, Barbara Abbott argues that users of 
English have been using sentences containing referentially used definite descriptions to 
express singular thoughts about their intended particular referents for at least a thousand 
years. This phenomenon, she seems to think, confirms that referential descriptions (RD) 
have got a sort of semantic meaning which is different from the sort of meaning (attributive 
meaning) definite descriptions have when they are used attributively.
255
 In a footnote in her 
Reference Abbott claims that historically the referential meaning of a definite description 
is the original meaning of it, and the attributive meaning is the newcomer.
256
 At any rate, 
Devitt and Abbott think that the phenomenon that there is a sort of linguistic regularity of 
using sentences containing referentially used definite descriptions to express singular 
thoughts is strong evidence for the view that the alleged referential meaning of a referential 
description (RD) is a semantic meaning of it.  
 To provide a strong ground for his above mentioned view Devitt makes an 
analogy between the referential use of 
┌
the F
┐
 and the use of a deictic (non-anaphoric) 
complex demonstrative like 
┌
that F
┐
. He argues that if, for the demonstrative case, the 
convention of expressing a singular thought by a particular use of 
┌
That F is G
┐
 is 
semantically significant, then, for the case of referential descriptions (RD), the 
convention of expressing a singular thought by the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 must also be 
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 Abbott (2010), p. 152. 
256 Ibid., p. 152 (footnote-23). 
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semantically significant.
257
 According to Devitt, they should be given the same treatment 
for two reasons: (i) the referential 
┌
the F
┐
 and the deictic demonstrative 
┌
that F
┐
 may be 
substituted one for the other without any cost with respect to the goal of communicating a 
singular thought. When a demonstration is performed, 
┌
that F
┐
 seems to be appropriate; 
when no demonstration is performed, 
┌
the F
┐
 seems to be appropriate. But in each case, 
Devitt claims, 
┌
the F
┐
 for 
┌
that F
┐
 and 
┌
that F
┐
 for 
┌
the F
┐
 usually do fine.
258
 Now, it is 
generally agreed that the convention for demonstrative is not pragmatic but semantic. So, 
Devitt claims, the convention for referential descriptions (RD) must also be semantic as, 
according to him, it has the same—as the one that is had by the convention for 
demonstratives—conventional role behind it. And, (ii) the mechanism that determines 
which object is in the speaker‘s mind in the case of a referential description (RD) (i.e. the 
mechanism in virtue of what the speaker uses a particular definite description to refer to 
the object she has in mind) is similar to the mechanism that determines which object is in 
the speaker‘s mind in the case of deictic complex demonstrative. According to Devitt in 
the case of a referential description (RD) the speaker‘s use of a definite description must 
be based on some sort of perception (e.g. visual perception, having a particular belief 
about the object the speaker has in mind, etc.) of her intended referent in virtue of what 
she can use the definite description in question to refer to the object she has in mind.
259
 If 
there is no such perception of the speaker‘s intended referent, then the speaker cannot 
appropriately use a particular definite description to refer to that object. Devitt says: 
It would seem that, for a speaker to have the object in mind, his use of 
the description must be based on perception of it. Further, it is preferable 
that this perception be of the face-to-face variety.  … Suppose that, at the 
time we come upon Smith foully murdered, we see a man fleeing in the 
distance whom we talk to be the murderer. Many would doubt that this is 
sufficient for us to have a person in mind in using ‗Smith‘s murderer‘. 
We would not have a sufficient ―fix‖ on the object. The indubitable cases 
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258 Ibid., p. 288. 
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p. 290. 
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of having an object in mind are based on face-to-face perception of it. It 
is, indeed, appropriate enough that having an object in mind should be 
based on face-to-face perception of it.
260
 
Here, the perception (of the speaker‘s intended referent) Devitt mentions makes a 
perceptual-causal link between the object the speaker has in mind in using a particular 
definite description and the speaker‘s use of the particular definite description to refer to 
that object. For, according to Devitt, it is the object itself which leads (causes) the speaker 
to use a particular definite description to refer that object. Devitt claims: 
It was because of our experiences of Jones during his trial, and our 
beliefs about him, that we used ‗Smith‘s murderer‘ in that utterance 
[‗Smith‘s murderer is insane‘]. … In a sense, the object itself leads us to 
use the particular definite description in such cases.
261
 
And, if a use of a definite description is not, in Devitt‘s words, causally grounded in by 
perception (i.e. if the required sort of perceptual-causal link is absent), then that definite 
description does not appropriately refer to the intended object.
262
 It should be noted here 
that although, according to Devitt, in order for a speaker to properly use a definite 
description to refer to a particular object it is preferable that her perception of the object 
is of the face-to-face variety, it is not necessary that she perceives it directly. There may 
be a chain of the required sort of perceptual-causal link; and a speaker may perceive that 
link without directly perceiving the object by herself. Devitt explains this phenomenon in 
the following way: 
There can be a causal link of the required kind even though the speaker 
has had no direct experience of the object: it will be a causal connection 
running through others back to speakers who did experience the object. 
Thus, someone who has heard about our cat from me, but has never met 
her, can her in mind by ‗the Devitt‘s cat‘. And we can all have Aristotle 
in mind by ‗the philosopher who taught Alexander the great‘. One can 
―borrow‖ the ability to have something in mind.263 
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That is, in order for a speaker to use a definite description to refer to an object she has in 
mind, the speaker does not need to perceive the object by herself; those who perceived it 
may pass on the relevant perceptual-causal link (or the ability of having a certain object 
in mind, or the experience of the object intended to refer to) to the speaker and to others 
as well. What is needed here is that there must be a sort of perceptual-causal link (based 
on the speaker‘s direct perception or borrowed from others) between the speaker and her 
intended referent in virtue of what the speaker can properly use a particular definite 
description to refer to her intended referent. Devitt calls this phenomenon, i.e. the 
phenomenon that there is a sort of perceptual-causal link between the speaker and her 
intended referent when she referentially uses a definite description, the mechanism that 
determines which object the speaker has in mind when she referentially uses a definite 
description (what Devitt actually means here is that it is the above mention mechanism 
that determines which definite description is to be used by the speaker in order for her to 
refer to the object she has in mind).
264
 Now, according to Devitt in the case of a deictic 
complex demonstrative it is plain that there is a sort of perceptual-causal link between the 
speaker and the object demonstrated in virtue of what the speaker uses a complex 
demonstrative to refer to her intended referent. But it is not necessary that the speaker 
perceives the object when she uses a demonstrative to refer to that object; it may be that 
she has perceived the object before she uses a demonstrative to refer to that object.
265
 To 
Devitt, it is not important when the speaker perceives the object she intends to refer to, and 
how she perceives it; the important matter is that there is a perceptual-causal link between 
the speaker and her intended referent in virtue of what she uses the demonstrative to refer 
to that referent. This perceptual-causal link is important because, according to Devitt, this 
link is the mechanism that determines which object the speaker has in mind when she uses 
a deictic complex demonstrative. So, it seems that the mechanism that determines which 
object the speaker has in mind in the case of a referential description (RD) and the 
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mechanism that determines which object is in the speaker‘s mind in the case of a deictic 
complex demonstrative is the same—a perceptual-causal link between the speaker and the 
object she intends to refer to.
266
 Showing this similarity between referential descriptions 
(RD) and deictic complex demonstratives, Devitt claims that, like demonstratives, 
referential descriptions (RD) are semantically significant. 
To construct a proof for his thesis that referential descriptions (RD) bear semantic 
significance Devitt appeals to the law of exportation. He argues that exportation from the 
opaque context is appropriate only when the believer is en rapport
267
 with the object of 
belief. That is, according to Devitt, exportation from the opaque context is in order if the 
exported term is referential. For example
268
, the following exportation seems to be in order: 
(44) Ralph believes that Otrcutt is a spy. 
to (44a) Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes him to be a spy.  
But the following exportation seems to be not in order: 
(45) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy. 
to (45a) The shortest spy is such that Ralph believes him to be a spy. 
According to Devitt the inference from (44) to (44a) is in order because the name 
―Ortcutt‖ is referential; and the inference from (45) to (45a) is not in order because ―the 
shortest spy‖ is not referential but attributive. On the basis of this idea, Devitt then 
addresses Donnellan‘s example of Smith‘s murderer: 
(46) Ralph believes that Smith‘s murderer is insane. 
Devitt, then, mentions that when (46) is uttered on the basis of Ralph‘s comments made 
at the disgusting scene of crime (i.e. when Ralph does not have anyone in mind as a 
unique murderer of Smith), then the use of the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is 
an attributive use of it (i.e. ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is an attributive description), and it cannot 
be exported within (46); but when (46) is uttered on the basis of Ralph‘s comments made 
at the courtroom where Jones, the accused unique murderer of Smith, is showing unusual 
behavioral pattern, then the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used referentially 
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(i.e. ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is a referential description (RD)), and it can be exported within 
(46). Devitt believes that this phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon that in the case of an 
attributive description the exportation of the definite description within the relevant 
sentence is not in order whereas in the case of referential description (RD) the exportation 
of the definite description within the relevant sentence is in order, confirms that a 
referentially used definite description contributes in the specification of truth-conditions 
of the relevant sentence in a way which is different from how an attributively used 
definite description contributes in the specification of truth-conditions of the relevant 
sentence. So, Devitt thinks, the referential-attributive distinction bears on the truth-
conditions of the relevant sentence, and thus, the semantic significance of referential 
descriptions (RD) is confirmed.
269
 
 Now, if Devitt‘s analysis of referential descriptions (RD) and his arguments for 
their semantic significance are correct, then the ambiguity hypothesis about sentences 
containing definite descriptions is true; for, according to Devitt‘s analysis and arguments 
a sentence containing a definite description may have two semantic meanings: one meaning 
is salient when the definite description contained in it is used attributively (i.e. when the 
relevant definite description has an attributive meaning), and the other meaning is salient 
when the definite description contained in it is used referentially (i.e. when the relevant 
definite description has a referential meaning). The former sort of meaning may be called 
the attributive meaning of the descriptive sentence (and, in the case of a definite description, 
the attributive meaning of the definite description), and the latter sort of meaning may be 
called the referential meaning of the descriptive sentence (and, in the case of a definite 
description, the referential meaning of the definite description).
270
 So, if Devitt is right, 
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270 The terms attributive meaning and referential meaning of a descriptive sentence may be understood in 
the following way: when ┌the F┐ is used attributively in the sentence ┌The F is G┐ with the meaning that 
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then Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions should be treated as an inadequate analysis 
of sentences containing definite descriptions because it can be said then that Russell‘s 
theory ignores one sort of meaning, namely the referential meaning, of sentences 
containing definite descriptions. So, Devitt‘s analysis requires to be examined carefully.  
At the beginning of my examination of Devitt‘s arguments I want to focus on an 
interesting point of Devitt‘s analysis of definite descriptions. According to his analysis in 
the case of the definite description 
┌
the F
┐
 the nominal 
┌
F
┐
 contributes to the meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
.
271
 He argues that the phenomenon that the sentence 
┌
The F is not an F
┐
 is 
contradictory proves that the nominal 
┌
F
┐
 contributes to the meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
. According 
to Devitt if it is not granted that the nominal 
┌
F
┐
 contributes to the meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
, 
then it is hard to see why 
┌
The F is not an F
┐
 is contradictory.
272
 Now, the question is: how 
does the nominal 
┌
F
┐
 contribute to the meaning of 
┌
the F
┐
 when it is used referentially? 
Devitt answers this question when he responds to Nathan Salmon‘s claim that the sentence 
―The murderer is insane‖ is not true with respect to a world where no murder is committed 
by anyone even though a speaker, in such a world, may refer to a particular person, say 
Jones, by referentially using the definite description ―the murderer‖.273 In his ―The Case 
for Referential Descriptions‖ Devitt says: 
[There are] three ways in which ‗murderer‘ might contribute [to the 
meaning of ‗the murderer‘]. First, it might play a role in determining the 
reference of ‗the murderer‘. Then, in the actual world, ‗the murderer‘ 
will designate Jones, the person the speaker has in mind, only if he is a 
                                                                                                                                            
to talk about), then the sentence containing it has a referential meaning (the referential meaning of the 
sentence ┌The F is G┐ is: o is G). 
271 Devitt (2004), p. 291. 
272 Ibid., p. 291. 
273 Nathan Salmon, ―Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions‖, Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 42, no. 1 (1982), pp. 41-42.; Devitt agrees 
with Salmon‘s claim that in a world where no murder is committed by anyone, the sentence ―The murderer 
is insane‖ is not true even though a speaker, in that world, may succeed to refer to a particular person, say 
Jones, by referentially using the definite description ―the murderer‖ in the sentence ―The murderer is 
insane‖. But, Devitt thinks that that phenomenon cannot be used as a criticism of his notion of RD as, 
according to him, his notion of RD captures the above intuition about the falsity of the sentence ―The 
murderer is insane‖ in the world where no murder is committed by anyone. (See: Devitt (2004), pp. 295-96.) 
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murderer. And just the same should surely go for any other possible 
world. The referential „the murderer‟ can no more refer in any possible 
world to the person who is not a murderer. ...
274
 
In a different section of the same paper Devitt clearly states that according to the view he 
favors 
┌
the F
┐
 designates an object to which the 
┌
F
┐
 is applicable and 
┌
the F
┐
 is causally 
grounded in by perception.
275
 Now, it appears that if one grants the view favored by 
Devitt, then one needs to accept that the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, used 
referentially in the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖, cannot properly refer to Jones 
when Jones is not a murderer even though he may be insane and may be the person 
whom the speaker has in mind in using the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the 
sentence in question (the case of misdescribing the intended object). It happens so 
because of the following reasons: 
(i) According to Devitt‘s notion Jones can be designated by the definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ only if he is a murderer. But in the 
above case he is not a murderer. So, the definite description ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖ can no more refer, in any possible world, to Jones who is 
not a murderer.  
(ii) If Jones has not murdered anyone, then there cannot be any 
perceptual-causal link in virtue of which a speaker can properly use the 
definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ to refer to Jones. But, according 
to Devitt‘s view in order for a definite description to refer to a certain 
object it is required that the definite description in question is causally 
grounded in by perception, i.e. it is required that the speaker perceives 
the link between the object and her use of the definite description in 
question (note that according to Devitt, it is the object itself that leads 
the speaker to use a particular definite description to refer to it). Due 
to the lack of the required sort of perceptual-causal link, the definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ cannot refer to Jones if Jones has not 
murdered anyone.  
                                               
274 Devitt (2004), p. 296. (my italics) 
275 Ibid., p. 292.; by ―┌the F┐ is causally grounded in by perception‖ Devitt seems to mean that the speaker 
who uses 
┌
the F┐ referentially in a sentence perceives the link between the object she has in mind and her 
use of the definite description ┌the F┐ to refer to that object. 
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But, as Donnellan has correctly shown, in many circumstances a speaker may use the 
definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ to 
refer to Jones even though Jones has not murdered anyone.
276
 Devitt grants that there are 
referential uses of definite descriptions which are of the above sort (cases of misdescribing 
the intended objects). Now, the question is: what is the truth-value of the proposition 
expressed by the sentence which contains a referentially used definite description that 
misdescribes the intended referent? The same question may be put in the following 
concrete way: what is the truth-value of the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Smith‘s 
murderer is insane‖ when Jones, the person who is intended to be referred to by the speaker 
in using the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the above sentence, has not 
murdered anyone but is actually insane? To answer this question, Devitt says that in such 
a case the speaker does something right and something wrong.
277
 He seems to think that 
in such a case the speaker does something right as she succeeds in saying (that her referent 
is insane) something true of her intended referent; and she does something wrong as to 
refer to her intended referent she uses such a definite description which does not properly 
describe her intended referent (to refer to her intended referent the speaker wrongly uses 
a definite description which actually does not apply to her intended referent). On the basis 
of this view Devitt claims that in the above mentioned case the proposition expressed by 
the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ is partly true and partly false.278 He thinks that 
although what he suggests here sounds paradoxical, it is the right thing to say in the above 
mentioned case.
279
 At any rate, according to Devitt the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is 
insane‖ does not express a true proposition when by ―Smith‘s murderer‖ the speaker intends 
to refer to Jones who is insane but not a murderer. But that is not what Donnellan suggests 
                                               
276 Donnellan thinks that a speaker may referentially use a definite description and succeed to refer to her 
intended referent even when the speaker does not believe that her intended referent fits the definite 
description used to refer to it. (See: Donnellan (1966), pp. 290-91.) 
277 Devitt (2004), p. 292. (Footnote-25) 
278 Devitt (1974), p. 194. 
279 Ibid., p. 194.; I, however, do not agree with Devitt in this regard. I think, when, to handle the phenomenon 
arising from Donnellan‘s distinction, one has an available pragmatic analysis, e.g. Kripke‘s analysis, which 
does not lead one to a paradoxical view about the truth-value of descriptive sentences, there is no need for 
one to adopt a complicated idea, e.g. Devitt‘s partial truth and partial falsity, which leads one to a 
paradoxical outcome. 
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about the truth-value of the proposition expressed by the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is 
insane‖ in the above mentioned case. He, rather, holds the view that in such a case the 
speaker says something true of Jones. And, many philosophers, including Devitt, take him 
to be claiming that in such a case the sentence in question expresses a true proposition.
280
 
Thus, it appears that Devitt‘s analysis of definite descriptions and his specification of 
truth-conditions of sentences containing referentially used definite descriptions do not 
conform to Donnellan‘s specification of truth-conditions of such sentences. 
 Of course, Devitt may reply to the above observation by saying that he is not 
arguing for Donnellan‘s specification of truth-conditions of a descriptive sentence in 
which the relevant definite description is used referentially; rather, what he is arguing for 
is the claim that the alleged referential meaning of a definite description arising from 
Donnellan‘s distinction is a semantically significant meaning of the definite description 
in question. That is, Devitt may claim that he is arguing just for the ambiguity hypothesis 
about sentences containing definite descriptions, not for Donnellan‘s truth-conditions for 
them. But on inspection it appears that Devitt‘s arguments for the ambiguity hypothesis 
are flawed. In his first argument, i.e. in his argument about the regularity of using definite 
descriptions to express singular thoughts, Devitt seems to maintain that: 
If there is a regularity of using an expression e to mean that p in a 
language L, then that p must be a semantic meaning of e in L.  
But this idea is not correct. It is not the case that any regularity of using an expression to 
mean something in a language confirms that that meaning is a semantic meaning of that 
expression in the language in question. As we have seen earlier, if p is a cancellable 
                                               
280 Of course, it is not actually clear whether Donnellan intends to claim that in such a case the proposition 
expressed by the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ is true. He, rather, says that by using a definite 
description referentially a speaker may say something true of the object referred to by it even if the definite 
description she uses does not fit the object she refers to. But he does not claim, or at least avoids to claim, 
that the proposition expressed by such a sentence (which contains a referentially used definite description 
that does not fit the object the speaker intends to refer to) may, sometimes, be true. Devitt, however, thinks 
that what Donnellan actually intends to claim is that when a referentially used definite description 
misdescribes the object referred to by it, the sentence containing it expresses a true proposition if the object 
referred to by it has the property that is predicated to it. And, Devitt thinks, there Donnellan does a mistake, 
as, according to him, the correct thing to say here is the following: the proposition expressed by such a 
sentence is partly true and partly false.  
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meaning with respect to e in L and if there is a pragmatic-interpretation on which p 
counts as a meaning with which a speaker uses e on an occasion, then, by DC-2, that p is 
not a semantic meaning of e in L even though there may be a regularity of using e to 
mean that p by the speakers of L; rather, in such a case, that p is a pragmatic meaning 
with which e is used by the speakers on particular occasions. Now, consider Donnellan-
Devitt‘s example of ―Smith‘s murderer‖. It is true that there is a regularity of using a 
definite description like ―Smith‘s murderer‖ to mean an individual person, like Jones (or 
Black, or any other unique person who is described by the definite description ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖), the speaker has in mind. But such a meaning is a cancellable meaning with 
respect to the expression in question. For, although it is true that a speaker, on an 
occasion, may use the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ to mean Jones, Jones is a 
cancellable meaning with respect to ―Smith‘s murderer‖ as it is coherent to say: ―Smith‘s 
murderer is insane, but it is not the case that Jones is insane‖. Furthermore, in Donnellan-
Devitt‘s example, we see, there is a pragmatic-interpretation on which Jones counts as a 
meaning with which the speaker uses the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖. This 
pragmatic-interpretation consists of—with other things—the phenomena that Jones is 
accused for the murder of Smith, that he is standing on the dock, that the speaker expects 
that her audiences can recognize that Jones is intended to be referred to by her use of the 
definite description in question, etc. So, we see, Jones is a cancellable meaning with 
respect to the expression ―Smith‘s murderer‖ even though the speaker uses that 
expression to mean Jones, and there is a pragmatic-interpretation on which Jones counts 
as a meaning with which the speaker uses the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ on 
the given occasion. So, by DC-2, Jones is not a semantic meaning of the definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖; it, rather, is a pragmatic meaning with which the definite 
description in question is used by the speaker on the given occasion. That is, no semantic 
ambiguity is established here. In short, Devitt is wrong in arguing for the ambiguity 
hypothesis when he argues for it on the basis of a sort of linguistic regularity of using 
sentences containing referentially used definite descriptions to express singular thoughts.   
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 Devitt‘s example of dead metaphors is interesting. It is true that a metaphor may 
die and that what was once a metaphorical meaning of an expression may, in time, 
become its conventional meaning. So is happened in the case of the verb ―incense‖. This 
phenomenon indicates that what is a speaker‘s reference of an expression at a time may 
turn into the semantic reference of that expression in the course of time. Even Kripke 
allows it. Toward the very end of his paper ―Speaker‘s Reference and Semantic 
Reference‖ Kripke says: 
... I find it plausible that a diachronic account of the evaluation of 
language is likely to suggest that what was originally a mere speaker‘s 
reference may, if it becomes habitual in community, evolve into a 
semantic reference.
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Still, this phenomenon does not provide strong evidence for Devitt‘s view that referential 
descriptions (RD) have got—because of the existing linguistic regularity of using them in 
descriptive sentences to express singular thoughts—semantically significant referential 
meanings. For, the case of dead metaphors and the case of referentially used definite 
descriptions are different. A competent user of a language may immediately and directly 
understand the now-semantic meaning of a dead metaphor without knowing its literal 
meaning or without having a grasp of its past-metaphorical character. For example, 
competent users of English may immediately and directly understand the verb ―incense‖ 
as to mean to make very angry without knowing that once it was used to mean to make 
fragrant with incense or that once it metaphorically meant to make very angry. But, in the 
case of a definite description a user of a language cannot understand its so-called 
referential meaning without knowing the literal (attributive) meaning of the definite 
description in question. For example, a user of English won‘t understand (even in 
Donnellan‘s courtroom in the Scenario-2) that Jones (the alleged referential meaning) is 
meant by ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ if he does not 
know that the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ literally means a unique murderer 
of Smith or, following Devitt‘s style, whatever is alone in being murderer of Smith 
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(attributive meaning). Kent Bach describes this difference between dead metaphors and 
referentially used definite descriptions in the following way: 
... if you hear an utterance of ‗Kirk kicked the bucket‘, you can understand 
the idiom ‗kick the bucket‘ to mean die, without having a clue about the 
once-living metaphor (whatever that was) from which it was derived. In 
contrast ... one cannot understand a referential use of a definite 
description without grasping its literal, quantificational meaning.
282
 
To undermine Bach‘s claim Devitt needs to show that the literal meaning (attributive 
meaning) of a definite description does not play a role in determining the meaning of it 
when it is used referentially. But that would contradict Devitt‘s own idea about the 
referential meaning of a referentially used definite description. For, as we have seen 
earlier, according to Devitt‘s idea of referential meaning the ―murderer‖ contributes to 
the referentially used definite description ―the murderer‖, and ―the murderer‖ will 
designate a particular person, say Jones, only if he is a murderer. Here, by saying that the 
referentially used definite description ―the murderer‖ designates a particular person Jones 
only if Jones is a murderer, Devitt actually agrees that the literal meaning of ―murderer‖, 
which is a part of the definite description ―the murderer‖, plays a role in determining the 
referential meaning of ―the murderer‖. At any rate, according to Devitt‘s view the literal 
meaning of a definite description (or the literal meaning of a part of it) plays a role in 
determining the referential meaning of the definite description in question. That is why 
Devitt cannot deny Bach‘s claim mentioned above without being inconsistent with his 
own view.  
 Besides, the now-semantic meaning of a dead metaphor passes the cancellability 
test. For example, in the case of ―incense‖, it is incoherent to say: ―The boy knows how 
to incense his mother, but he does not know how to make her very angry‖. That means 
that to make very angry is now a non-cancellable meaning of the verb ―incense‖. So, to 
make very angry is a semantic meaning of ―incense‖. But, as we have seen earlier, the 
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alleged referential meaning of a definite description does not pass the cancellability test  
and involves a pragmatic-interpretation on which it counts as a meaning. So, the issue of 
dead metaphors is different from the issue of referentially used definite descriptions. 
Hence, the example of a dead metaphor‘s getting a semantic meaning does not provide a 
strong ground for Devitt‘s view that the alleged referential meaning of a definite 
description is also a semantic meaning of that definite description. And, about Abbott‘s 
claim concerning the historical originality of the referential use of definite descriptions, it 
can be said that to defend Russell‘s unitary hypothesis it is not necessary to show that the 
attributive use of definite descriptions has come prior to their referential use. To defend 
Russell‘s unitary hypothesis what is needed is to show that a descriptive sentence like 
┌
The F is G
┐
 has one and only one semantic meaning, and that meaning is: exactly one 
thing is an F, and whatever is an F is G. This meaning of 
┌
The F is G
┐
 may be called the 
attributive meaning of 
┌
The F is G
┐. The defenders of Russell‘s theory have been arguing 
for the claim that the attributive meaning is the only semantic meaning of a sentence 
containing a definite description; they do not (and need not) argue for the historical 
originality of the attributive use of definite descriptions. Bach clearly states this point: 
To endorse the Russellian claim that definite descriptions are quantifier 
phrases, not referring terms, and that their attributive use is their only 
strictly literal use, does not commit one to the view that their attributive 
use came first and their referential use somehow developed later. It does 
not require the supposition that there was a time when definite 
descriptions were not used referentially.
283
 
So, Abbott‘s remark about the historical originality of the referential use of definite 
descriptions does not pose a threat to the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions; it 
does not add a point that can strengthen the ambiguity hypothesis; what it does is just to 
make a controversial claim about a historical-linguistic fact. 
Devitt‘s analogy between the referential use of ┌the F┐ and the use of the deictic 
complex demonstrative 
┌
that F
┐
 (on the basis of what he argues that, like 
┌
that F
┐
, the 
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convention for 
┌
the F
┐
 is semantically significant) is founded on his observation that the 
referential 
┌
the F
┐
 and the deictic complex demonstrative 
┌
that F
┐
 may be substituted 
one for the other without any cost with respect to the goal of communicating a singular 
thought—in a sentence ┌the F┐ for ┌that F┐ and ┌that F┐ for ┌the F┐ usually do fine.284 But 
this observation is not always correct. There are cases in which 
┌
the F
┐
 for 
┌
that F
┐
 or 
┌
that 
F
┐
 for 
┌
the F
┐
 cannot be substituted in a sentence keeping the overall meaning of the 
sentence in question unchanged. Kent Bach offers an example
285
 of such a case: suppose 
that several physicists have been mentioned successively in a conversation. Then, by uttering 
the sentence ―That physicist is a genius‖ the speaker refers to the last physicist mentioned. 
But if the speaker uttered the sentence ―The physicist is a genius‖ instead of uttering the 
sentence ―That physicist is genius‖ in this case, then it would be unclear who was referred 
to by the speaker in uttering the sentence ―The physicist is genius‖. That means that in the 
above case ―That physicist‖ cannot be substituted by ―The physicist‖ without any cost 
with respect to the goal of communicating a particular thought by the relevant sentence. 
So, it appears that Devitt‘s observation on which his analogy between the referential use of 
┌
the F
┐
 and the use of deictic complex demonstrative 
┌
that F
┐
 is founded is wrong; we have 
counterexamples to his observation. Since Devitt‘s above mentioned analogy is founded 
on a wrong observation, it cannot provide a strong support for his thesis that the convention 
for 
┌
the F
┐
, like the convention for 
┌
that F
┐, is semantically significant. In sum, Devitt‘s 
claim that referential descriptions (RD), just like demonstratives, involve a semantically 
significant meaning (which is different from their attributive meaning) is unfounded. 
Finally, Devitt‘s argument based on the law of exportation also fails to establish 
his thesis. What it succeeds to show is only that when a speaker uses the definite description 
―Smith‘s murderer‖ referentially to mean Jones, then it (with its speaker‘s meaning) can be 
exported within what the speaker says by the sentence ―Ralph believes that Smith‘s murderer 
is insane‖, although when the speaker uses the same definite description, in the same 
sentence, attributively to mean, in Devitt‘s words, whoever is alone in being the murderer 
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of Smith, then it (with its semantic meaning) cannot be exported within what the speaker‟s 
sentence says. That is, the phenomenon Devitt mentions does not prove that a referentially 
used definite description, or following Devitt‘s term, a referential description (RD), has 
another semantic meaning other than its attributive meaning (which is uncontroversially a 
semantic meaning of the definite description in question); rather, it shows that a speaker may 
use a definite description, on an occasion, to mean something different from what is meant 
by the definite description she uses. Let me illuminate further on Devitt‘s argument based 
on the law of exportation in order to show that it really fails to establish his thesis. What 
Devitt claims in his argument is that when the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is 
used referentially to refer to an individual, say Jones, in the following sentence: 
(46) Ralph believes that Smith‘s murderer is insane, 
then the following sentence, i.e. (46a), can validly be inferred from (46) by exporting 
―Smith‘s murderer‖ within (46): 
(46a) Smith‘s murderer is such that Ralph believes of him that he is 
insane. 
But when the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used attributively in (46), it 
cannot be exported within (46), and hence, (46a) cannot validly be inferred from (46). 
Now, Devitt finds that the only difference between the first case and the second case is 
that in the first case the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used referentially 
whereas in the second case it is used attributively. So, Devitt thinks that that difference is 
responsible for the phenomenon that in the first case the definite description ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖ can be exported within (46) and that (46a) can be inferred from (46) whereas 
in the second case ―Smith‘s murderer‖ cannot be exported within (46) and that (46a) cannot 
validly be inferred from (46). This, thus, leads Devitt to claim that the referential use of the 
definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ in (46) and the attributive use of it in the same 
sentence involve two different semantic meanings (i.e. Jones and whoever is alone in 
being Smith‟s murderer, respectively) for what in one case the exportation of ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖ within (46) is in order and the inference of (46a) from (46) is valid, and in the 
other case the exportation of ―Smith‘s murderer‖ within (46) is not in order and the 
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inference of (46a) from (46) is not valid. Then, on the basis of this finding, Devitt claims 
that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. 
I, however, think—contrary to what Devitt says—that the above phenomenon 
(regarding the claimed exportation of ―Smith‘s murderer‖ within (46)) can be well explained 
without positing any semantic ambiguity in the definite description in question. The 
explanation I have in mind is of the following line: when the sentence (46) is uttered on 
the basis of Ralph‘s comments made at the courtroom where Jones, the accused unique 
murderer of Smith, is showing unusual behavioral pattern (i.e. when ―Smith‘s murderer‖ 
is used referentially), the speaker uses the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ to mean 
Jones. Here, the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ can be exported within what the 
speaker says by uttering (46). On the other hand, when (46) is uttered on the basis of Ralph‘s 
comments made at the disgusting scene of crime (i.e. when ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used 
attributively), the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used to mean a unique person 
who murdered Smith or, following Devitt, whoever is alone in being Smith‟s murderer. 
This meaning is the meaning of the definite description in question, not merely what is 
meant by the speaker in using that definite description. When the definite description is 
used in this way (i.e. with its own meaning), we see, it cannot be exported within (46), 
and hence, (46a) cannot validly be inferred from (46). So, what is responsible for the 
phenomenon that in one case the exportation of ―Smith‘s murderer‖ within (46) seems to 
be in order and in the other cases such an exportation is not in order is that in the former 
case we are concerned about what the speaker says by using (46) and in the latter case we 
are concerned about what the sentence (46) says. If in the former case we were concerned 
about what the sentence (46) says, instead of being concerned about what the speaker says 
by using (46), we would find that ―Smith‘s murderer‖ could not be exported within (46) 
even in the courtroom scenario (the former case). But, as has been mentioned earlier, what 
the speaker says by using an expression/sentence, i.e. the speaker‘s meaning, is a pragmatic 
meaning with which the speaker uses the expression/sentence on a particular occasion 
whereas what the expression/sentence says (means) on various occasion on which it is used, 
i.e. the expression/sentence‘s meaning, is a semantic meaning of that expression/sentence 
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(although in some cases the speaker‘s meaning may coincide with the expression/sentence‘s 
meaning). So, it can be said now that what is responsible for the phenomenon Devitt 
mentions is that in the first case (the case in which the exportation of ―Smith‘s murderer‖ 
within (46) seems to be in order) the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ is used with 
a pragmatic meaning, the meaning with which the sentence is used by the speaker on the 
given occasion, whereas in the second case (the case in which the exportation of ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖ within (46) is not in order) it is used with its semantic meaning, the meaning of 
the definite description. DC-2 can be used to confirm that the first case involves a pragmatic 
meaning whereas the second case involves the semantic meaning. Here, DC-2 can be 
applied in the following way: in the first case in which the speaker means Jones by her 
use of the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, Jones is a pragmatic meaning with which 
the definite description in question is used by the speaker on the given occasion as (i) it is 
a cancellable meaning with respect to the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖, for it 
is coherent to say: ―Ralph believes that Smith‘s murderer is insane but it is not the case 
that Ralph believes that Jones is insane‖, and (ii) it has a pragmatic-interpretation on which 
it counts as a meaning with which the speaker uses it on the given occasion; the features of 
the courtroom scenario, e.g. that Jones is accused for the murder, that he is standing on the 
dock, that he is showing unusual behavioral pattern, etc.—with other things—are included 
in the pragmatic-interpretation.
286
 On the other hand, in the second case in which a unique 
person who murdered Smith (or whoever is alone in being Smith‟s murderer) is meant by 
the definite description ―Smith‘s murderer‖,  a unique person who murdered Smith (or 
whoever is alone in being Smith‟s murderer) is the semantic meaning of the definite 
description in question as it is the non-cancellable meaning of the that definite description, 
for it is incoherent to say: ―Ralph believes that Smith‘s murderer is insane but it is not the 
case that Ralph believes that a unique murderer who murdered Smith is insane.‖ At any rate, 
the phenomenon Devitt mentions does not prove that there is a semantic ambiguity in 
definite descriptions; it only shows that a speaker may use a sentence containing a definite 
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description in two different ways in one of which the definite description in question can 
be exported within what the speaker says by using that sentence, and in the other of which 
the definite description cannot be exported within the sentence used. 
On the basis of the line of thought explained above I now propose the following 
idea that accounts for the phenomenon Devitt mentions: when a speaker uses a sentence 
containing a definite description (used referentially) with a pragmatic meaning with 
which she uses it, the definite description can be exported within what the speaker says 
by the sentence she uses; but when a sentence containing a definite description (used 
attributively) is used with its semantic meaning (including the semantic meaning of the 
definite description contained in it), the definite description cannot be exported within the 
sentence used. This idea, as has been shown in the above paragraphs, accounts for the 
phenomenon Devitt mentions without positing another semantic meaning for a 
referentially used definite description in addition to the semantic meaning (the attributive 
meaning) it already has. Now from the perspectives of Grice‘s Modified Occam‘s Razor 
and Kripke‘s Policy of Caution, the idea I have just proposed is more preferable than the 
idea which Devitt advances because the idea I have proposed accounts for the above 
mentioned phenomenon without multiplying the semantic meaning of the definite 
description beyond necessity (Modified Occam‘s Razor) and without positing a semantic 
ambiguity in the definite description as there are no really compelling theoretical and 
intuitive grounds that force one to posit a semantic ambiguity in it (Policy of Caution). 
On the other hand, Devitt‘s idea attempts to account for the same phenomenon by 
unnecessarily postulating a sort of semantic ambiguity in the definite description in 
question. So, it is not unreasonable to claim that Devitt‘s argument based on the law of 
exportation does not establish his thesis. And, as has been shown earlier, Devitt‘s other 
arguments fail to establish that a referentially used definite description (as well as the 
sentence containing it) has a sort of referential meaning which is semantically significant 
and is different from the attributive meaning (which is uncontroversially a semantic 
meaning) it already has. So, the ambiguity hypothesis proposed and supported by Devitt 
and others fails. 
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 From the above discussion it appears that the unitary hypothesis, e.g. Russell‘s 
analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions, is more plausible than the ambiguity 
hypothesis, e.g. Donnellan‘s analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. So, it 
seems reasonable to return to Kripke‘s position that the phenomenon arising from Donnellan‘s 
distinction does not posit a semantic ambiguity in sentences containing definite descriptions, 
and that the alleged referential meaning of a definite description (as well as the so-called 
referential meaning of a sentence containing a referentially used definite description) is 
an issue of pragmatics and not of semantics (hence, the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction does not pose a real threat to Russell‘s theory). But Kripke, himself, seems to 
treat his defense of Russell‘s theory from the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction as 
tentative.
287
 There seems to be at least two reasons for why Kripke treats his defense of 
Russell as tentative: first, the considerations that form the basis of his defense of Russell‘s 
unitary hypothesis are, as he mentions, primarily methodological. However, Kripke claims, 
there is one piece of direct evidence that favors Russell‘s unitary hypothesis. Second, 
according to him although Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions provides a better 
analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions than that provided by many other 
competing theories, ultimately Russell‘s theory fails because, in Kripke‘s opinion, it cannot 
properly handle the issue arising from the Argument from Incompleteness.
288
 Kripke‘s 
above remarks are important. We have already seen, in the third chapter of the present 
dissertation, that all prominent strategies to solve the problems posed by the Argument 
from Incompleteness end up with a failure. Furthermore, although the cancellability test 
and the Distinguishing Criteria, namely DC-1 and DC-2, proposed and defended in the 
present dissertation succeed in showing that the so-called referential meaning with which a 
speaker uses a sentence containing a referentially used definite description is not a semantic 
but a pragmatic meaning (and hence, the existence of the so-called referential meaning 
does not make the relevant descriptive sentence semantically ambiguous), they (i.e. the 
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cancellability test, DC-1 and DC-2) do not provide a theoretical explanation of how
289
 a 
speaker, on some occasions, manages to say something true of her intended referent by 
uttering a descriptive sentence containing a referentially used definite description even 
though, on the Russellian analysis, the proposition expressed by the sentence she utters is 
false. For that reason it may be said that the cancellability test, DC-1 and DC-2 are—like 
Kripke‘s apparatus—primarily methodological considerations. So, the challenge for one, 
if one wants to defend Russell‘s theory (not merely defending it from methodological 
grounds but also from purely theoretical and conceptual grounds), is to provide a theory that 
can (i) account for, in favor of Russell‘s theory, the issue arising from the incompleteness 
of incomplete definite descriptions, and (ii) give a theoretical and conceptual ground for 
the claim that the issue arising from Donnellan‘s Distinction is an issue of pragmatics, 
and not of semantics. The aim of the next chapter is to determine whether any such 
theory is available or not. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Meaning and Assertion 
In order to find a theory that satisfies the two requirements mentioned at the end of the 
previous chapter, let us have a quick look again at the problems posed by the Argument 
from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction: 
● The problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness: according 
to the Russellian analysis the meaning (semantic content) of, or the 
proposition semantically expressed by, the sentence ―The table is 
covered with books‖—a sentence that contains the incomplete definite 
description ―the table‖—is the following: exactly one thing is a table, 
and whatever is a table is covered with books. So, on every present-day 
occasion of its use the sentence is false as there is more than one table 
in the world now.  But still, speakers may assert something true by 
assertively uttering the above sentence on many present-day occasions. 
So, the problem for a Russellian is the following: how does a speaker, 
on some occasions, succeed in asserting something true by uttering a 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description which, on the 
Russellian analysis, expresses a false proposition? 
● The problem posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction: 
according to the Russellian analysis the proposition semantically 
expressed by a sentence containing a definite description (it does not 
matter whether the definite description in question is used attributively 
or referentially) is a general proposition. But still, as we have already 
seen in the example of ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖290, a speaker may, 
on some occasions, assert a singular proposition about a particular 
object she intends to talk about by using a sentence containing a 
referentially used definite description. So, one problem for a Russellian 
is to explain how a speaker asserts a singular proposition by uttering a 
sentence containing a referentially used definite description even 
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though the proposition semantically expressed by that sentence is a 
general proposition. Furthermore, in the example of ―Smith‘s murderer 
is insane‖ we have also seen that a speaker may say something true of 
her intended referent, say Jones, by using the above sentence 
(containing the referentially used definite description ―Smith‘s 
murderer‖) when neither Jones nor even anyone else fits the definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖. But, according to the Russellian 
analysis the proposition expressed by the above sentence is false. So, 
here again, the problem for a Russellian is the following: how does a 
speaker assert something true by uttering a sentence containing a 
referentially used definite description which, on the Russellian 
analysis, expresses a false proposition?  
So, we see, at the heart of the problems posed by these arguments, i.e. the 
Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction, lies the 
issue of how on some occasions a speaker, by uttering a sentence containing a definite 
description, asserts something (true) which is not what is semantically expressed by the 
sentence she utters. Traditionally, it is thought that by using a sentence (literally and non-
metaphorically) what the speaker of that sentence asserts is the meaning or the semantic 
content of (or the proposition semantically expressed by) the sentence uttered. Scott 
Soames, in his ―The Gap Between Meaning and Assertion: Why What We Literally Say 
Often Differs from What Our Words Literally Mean‖, describes this connection between 
meaning and assertion in the following way: 
A sincere, reflective, competent speaker who assertively utters S 
(speaking literally, nonironically, nonmetaphorically, and without 
conversational implicatures cancelling the normal force of the remark) in 
a context C says (or asserts), perhaps among other things, what S ―says‖ 
in C (also known as the semantic content of S in C).
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The above principle that describes the traditionally believed connection between the 
assertions a speaker makes by uttering a sentence and the meaning or the semantic 
content of the sentence she utters may be called, following Soames, the Traditional 
Connection between Meaning and Assertion, or simply, the Traditional Picture. On this 
picture, pragmatics enters after identifying what the speaker has asserted by uttering the 
sentence S. Soames describes this point in the following way: 
After identifying what the speaker has said, conversational maxims and 
other principles are used to generate further implicatures, presuppositions, 
or suggestions carried by the utterance.
292
 
If that is the case, then pragmatics does not contribute to what is asserted by a speaker by 
her utterance of S. Rather, what the speaker asserts by uttering S is the semantic content 
of S. And, pragmatics enters at the next stage taking the semantic content of S (which is 
what is asserted by the speaker by uttering S in a context) as its input.
293
 At any rate, 
according to the Traditional Picture by uttering a sentence literally and non-
metaphorically what a speaker asserts is the semantic content of the sentence in question. 
In short, on the Traditional Picture what is asserted by a speaker by uttering a sentence 
(literally and non-metaphorically) is identical with the semantic content of that sentence. 
 The Traditional Picture seems to be applicable in many cases. It is true that on many 
occasions by literally uttering a sentence what the speaker says is what the sentence she 
uses says. For example, in many cases by literally and non-metaphorically uttering the 
sentence ―I ate rice in my lunch yesterday‖ what the speaker asserts is what is said (the 
semantic content) by the sentence in question. Still, the Traditional Picture is not quite 
right. For, there are cases in which what is asserted by a speaker by literally and non-
metaphorically uttering a sentence is not identical with the semantic content of the 
sentence uttered. For example, suppose in reply to the question ―What did she eat in her 
lunch yesterday?‖ asked about one of my friends whom I invited for a lunch yesterday, I 
utter the following sentence: 
(47) She ate rice and fish in her lunch yesterday. 
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The semantic content of (47) is the following proposition: she ate both, rice and fish, in 
her lunch yesterday. Now, by uttering (47) I have asserted, among other things, that she 
ate rice in her yesterday‘s lunch; I have also asserted that she ate fish in her yesterday‘s 
lunch. And, another assertion that has been made by me by uttering (47) is that she ate 
both, rice and fish, in her lunch yesterday. That is, by literally and non-metaphorically 
uttering (47) I have asserted at least the following three propositions: 
(47a) She ate both, rice and fish, in her lunch yesterday. 
(47b) She ate rice in her lunch yesterday. 
(47c) She ate fish in her lunch yesterday. 
Now, it is plain that (47a), (47b) and (47c) are not identical; they involve different truth-
conditions. Here, (47a) is identical with the semantic content of (47); but, (47b) and 
(47c), which have also been asserted by me by uttering (47), are not identical with the 
semantic content of the sentence (47).
294
 So, we see, it is not always the case that what is 
asserted by a speaker by uttering a sentence (literally and non-metaphorically) is identical 
with the semantic content of the sentence uttered. Hence, the Traditional Picture is wrong 
as it holds the view that what is asserted by a speaker by uttering a sentence (literally and 
non-metaphorically) is the semantic content of the sentence uttered. A further point 
should be noted here. In the above example, we see, what has been asserted by me by 
uttering the sentence (47) is either the semantic content of the sentence (47) or one or the 
other part of its semantic content. This phenomenon, however, should not lead one to 
think that by uttering a sentence (literally and non-metaphorically) a speaker asserts the 
semantic content of the sentence and/or a part of the sentence‘s semantic content. For, 
there are cases in which by uttering a sentence (literally and non-metaphorically) a 
speaker asserts a proposition which is neither identical with the semantic content of the 
sentence uttered nor a mere part of its semantic content, but is richer than the semantic 
content of the sentence in question. We will see such a case in the next paragraph. 
At this point it is reasonable to inquire why the above mentioned phenomenon—i.e. 
the phenomenon that by uttering a sentence (literally and non-metaphorically) a speaker 
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may assert something which is not identical with the semantic content of the sentence the 
speaker utters in a context—sometimes arises. According to Soames the above mentioned 
phenomenon sometimes arises due to, what he calls, the gap between the meaning or 
semantic content of a sentence and the assertions a speaker makes by using that sentence 
in a context. He observes that the Traditional Picture fails to identify the above mentioned 
gap and sets up an overly tight connection between the meaning or semantic content of a 
sentence and the assertions a speaker makes by using that sentence.
295
 To explain the nature 
of the above mentioned gap Soames says that although the meaning or semantic content 
of a sentence is often a complete proposition, and hence, a proper candidate for being 
asserted by the speaker of the relevant sentence, in many cases the meaning of a sentence 
interacts with information that is presupposed to generate a pragmatically enriched 
proposition which is the speaker‘s primary intention to assert by uttering the sentence in 
question.
296
 Soames calls such pragmatically enriched propositions (what the speaker of a 
sentence intends to assert by using the sentence in question) the primary assertions (made 
by the speaker). Now, a primary assertion made by a speaker by uttering a sentence may 
not be identical with the semantic content of the sentence the speaker utters, as a primary 
assertion made by the speaker is pragmatically enriched by elements supplied by the context 
in which the sentence is uttered whereas the semantic content of the sentence is not 
pragmatically enriched by contextual supplementations. Hence, there is a gap between the 
primary assertions made by a speaker by uttering a sentence and the semantic content of 
that sentence. An example may make the point clearer. Suppose, in response to the question 
―Have you ever met a cricket genius?‖ I utter the following sentence: 
(48) I met Tendulkar. 
Here, the semantic content of the sentence I have uttered is that: 
 (48a) I met Tendulkar.  
But, in the given context what I have primarily intended to assert is not merely that I met 
Tendulkar but that:  
(48b) I met the genius cricketer Tendulkar.  
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This shows that the primary assertion I have made by uttering the sentence (48) in the 
given context is built by pragmatically enriching (with contextual supplementations) the 
semantic content of the sentence in question. Here, the primary assertion made by me is 
neither identical with the semantic content of the sentence I have uttered nor is it a mere 
part of the semantic content of the sentence in question. Rather, the primary assertion that 
has been made by me by uttering (48) is richer than the semantic content of the sentence I 
have uttered. So, it should not be thought that by uttering a sentence (literally and non-
metaphorically) a speaker asserts the semantic content of the sentence and/or a part of the 
sentence‘s semantic content. 
Soames claims that a primary assertion which is made by a speaker by uttering a 
sentence in a particular context is always built on the pragmatic enrichments of the semantic 
content of the sentence uttered; and the other propositions that are counted as asserted are 
only those which are relevant, unmistakable, necessary and a priori consequences of the 
primary assertions.
297
 For instance, in the case of the sentence (48) the proposition stated in 
(48a)—which, as a matter of fact, is the semantic content of the sentence uttered—is counted 
as asserted because it is a relevant, unmistakable, necessary and a priori consequence of 
the primary assertion stated in (48b). Of course, there may be cases in which what a speaker 
primarily intends to assert by using a sentence does not involve any pragmatic enrichment. 
Soames does not rule out such possibility. He, rather, proposes that in a case like that the 
semantic content of the relevant sentence should be counted as the proper pragmatic 
enrichment of itself,
298
 and hence it should be counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion. 
At this point the following question deserves to be answered: what is the role of 
the semantic content of a sentence in determining the assertions the speaker makes by 
using that sentence? Soames maintains that the semantic content of a sentence does not 
directly determine the assertions made by the speaker by uttering that sentence. Rather, as 
we have already seen in the case of the sentence (48), the primary assertions made by a 
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speaker by uttering a sentence are contributed (pragmatically enriched) by elements 
supplemented by the context of utterance of the sentence the speaker utters; and the other 
assertions, as mentioned above, are determined by the primary assertions made. But that 
does not mean that there is no connection between the semantic content of a sentence and 
the assertions the speaker makes by using that sentence. Rather, the semantic content of a 
sentence interacts with what is supplied by the context of utterance of that sentence to 
generate pragmatically enriched propositions which the speaker primarily intends to 
assert, i.e. the primary assertions. That is why Soames takes it for granted that the 
semantic content of a sentence constrains, though not determines, the assertions the 
speaker makes by using that sentence. He says: 
[T]he semantic content of S in a context constrains what S is used to 
assert, without always determining what is asserted, even when S is used 
with its normal literal meaning.
299
 
In another section of the same paper Soames confirms his inclination to the idea that the 
semantic content of a sentence does not determine but constrains the assertions the 
speaker makes by that sentence: 
[T]his [his idea that the knowledge of meaning does play a central role in 
interpreting utterances] leads me to a different conception of semantics – 
one in which contexts are real, conversationally given, circumstances of 
utterance, and the meanings of expressions constrain, but do not always 
determine, the contributions made by occurrences of them to assertions 
made in these contexts.
300
 
Actually, it is the semantic content of a sentence that is pragmatically enriched by 
elements supplied by the context in which the sentence in question is uttered, and thus, 
the primary assertions are made. But that does not mean that a competent speaker must 
first identify the semantic content of the sentence she utters and, then, with the help of 
contextual elements (the pragmatic enrichments), she makes her primary assertions. 
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Rather, a competent speaker may assert something by uttering a sentence without 
identifying what the sentence she uses semantically means. Soames says: 
... sentence meaning is a notion with its own theoretical interest. 
However, it is not obvious that it is something individual speakers need 
to separate out in order to reliably identify what is asserted and 
conveyed.
301
 
According to Soames, a competent speaker who understands the sentence ┌ I have n Fs┐ 
is a reliable judge of what she asserts as well as what others may assert by it in a particular 
context. But she may not have a reliable intuition about whether the semantic meaning of 
the sentence 
┌
I have n Fs┐ is: I have at least n Fs, or I have exactly n Fs, or I have up to n Fs, 
or something else.
302
 A competent speaker, Soames claims, may not have a reliable and 
clear grasp of the semantic content of a sentence she uses in a particular context even though 
she knows what she asserts by her utterance of that sentence because the semantic content 
of a sentence is a theory-laden conception which may not be psychologically available to 
the speaker simply by virtue of her linguistic ability.
303
 In short, a competent speaker may 
know what she asserts by uttering a sentence without knowing the semantic meaning of 
that sentence even though the semantic meaning of that sentence constrains the assertions 
the speaker makes by using that sentence in a context. 
 At any rate, the above explained ideas—i.e. the idea concerning the pragmatic 
enrichment of the semantic content of a sentence by elements supplemented by the context 
of utterance of the sentence in question, the idea of the primary assertions made by a 
speaker (by using a sentence) as  pragmatically enriched propositions that the speaker 
primarily intends to assert in a context, and the idea of assertions (not the primary ones) 
made by a speaker as relevant, unmistakable, necessary and a priori consequences of the 
primary assertions—provide Soames a way to put forward the following principle in which, 
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unlike the  erroneous Traditional Picture, the connection between meaning and assertion 
is not overly tight, and the gap between them is properly addressed: 
If M is a meaning (or semantic content) of an indexical-free sentence S, then 
normal, literal uses of S (without conversational implicatures that force 
reinterpretation of the utterance) result in assertions of propositions that are 
proper pragmatic enrichments of M. When M is a complete proposition, 
it counts as asserted only if M is an obvious, relevant, necessary and a priori 
consequence of enriched propositions asserted in uttering S, together with 
salient shared presuppositions in the conversation.
304
 
The above principle which provides an alternative (to the Traditional Picture) idea 
concerning the relationship between the meaning or semantic content of a sentence and 
the assertions a speaker makes by using that sentence may be called Soames‘ Alternative 
Conception of the Connection between Meaning and Assertion, or simply, the Alternative 
Picture. One virtue of the Alternative Picture is that it allows the idea that when a speaker 
assertively, literally and non-metaphorically utters a sentence S, the meaning or semantic 
content of S may not be asserted by the speaker by uttering that sentence, even though the 
semantic content of S may be a complete proposition.
305
 This idea is important as—we will see 
it soon—it helps one in defending Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions by resolving the 
problems posed by the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction. But, it shouldn‘t be thought that the Alternative Picture is an ad hoc proposal 
which is adopted to defend specifically Russell‘s theory. Rather, the Alternative Picture is 
actually a theory about language which, in addition to solving the above mentioned problems 
(i.e. the problems posed by the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from 
Donnellan‘s Distinction), solves many other problems that cannot not be properly handled 
by the Traditional Picture. For example, the case of the sentence (47), i.e. ―She ate rice 
and fish in her lunch yesterday‖, can properly be explained by means of the Alternative 
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Picture. One can now argue that although the proposition stated in (47b), i.e. she ate rice 
in her lunch yesterday, and (47c), i.e. she ate fish in her lunch yesterday, are not identical 
with the semantic content of the sentence (47), still they are considered as asserted by me 
as they are relevant, unmistakable, necessary and a priori consequences of the primary 
assertion, namely the assertion that she ate both, rice and fish, in her lunch yesterday (stated 
in (47a)), that has been made by me by uttering (47) in the given context. So, by using the 
Alternative Picture here we have got an explanation of how a speaker may say (assert) 
something by using a sentence that is not said (the semantic content) by the sentence she 
uses.
306
  
Now I turn to my main concern: how the Alternative Picture deals with the problem 
posed by the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction, and, thus, helps in defending Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. Soames 
claims that the implicit reliance on the incorrect traditional conception (the Traditional 
Picture) about the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the assertions a 
speaker makes by using that sentence is the main culprit that causes the problem of 
incomplete definite descriptions.
307
 And, the same is true of the problems posed by the 
Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction. Once we replace the Traditional Picture by the 
Alternative Picture, we see that the problems posed by the Argument from Incompleteness 
and the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction can be well-answered by a Russellian. In 
the next two sections we will see how these problems can be dealt with by endorsing the 
Alternative Picture. 
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● Dealing with the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness by 
endorsing the Alternative Picture: as has been mentioned at the beginning of the present 
chapter, the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness is the following: 
How does a speaker assert something true by uttering a sentence containing 
an incomplete definite description which, on the Russellian analysis, 
expresses a false proposition? 
The answer to the problem is simple: the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence 
(i.e. the semantic content of a sentence) may not be asserted by the speaker of that sentence; 
this allows a speaker to assert something true by uttering a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description which semantically expresses a false proposition. For 
example, consider again the sentence (36) which contains an incomplete definite 
description ―the murderer‖: 
(36) The murderer is insane. 
The (Russellian) semantic content of (36) is the following: 
(36a) [the x: x is a murderer] x is insane. 
(36a) is false since there is more than one murderer in the world. Now, suppose (36) is 
uttered by a speaker after coming across the body of the victim v; and suppose also that the 
speaker, in uttering (36), uses the incomplete definite description ―the murderer‖ 
attributively. Here, the semantic content of his utterance is what is expressed in (36a); 
but, in the given context, the pragmatically enriched proposition the speaker primarily 
intends to assert by uttering (36), i.e. the primary assertion the speaker makes by uttering 
(36), is: 
(36b) [the x: x is a murderer of v] x is insane.    
Here, we see, (36a) is not a necessary or a priori consequence of the primary assertion 
(36b). So, the false proposition (36a) should not be counted as asserted. Hence, if the 
murderer of v is insane, then the speaker has asserted something true even though there is 
more than one murderer in the world. So, the problem posed by the Argument from 
Incompleteness is well-answered, and Russell‘s theory is saved.308 
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Again, suppose, the incomplete definite description ―the murderer‖ contained in 
(36) is used referentially. In that case the speaker has a particular person, say m, in mind 
who is described as ―the murderer‖; and the speaker intends to make a statement about m. 
In such a case the pragmatically enriched proposition (supposing that the victim is not 
identified by the speaker) the speaker primarily intends to assert is: 
(36c) [the x: x is a murderer & x = m] m is insane. 
And, like before, the semantic content of (36) is what is expressed in (36a). Here, again, we 
see, (36a) is not a necessary or a priori consequence of the primary assertion (36c). Hence, 
the false proposition (36a) should not be counted as asserted. But the following proposition: 
(36d) m is insane 
should be counted as asserted as (36d) is a necessary and a priori consequence of the 
primary assertion (36c). (36d) is true, if the person referred to, i.e. the person m, is really 
insane. So, by uttering (36), in this context, the speaker has asserted (i.e. m is insane) 
something true provided that m is insane, even though there are more than one murderer 
in the world. Hence, again, the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness is 
properly answered without sacrificing Russell‘s analysis of sentences containing definite 
descriptions. 
In a context in which the victim v is identified by the speaker and she, the speaker, 
uses the incomplete definite description referentially when she utters (36), we get the 
same result. In such a case, the primary proposition that the speaker asserts by uttering 
(36) is the following: 
(36e) [the x: x is a murderer of v & x = m] x is insane. 
Here, again, we see, the semantic content of (36), i.e. (36a), is not a necessary or a priori 
consequence of (36e). So, it should not be counted as asserted; but, in this case too (36d) 
should be counted as asserted as it is a necessary and a priori consequence of (36e). And 
hence, although there is more than one murderer in the world, by uttering (36) in the 
above mentioned context the speaker has asserted (i.e. m is insane) something true, if it is 
true that m is insane. So, the problem posed by the Argument from Incompleteness is 
solved and Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentences is kept intact. 
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 Now, let us recall the more complicated descriptive sentence—addressed in the 
third chapter of the present dissertation—which contains two identical incomplete 
definite descriptions: 
(33) The Russian has voted for the Russian. 
The above sentence is uttered during a boxing match between a Russian and a Swede; 
and the speaker and her audiences know that one of the judges is a Russian and that no 
participating boxer is a member of the panel of judges. The (Russellian) semantic content 
of (33) is expressed by the following proposition: 
(33b) [the x: x is a Russian] x voted for the Russian. 
Obviously, (33b) is false as there is more than one Russian (in the world or in the domain 
of discourse). But, still, by uttering (33) in the above context the speaker has asserted 
something true. This can now be explained in the following way: in the given context the 
pragmatically enriched proposition the speaker primarily intends to assert is the following: 
(33c) [the x: x is a Russian & x is a judge of today‘s match here] {[the y: 
((y is a Russian & y is a boxer of today‘s match here) & (y ≠ x))] (x 
voted for y)} 
In the given context (33c) is true provided that the Russian judge (of the above mentioned 
match) really voted for the Russian boxer (of the above mentioned match). Here, the false 
proposition (33b) which is the semantic content of (33) should not be counted as asserted 
as it is not a necessary or a priori consequence of the speaker's primary assertion (33c). So, 
in the above case, by uttering the sentence (33), which contains two apparently identical 
incomplete definite descriptions, the speaker has asserted something true when it is true that 
the Russian judge really voted for the Russian boxer. Soames‘ example of the sentence 
(37), i.e. "The cook is more experienced than the cook who prepared the main course", by 
which he has shown that Barwise and Perry‘s framework cannot solve the problem pose 
by the Argument from Incompleteness (discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation), 
can now be explained in a similar way. Briefly, in the given scenario by uttering (37) what 
the speaker primarily asserts is the following pragmatically enriched proposition: [the x: x 
is a cook & x is responsible for the desert of tonight‘s dinner here] {[the y: (y is a cook 
and y is responsible for the main course of tonight‘s dinner here) & (x ≠ y)] (x is more 
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experienced than y)}. This pragmatically enriched proposition may be true even though 
the semantic content of (37), i.e. [the x: x is a cook] {[the y: (y is a cook and y is responsible 
for the main course) & (x ≠ y)] (x is more experienced than y)}, is false (because there is 
more than one cook in the domain of discourse or in the world). But the semantic content 
of (37) cannot be counted as asserted as it is not a necessary or a priori consequence of 
the primary assertion made by the speaker by uttering (37). Hence, by uttering (37) in the 
given scenario the speaker has asserted something true. At any rate, by endorsing the 
Alternative Picture in the place of the Traditional Picture, the problem posed by the 
Argument from Incompleteness can be well-answered without sacrificing anything of 
Russell's analysis of descriptive sentences. 
● Dealing with the problem posed by the Argument from Donnellan’s 
Distinction by endorsing the Alternative Picture: as has been mentioned at the 
beginning of the present chapter, the problems posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction are the following: 
How does a speaker assert a singular proposition by uttering a sentence 
containing a referentially used definite description even though the 
proposition semantically expressed by the sentence the speaker utters is a 
general proposition? 
And, 
How does a speaker succeed in asserting something true by uttering a 
sentence containing a referentially used definite description which, on 
the Russellian analysis, expresses a false proposition? 
By endorsing the Alternative Picture both of the above problems can be well-answered 
without harming the Russellian analysis of descriptive sentences. For instance, consider 
again Donnellan‘s example of the sentence (27) uttered in the Scenario-1: 
(27) Smith‘s murderer is insane. 
In the given scenario the speaker, when she utters (27), uses the complete definite 
description ―Smith‘s murderer‖ referentially having a particular person, Jones, in mind as 
the referent of the definite description in question. The (Russellian) semantic content of 
(27) is the following: 
(27a) [the x: x murdered Smith] x is insane 
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Now, in the given context in which Jones is the particular person the speaker has in mind 
as her intended referent what the speaker primarily asserts by her utterance of (27) is the 
following pragmatically enriched proposition: 
(27b) [the x: x murdered Smith & x = Jones] x is insane. 
Here, the following proposition: 
(27c) Jones is insane 
should be counted as asserted since it is a necessary and a priori consequence of the 
speaker‘s primary assertion (27b).309 (27c) expresses a singular proposition. That means 
that in the given scenario the speaker has asserted a singular proposition by uttering a 
descriptive sentence, containing a referentially used complete definite description, which 
semantically expresses a general proposition. Russell‘s theory does not have any problem 
to accept this phenomenon. So, here, we have got a satisfactory answer to the first problem 
mentioned above.  
Of course, following Soames,
310
 it can also be shown that the semantic content of 
the sentence (27), in the above context, may be counted as asserted if the following 
proposition in which Jones is identified as a unique murderer of Smith is taken as the 
background presupposition of the conversation: 
(27d) [the x: x murdered Smith] x = Jones. 
That is, although the semantic content of (27), i.e. (27a), is not a necessary and a priori 
consequence of the primary assertion (27b), it is a necessary and a priori consequence of 
(27b) plus (27d); and for that reason it can be counted as asserted. This does not indicate 
a deviation from Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentences as Russell‘s analysis is 
conformable with the idea that by uttering a semantically non-ambiguous sentence a 
speaker may assert more than one proposition. 
 Now, we turn to the second problem posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction. Suppose that there is more than one person who murdered Smith (both the 
speaker and her audience know it) but it is contextually obvious that the speaker is talking 
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about Jones (because Jones is standing on the dock) who appears to be insane. In that case 
the speaker‘s primary assertion, i.e. (27b), and the other assertion, i.e. (27c), arising from 
the primary assertion are true; but the semantic content of (27), i.e. (27a), is false. But this 
is not a problem because, as Soames shows,
311
 in such a case (27d) is not counted as a 
background presupposition, and hence, (27a) should not be counted as asserted. That means 
that in the case just mentioned the speaker may assert something true even though the 
descriptive sentence she utters, which contains a referentially used definite description, 
semantically expresses (on the Russellian analysis) a false proposition.  
Again, if Jones, the accused murderer of Smith, actually has not murdered him 
(the case of misdescription), then (27a), (27b) and (27d) are false. Still, the speaker, in 
such a case, says something true as (27c), which is also counted as asserted by the 
speaker by her utterance of (27), is true. Does the speaker, in the case just mentioned, 
assert something true and something false? A negative answer to this question may be 
given. How? One of the lessons learned from the Gricean maxims is that when several 
pragmatically enriched propositions are otherwise feasible (for being counted as 
asserted), then the one which is the strongest, most informative, most relevant, and for 
which the speaker has adequate evidence should be counted as the one which is asserted 
by the speaker. Following this lesson it may be claimed that in the above case it is the 
proposition expressed in (27c)—which is the strongest, most informative, most relevant, 
and the one for which the speaker has adequate evidence in the given context—which 
should be counted as asserted by the speaker in the above mentioned situation. So, in the 
given context by uttering (27) the speaker asserts something true. However, even if it is 
granted that in the above case the speaker also asserts something false, e.g. (27b), that 
won‘t be a big problem as, in this case, the true assertion, i.e. (27c), is conversationally 
more important than the false assertion, i.e. (27b). Soames says: 
[T]he fact that [in such a case] the speaker has, strictly speaking, asserted 
one or more falsehoods, will matter less than his having asserted an 
important truth.
312
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So, there is no need to amend the Alternative Picture or Russell‘s theory to mitigate the 
above problem. The important thing is that, like the previous cases, in the above case the 
speaker says something true by uttering a sentence containing a referentially used definite 
description even though the sentence semantically expresses a false proposition. Hence, 
this case also supplies a satisfactory answer to the second problem posed by the Argument 
from Donnellan‘s Distinction. 
 The example I have dealt with in this section, i.e. the example concerning the 
sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖, is an example of referentially used complete definite 
description. There are referentially used incomplete definite descriptions too. For example, 
the sentence (36), i.e. ―The murderer is insane‖, which contains the incomplete definite 
description ―the murderer‖ may be, in some contexts, used referentially. In the previous 
section it has already been shown how a speaker by uttering this sentence (and by 
referentially using the incomplete definite description contained in it) may say something 
true even though the semantic content of the sentence in question is false. For the sake of 
brevity I am not repeating here that analysis. At any rate, from the discussion and examples 
analyzed in this section it has become clear that both of the problems posed by the Argument 
from Donnellan‘s Distinction can be well-answered by endorsing the Alternative Picture 
in the place of the Traditional Picture. And, there is no need to amend Russell‘s theory in 
order to deal with these. So, none of the above problems really undermines Russell‘s theory. 
 A critic of the above defense of Russell‘s theory may claim that although the above 
defense of Russell‘s theory seems promising, there is still a problem. She may argue against 
the defense of Russell‘s theory in the following way: in the above defense the conception 
of primary assertion, the conceptions of assertions (other than primary assertions) and 
semantic content as well as the conception of the difference between them play important 
roles. But, there may be cases in which two or more complete propositions are equally 
strong candidates for being the speaker‘s primary assertion in the context of utterance of 
a sentence. Now, the critic may raise the following question: in a context in which two or 
more complete propositions are proper candidates for being the speaker‘s primary assertion, 
which one of them should be counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion? One way of 
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answering this question may be that in such a case, i.e. in a case in which two or more 
complete propositions are proper candidates for being the speaker‘s primary assertion, the 
Gricean maxims of conversational implicature play a role in deciding which one of the 
candidates is the primary assertion made by the speaker in the relevant context. For example, 
consider the following scenario: today is 14
th
 of September 2012; a philosophy-talk is 
running on in the room SS 1252 of the University of Calgary. During the talk, at 11 a.m., 
a person who is very attentively attending the talk hears a little noise, and then, observes 
that a man sitting on the seat numbered 30 is talking with another man sitting at a distance. 
Seeing her frowning, another person who is sitting beside her asks if she can tell him what 
makes her annoyed. She, then, utters (with appropriate gesture) the following sentence: 
(49) The man is talking with another man. 
The semantic content of (49) can be stated in the following way: 
(49a) [the x: x is a man] x is talking with another man. 
Here, (49a) is a complete proposition and may be considered as pragmatically enriched 
by itself.
313
 So, (49a) is a proper candidate for being counted as the speaker‘s primary 
assertion. But in the given scenario the following pragmatically enriched proposition is 
also a proper candidate for being counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion: 
(49b) [the x: x is a man & x is sitting on the seat numbered 30 in the 
room SS 1252 of the University of Calgary at 11 a.m. of 14
th
 
September] x is talking with another man. 
The Gricean maxims, then, enter into the picture: it is natural to think that the speaker and 
her audience in the above mentioned conversation know that there is more than one man 
(in the world or in the domain of discourse), and hence, they know that (49a) is obviously 
false; since it is clear to everyone in the conversation that (49a) is false, it cannot be what 
the speaker is inviting her audience to believe as there is no reason to think that in the 
given context the speaker is not obeying the following Gricean maxim of quality: 
Do not say what you believe to be false.
314
 
                                               
313 Note that according to Soames in some cases the semantic contents of sentences may be counted as 
pragmatically enriched by themselves. 
314 Grice (1975/1989), p. 27. 
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So, (49a) is ruled out from the list of the candidates of being the speaker‘s primary 
assertion. But, the pragmatically enriched proposition (49b) does not violate any of the 
Gricean maxims of conversational implicatures. So, if there is no other candidate for 
being counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion, then (49b) is the primary assertion 
made by the speaker by uttering (49) in the given context. So, in reply to the question 
raised by the critic a defender of the above discussed defense of Russell‘s theory may 
claim that when there are two or more proper candidates for being the speaker‘s primary 
assertion (made by uttering a sentence), the Gricean maxims of conversational 
implicatures may be used to decide which one of the two or more proper candidates is the 
primary assertion made by the speaker by uttering the sentence in the given context. In 
this way the defender of the above defense of Russell‘s theory may claim that the 
problem raised by the critic of the above defense is solved. 
But the above solution to the problem of deciding one from many candidates as 
the speaker‘s primary assertion may not satisfy the critic. She may claim that although 
the Gricean maxims work in some cases, there are many other cases in which the Gricean 
maxims cannot contribute in deciding which one of many proper candidates is the 
speaker‘s primary assertion. For example, suppose a speaker utters the sentence (25), i.e. 
―The table is covered with books‖, in a context in which one of the speaker‘s friends 
wonders (looking at the speaker‘s empty bookshelf) whether he has many books or not. 
Suppose again that (i) there is actually a table covered with books at a small distance 
from the speaker, (ii) the table is the only table owned by the speaker, (iii) the speaker 
bought that table last month, and (iv) the speaker and her audience know and are aware of 
the information stated in (i)-(iii). Now, in the given context, there are, at least, three 
pragmatically enriched propositions which are proper candidates for being counted as the 
speaker‘s primary assertion. These are: 
(25b) [the x: x is a table & x is over there] x is covered with books. 
(25c) [the x: x is a table & x is owned by me] x is covered with books. 
(25d) [the x: x is a table & x was bought last month by me] x is covered 
with books. 
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In the given context, (25b), (25c) and (25d) seem to be equally strong candidates for 
being counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion. But, they are not equivalent; the first 
one, i.e. (25b), picks out a location (by ―over there‖), the second one, i.e. (25c), picks out 
a person, namely the speaker (by ―owned by me‖), and the last one, i.e. (25d), picks out a 
time (by ―bought last month‖). All of them involve different truth-conditions; in one 
circumstance it may the case that (25b) is true but the other two are false, in another 
circumstance it may be the case that (25c) is true and the other two are false and so on. 
Now, it seems that the Gricean maxims are unable to decide which of (25b)-(25d) is the 
primary assertion made by the speaker by uttering (25) in the given context as all of the 
candidates are equally enriched by elements supplemented by the context (the context of 
utterance supplies the information that the table over there is covered with books; it 
equally strongly supplies the information that the only table owned by the speaker is 
covered with books, and it supplies, no less strongly, the information that the table which 
was bought last month is covered with books) in which the sentence (25) is uttered. And, 
the Alternative Picture as well as the defense of Russell‘s theory made by means of the 
Alternative Picture provide no principled way by which one of the competing 
pragmatically enriched propositions can be selected as the primary assertion made by the 
speaker by uttering the sentence in the given context. At this point a defender of the 
Alternative Picture may claim that it is not necessary to single out one pragmatically 
enriched proposition from a number of competing candidates as the primary assertion 
made by the speaker by uttering a sentence. For, it is plain that by uttering a non-
ambiguous sentence a speaker may make more than one assertion; and there is nothing 
wrong in allowing that sometimes the speaker may also make more than one primary 
assertion by uttering a non-ambiguous sentence. Soames seems to take the matter in this 
way.
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 But this defense of the Alternative Picture may not satisfy the critic either. Here, 
                                               
315 Recall Soames‘ formulation of the Alternative Picture: ―If M is a meaning (or semantic content) of an 
indexical-free sentence S, then normal, literal uses of S (without conversational implicatures that force 
reinterpretation of the utterance) result in assertions of propositions that are proper pragmatic enrichments 
of M. ...‖ (Soames (2009a), p. 281. (my emphases)). Here, Soames‘ uses of the words ―assertions‖ and 
―propositions‖ in plural indicate that he allows the idea that a speaker may make two or more primary 
assertions by uttering a non-ambiguous sentence in a context. 
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she may attract our attention to the fact that one of the reasons for why the Elliptical 
Approach—which has been proposed to defend Russell‘s theory—has been rejected 
(discussed in the third chapter of the present dissertation) is the phenomenon that there is 
no principled way of selecting one of the possible fuller descriptions (e.g. ―the table I 
own‖, ―the table over there‖) as the genuine completer of the incomplete definite 
description ―the table‖ contained in the sentence ―The table is covered with books‖. Now, 
by parity of reasoning, the critic may claim that the above defense of Russell‘s theory 
made by means of the Alternative Picture, just like the previously proposed defense of 
Russell‘s theory made by the Explicit Approach, should be rejected. 
 In order to evaluate the points made by the critic of the Alternative Picture I 
prefer to distinguish between two views that are proposed by the Alternative Picture. The 
first view proposed by the Alternative Picture consists of two claims, namely that there is 
a gap between the meaning (or semantic content) of a sentence and the assertions the 
speaker makes by using that sentence, and that what is meant by a sentence may be 
different from what is asserted by the speaker by using that sentence. And, like the first 
view, the second view proposed by the Alternative picture consists of two claims, namely 
that the primary assertions made by a speaker by using a sentence are built by 
pragmatically enriching (with contextual supplementations) the semantic content of the 
sentence in question, and that other propositions that are counted as asserted are obvious, 
relevant, necessary and a priori consequences of the primary assertions made by the 
speaker by uttering the sentence. About the second view, I agree with the critic that 
neither the Alternative Picture nor the Gricean maxims provide a principled way by 
which one pragmatically enriched proposition from a number of candidates can be 
singled out as the speaker‘s primary assertion. The thought that it is not needed to single 
out one pragmatically enriched proposition from a number of candidates as the speaker 
may make more than one primary assertion by using a non-ambiguous sentence cannot be 
given a blank check. For, it is plain that in a given context there may be some 
pragmatically enriched propositions which are true and relevant but are not eligible to be 
counted as primary assertions made by a speaker by uttering a sentence in that context. 
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For example, suppose a person, say Jones, attended a dinner party last night, held in 
River Café, with some of his friends. Suppose again that yesterday it was Friday, 14
th
 of 
September 2012 and that Jones‘ friends were aware of it. Jones, though he knew the date, 
was not aware about the day. Now, today, one of Jones‘ friends, say Black, who attended 
the dinner last night with Jones asks ―How was the dinner party?‖ and Jones replies by 
uttering the following sentence: 
(50) The dinner party was nice. 
Now, we see, in the given context, the following are some pragmatically enriched 
propositions which are built by pragmatically enriching the semantic content of (50) by 
elements supplemented by the context: 
(50a) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held last night in River Café) 
& Jones and Black, among others, attended in x] x was nice. 
(50b) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held on the night of 14
th
 of 
September 2012 in River Café) & Jones and Black, among others, 
attended in x] x was nice. 
(50c) [the x: (x was a dinner party & x was held last Friday night in River 
Café) & Jones and Black, among others, attended in x] x was nice. 
Here, all, i.e. (50a), (50b) and (50c), are complete propositions and are seemingly equally 
strong candidates for being the primary assertion made by the speaker by uttering (50). I 
agree with the thought that in some cases more than one proposition may be counted as 
the primary assertions made by the speaker by uttering a sentence. From that point of 
view I agree that both of (50a) and (50b) may be counted as the speaker‘s primary 
assertions made by uttering (50) in the given context. But about (50c), I think, although it 
is true and like (50a) and (50b) it is built by enriching the semantic content of (50) by 
elements supplemented by the context of utterance of (50), it cannot be counted as one of 
the primary assertions made by the speaker by uttering (50) in the given context. For, a 
person cannot (primarily) assert a proposition without knowing (or without being aware 
of) that she is asserting that proposition.
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 So, Jones, by uttering the sentence (50), has 
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 Assertions are made by speakers. So, if a speaker does not know (or is not aware of) a proposition, then 
she does not assert that proposition. A speaker may use a sentence to assert something even without 
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not asserted (50c) as he is not aware of the fact that the day on which the party was held 
was Friday. Two lessons are learned from the above example: (i) not all relevant 
pragmatically enriched propositions can be counted as the speaker‘s primary assertion 
made by uttering a sentence in a context, and (ii) either a principled way of selecting 
which of many candidates are the primary assertions made by the speaker by uttering a 
sentence in a context or a principled way of eliminating some of the candidates of being 
the speaker‘s primary assertions is required. The second view proposed by the 
Alternative Picture—i.e. the view concerning the claims that the primary assertions made 
by a speaker by using a sentence are built by pragmatically enriching (with contextual 
supplementations) the semantic content of the sentence in question, and that other 
propositions that are counted as asserted are obvious, relevant, necessary and a priori 
consequences of the primary assertions made by the speaker by uttering the sentence—is 
not unconformable to (i); but the lack of a principled way of selecting which ones of 
many candidates are the primary assertions made by the speaker or the lack of a 
principled way of eliminating some of the candidates of being the speaker‘s primary 
assertions makes the view incomplete and open for criticism. 
 However, the incompleteness of the second view proposed by the Alternative 
Picture does not affect the first view—i.e. the view concerning the claims that there is a 
gap between the meaning (or semantic content) of a sentence and the assertions made by 
the speaker by using that sentence, and that what is meant by a sentence may be different 
from what is asserted by the speaker by using that sentence—proposed by the Alternative 
Picture. Although it is true that we do not have a principled way of selecting one or more 
propositions (or eliminating one or more propositions) from a number of candidates for 
being counted as the speaker‘s primary assertions made by uttering a sentence in a 
context, it cannot be denied that the primary assertions (and the other assertions as well) 
made by a speaker by uttering a sentence in a context may differ from the semantic 
                                                                                                                                            
knowing the (semantic) meaning of the sentence used; but she cannot use a sentence to assert something 
without knowing what she asserts by using the sentence in question. An assertion involves the knowledge 
of (or the awareness of) what is asserted. 
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content of the sentence uttered. There is clear evidence that favor this claim. Recall the 
examples of the sentences (25), (27), (33), (36), (47)-(50) discussed in this chapter. In 
each of these examples it has been observed that a speaker may assert something which 
differs from the semantic content of the sentence she uttered. These examples involve 
either sentences containing definite descriptions or singular sentences. But these 
examples must not lead us to the thought that the first view proposed by the Alternative 
Picture is true only when the concerned sentence is either a singular sentence or a 
sentence containing a definite description. Rather, it is true of other sort of sentences too. 
For example, suppose, Mr. Y, a professor of Philosophy working in the University of 
Calgary, teaches the course titled PHIL 501. Today, in his lecture, he talks about a 
seminar to be held tomorrow in the room SS 1252 of the University of Calgary. He wants 
that all of his students attend the seminar. Having that in mind, he utters the following 
sentence: 
(51) Every student must attend tomorrow‘s seminar. 
Here, (51) is not a singular but a general sentence containing the quantifier ―every 
student‖. The semantic content of (51) is the following: 
(51a) [Every x: x is a student] x must attend tomorrow‘s seminar. 
But, obviously, by uttering (51) Mr. Y is not asserting that anyone in the world who is a 
student must attend the seminar he mentioned. Rather, what he asserts by uttering (51) is 
that any student who takes the course PHIL 501, taught by him, must attend the seminar 
he mentioned. That is, by uttering (51) in the given context, Mr. Y actually asserts the 
following proposition: 
(51b) [Every x: x is a student & x takes the course PHIL 501 taught by 
Mr. Y] x must attend the seminar to be held tomorrow in the room 
SS 1252 of the University of Calgary. 
It is plain that (51b) is not identical with (51a). So, the claims that there is a gap between 
the semantic content of a sentence and the primary assertions (and the other assertions as 
well) made by the speaker by using that sentence, and that the speaker may assert 
something by uttering a sentence which is different from the semantic content of the 
sentence used are true not only of singular sentences and sentences containing definite 
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descriptions but also of other sort of sentences. In short, the first view proposed by the 
Alternative Picture is a theory about language in general which is not specific to singular 
sentences and descriptive sentences. 
 Now, in order to defend Russell‘s theory by means of the Alternative Picture 
(henceforth the Alternative Picture Defense) a defender of Russell‘s theory does not need 
to be concerned about how one or more propositions from a number of candidates can be 
selected as the speaker‘s assertions made by uttering a sentence in a context. That is, the 
issue concerning whether or not there is a principled way of selecting (or eliminating) 
some of the candidates for being counted as asserted by the speaker is irrelevant to the 
Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory. For, Russell‘s theory is a theory about 
the semantic content of a descriptive sentence which has nothing to do with the assertions 
made by a speaker by uttering a descriptive sentence in a particular context. So, to 
constitute the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory what one needs is just to 
make it clear that the semantic content of a descriptive sentence may differ from the 
assertions a speaker makes by uttering it in a particular context. And, the first view 
proposed by the Alternative Picture does it quite properly.  
 A question may be raised here: does the problem faced by the second view 
proposed by the Alternative Picture—i.e. the problem that there is no principled way of 
selecting (or eliminating) one or more propositions from a number of candidates for being 
counted as asserted by a speaker by uttering a sentence in a context—somehow affect the 
Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory? A critic of the Alternative Picture Defense 
may claim that it does. As we have seen earlier, the critic may attract our attention to one 
of the reasons—namely the phenomenon that there is no principled way of selecting one 
of the possible fuller descriptions as the genuine completer of a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description—for why the Explicit Approach (henceforth the Explicit 
Approach Defense of Russell‘s theory) has been rejected; and then, by parity of  reasoning 
she may claim that the Alternative Picture Defense should be rejected for its failure of 
providing a principled way of selecting (or eliminating) one or more candidates for being 
counted as asserted by a speaker by uttering a sentence in a particular context. I have two 
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observations about this claim: first, the critic misses the point that the second view proposed 
by the Alternative Picture is not a part of the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s 
theory. One may reject the second view proposed by the Alternative Picture, and still, 
proceed to defend Russell‘s theory by means of the first view proposed by the Alternative 
Picture.
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 Second, the issue concerning the lack of any principled way of selecting one of 
many possible fuller descriptions as the genuine completer of a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description (i.e. the issue raised against the Explicit Approach 
Defense of Russell‘s theory) and the issue concerning the lack of any principled way of 
selecting (or eliminating) one or more propositions from a number of candidates for 
being counted as the speaker‘s primary assertions (i.e. the issue raised against the 
Alternative Defense of Russell‘s theory)—though apparently similar—are significantly 
different. The former involves the semantic content or the meaning of the relevant 
sentence whereas the latter involves not the semantic content or meaning of the relevant 
sentence but the assertions made by the speaker of the sentence in question. In the former 
case, the lack of any principled way of selecting one of many possible fuller descriptions 
as the genuine completer of a sentence containing an incomplete definite description makes 
the Explicit Approach Defense incapable of defending Russell‘s theory. For, if there is no 
such principled way, then it seems that either we have to accept that none of the possible 
fuller descriptions is the genuine completer of the relevant incomplete definite description or 
we have to accept that all of them are genuine completers of the relevant incomplete 
definite description. If none of the possible fuller descriptions is the genuine completer of 
                                               
317 One may endorse the idea that by uttering a sentence a speaker makes one primary assertion and that is 
why a principled way of selecting the primary assertion from two or more proper candidates is required, 
and due to the lack of any such principled way the Alternative Picture is not a plausible theory about the 
speaker‘s assertion. Still she may endorse the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s semantic analysis of 
descriptive sentences by granting the first view proposed by the Alternative Picture. Again, one may endorse 
the idea that by uttering a sentence a speaker may make more than one primary assertion and that no 
principled way of selecting (or eliminating) one (or few) from many proper candidates of primary 
assertions is required, and hence the lack of any such principled way does not undermine the second view 
proposed by the Alternative Picture as a theory about the speaker‟s assertion. And, she may endorse the 
Alternative Picture to defend Russell‘s semantic analysis of descriptive sentences. So, what position one 
takes about the second view proposed by the Alternative Picture does not affect the Alternative Picture 
Defense of Russell‘s theory about the semantic meaning of sentences containing definite descriptions.   
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the relevant incomplete definite description, then the problem of incompleteness remains 
and hence Russell‘s theory is not defended. Again, if all of the possible fuller descriptions 
are treated as genuine completers of the relevant incomplete definite description, then a 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description becomes an ambiguous sentence. For 
example, if in a context, both ―the table over there‖ and ―the table I own‖ are genuine 
completers of the incomplete definite description ―the table‖, then in the relevant context 
both of the following propositions: 
(25b) [the x: x is a table & x is over there] x is covered with books 
(25c) [the x: x is a table & x is owned by me] x is covered with books 
are semantic contents or meanings of the sentence ―The table is covered with books‖. 
This, thus, makes the sentence semantically ambiguous. But, according to Russell‘s 
theory a sentence containing a definite description has exactly one meaning—it is not 
semantically ambiguous. So, Russell‘s theory cannot be defended by taking all of the 
possible fuller descriptions as genuine completers of the relevant incomplete definite 
description. At any rate, due to the lack of a principled way of selecting one of many 
possible fuller descriptions as the genuine completer of a sentence containing an 
incomplete definite description, the Explicit Approach Defense fails to defend Russell‘s 
theory. But the lack of any principled way of selecting one of many possible 
pragmatically enriched propositions as the speaker‘s primary assertion does not 
undermine the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory as, in this case, the lack of 
any such principled way involves the assertions made by a speaker by uttering a sentence, 
not the semantic content of the sentence uttered. For example, in the above context in 
which the sentence (25) is uttered the Alternative Picture treats the propositions (25b) and 
(25c) as pragmatically enriched propositions which may be counted as the speaker‘s 
primary assertions. If both of the pragmatically enriched propositions are counted as the 
speaker‘s primary assertions in the given context, that won‘t make the sentence 
semantically ambiguous. For, in this case, the following proposition: 
(25e) [the x: x is a table] x is covered with book 
is the only proposition which is counted as the semantic content of the sentence (25). This 
outcome conforms to Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentence according to which the 
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sentence (25) has exactly one meaning and that meaning is identical with (25e). In short, 
the problem faced by the second view proposed by the Alternative Picture does not affect 
the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory as the second view proposed by the 
Alternative Picture is not a part of the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory; 
even if it had a bearing on the Alternative Picture Defense, that would not be something 
inconsistent with the defense (of Russell‘s theory) made by the Alternative Picture Defense. 
 Concerning the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory, it is interesting to 
note that the problems posed by the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from 
Donnellan‘s Distinction have been accounted for by the same theory of language, namely 
the Alternative Picture. But this phenomenon should not lead one to think that the relationship 
between an incomplete definite description of the form ―the F‖ and a referentially used 
definite description of the form ―the F‖ is very tight, e.g. the incompleteness of a definite 
description is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for the referential use of that 
definite description. The relationship between an incomplete definite description and a 
referential use of it is not actually that tight. As has been shown in the second chapter of this 
dissertation, there are incomplete definite descriptions (e.g. ―the thief‖ in the sentence ―The 
thief has stolen my dictionary‖, when the speaker does not have any idea about who the 
thief is) which are used attributively; there are complete definite descriptions (e.g. 
―Smith‘s murderer‖ in the sentence ―Smith‘s murderer is insane‖ uttered in Donnellan‘s 
Scenario-2) which are used referentially. That is, a definite description may be used 
referentially even though it is not incomplete (so, the incompleteness of a definite description 
is not a necessary condition for its referential use); again, an incomplete definite description 
may be used non-referentially, i.e. attributively (so, the incompleteness of a definite 
description is not a sufficient condition for its referential use). Hence, the incompleteness 
of a definite description is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its referential 
use, and so, their relationship should not be counted as a very tight relationship. In the same 
chapter it has been claimed that although the relationship between them is not that tight, it 
should not be thought that there is no significant relationship between them. There is a 
significant relationship between them. And we now see that relationship: by uttering a 
sentence containing an incomplete definite description or a sentence containing a 
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referentially used definite description the speaker, in the relevant context, normally asserts 
a proposition(s) which is pragmatically richer (pragmatically enriched) than the semantic 
content of the sentence in question (the semantic content of the sentence in question may 
or may not belong to the assertions the speaker makes by uttering such a sentence). That 
is, in both cases the speaker‘s assertions may be different from the semantic contents of the 
relevant sentences. This is a sort of relationship between them. And I take it as a significant 
relationship because it is relevant to the problems posed by the Argument from 
Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction. At the heart of the 
problems posed by both of the arguments is the incorrect conception that what is said by a 
sentence (i.e. the semantic content of the sentence) is also what is said by the speaker (i.e. the 
assertions made by the speaker) of that sentence. Since, the problem posed by the Argument 
from Incompleteness and the problems posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction both are rooted into the same incorrect conception (the Traditional Picture), 
they can be accounted for by the same theory, namely the Alternative Picture. 
At any rate, from the whole discussion and examinations made in this dissertation 
we have found: 
1. The descriptive sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
 semantically expresses the 
following general proposition: exactly one thing is an F, and whatever 
is an F is G.
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2. When 
┌
the F
┐
, used in the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
, is an incomplete 
definite description, a speaker may use the sentence 
┌ 
The F is G
┐
 to 
say something true even though, on the Russellian analysis, in such a 
case 
┌
The F is G
┐ 
may semantically express a false proposition (due 
to the failure of satisfying the uniqueness condition). How it happens 
has become a problematic issue for the Russellian analysis of 
sentences containing definite descriptions.
319
 
3. When 
┌
the F
┐
, in the sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
, is used referentially, a 
speaker may assert a singular proposition, e.g. o is G, by uttering 
┌
The F is G
┐
 even though, on the Russellian analysis, 
┌
The F is G
┐
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 Discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
319 Discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
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expresses a general proposition. Besides, a speaker may use the 
sentence 
┌
The F is G
┐
, in which 
┌
the F
┐
 is used referentially, to say 
something true of her intended referent even when her intended 
referent does not fit the referentially used definite description 
┌
the F
┐
. 
These phenomena pose problems for the Russellian analysis of 
descriptive sentences.
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4. Although the problem mentioned in (2) does not prove that sentences 
containing definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous, most of 
the attempts that are taken to solve the problem end up with a 
failure.
321
 
5. The problem mentioned in (3) indicates that some descriptive 
sentences which contain referentially used definite descriptions may 
have referential meanings in addition to their (attributive) meanings 
indicated by Russell‘s theory. But Russell‘s theory does not allow any 
ambiguity in descriptive sentence. In that case the issue of how the so-
called referential meaning with which a referentially used definite is 
used by a speaker on a particular occasion can be accounted for has 
become a problematic issue for Russell‘s theory.322 
Here, (2) and (4) indicate what I have called the problem posed by the Argument from 
Incompleteness; (3) and (5) indicate what I have called the problem posed by the Argument 
from Donnellan‘s Distinction. However, we also have the following two things: 
(a) A test
323
, namely the cancellability test, which, along with the 
Distinguishing Criteria, namely DC-1 and DC-2, shows that the 
phenomenon arising from Donnellan‘s distinction actually raises an 
issue of pragmatics, not of semantics. More precisely, the cancellability 
test and DC-2 show that the so-called referential meaning arising 
from Donnellan‘s distinction is a pragmatic meaning with which the 
relevant descriptive sentence is used by a speaker on a particular 
occasion; it is not a semantic meaning of the relevant sentence, 
although the speaker may use the relevant sentence with that meaning 
                                               
320 Discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
321 Discussed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
322
 Discussed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
323 Proposed and defended in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
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on a particular occasion. So, no question of semantic ambiguity arises 
here. Hence, the problems indicated by (3) and (5), i.e. the problems 
posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction, are gone. 
 (b) A theory of language, namely the Alternative Picture, which concerns 
the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the assertions 
made by the speaker of that sentence.
324
 This theory consists of two 
views the first one of which accounts for the phenomenon arising 
from (2) and (4), i.e. the problem posed by the Argument from 
Incompleteness, keeping Russell‘s analysis of descriptive sentence 
intact. Besides, it accounts for the phenomenon arising from (3) and 
(5), i.e. the problems posed by the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction, too without harming the Russellian analysis of descriptive 
sentences. The defense of Russell‘s theory made by means of the first 
view proposed by the Alternative Picture has been called, in this 
dissertation, the Alternative Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory. 
So, we see, neither the Argument from Incompleteness nor the Argument from Donnellan‘s 
Distinction poses a genuine threat to Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. When we 
apply the test and the criterion mentioned above, we find that the apparent problems posed 
by the two arguments are not even relevant to Russell‘s semantic theory concerning the 
semantic meaning of descriptive sentences; they are rather relevant to pragmatics and are 
required to be addressed by a pragmatic theory of language. As a semantic theory of 
language Russell‘s theory does not need to address the issues they raise. And when we 
endorse the first view proposed by the Alternative Picture and, then, go with the Alternative 
Picture Defense of Russell‘s theory, we find that the phenomena arising from the 
Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction can easily 
be accounted for. So, the problems they pose are not genuine but pseudo problems for 
Russell‘s theory; the phenomena arising from them can easily be accounted for by Russell‘s 
theory of definite descriptions without harming the semantic analysis of descriptive 
sentences it gives. In simple words, the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument 
from Donnellan‘s Distinction fail to undermine Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions.    
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 Endorsed from Soames (2009a), p. 281 and Soames (2005), p. 19, and discussed and defended in the present 
chapter of this dissertation. 
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 Finally, in his theory of definite descriptions Bertrand Russell offers a semantic 
analysis of descriptive sentences of the form ―The F is G‖. His aim is to explain what a 
sentence of the form ―The F is G‖ means in various contexts of its use, not what the 
speaker asserts by using that sentence in particular contexts. What a sentence means (the 
sentence-meaning) and what a speaker asserts (the speaker‘s assertion) by that sentence 
in a particular context are different things and are, often, diverged—the sentence-
meaning may not belong to what is asserted by the speaker of the relevant sentence, and 
what is asserted by the speaker may differ from the sentence-meaning of the sentence in 
question. The pseudo problems posed by the Argument from Incompleteness and the 
Argument from Donnellan‘s Distinction are rooted in our ignorance of the distinction 
between these two concepts, i.e. the sentence-meaning and the speaker‘s assertion, which 
leads us unwarrantedly mixing them together. Once we get rid of this ignorance and 
avoid mixing the sentence-meaning and the speaker‘s meaning, we see that Russell‘s 
theory of definite descriptions is, to a large extent, correct. Because of its correctness 
Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions—more than a century after its introduction—
continues to be the most dominant theory concerning the semantic analysis of descriptive 
sentences in the study of philosophy of language. In 1929 F. P. Ramsey, in a footnote in 
the section ―Philosophy‖ of his ―Last Papers‖, described Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions as a paradigm of philosophy.
325
 Today, more than eighty years after that 
pronouncement, it may safely be said that Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions is a 
paradigm in the study of philosophy of language that has not shifted yet.   
▓▓▓
                                               
325 F. P. Ramsey, ―Last Papers‖ The Foundation of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, ed. Richard 
Bevan Braithwaite, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.(1931; reprinted in 2000 and 2001; the paper 
was written in 1929), p. 263. 
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